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Abstract 
The railway industry has foregone important changes in the last years, 
due to the European reform aimed at its liberalization. A number of 
studies analyze the qualitative differences across countries, because 
each Member State has some degree of discretion as the European 
directives provide only for the main principles (Seabright, 2003; 
Newbery, 1999; Gomez-Ibanez, 2003; Gomez-Ibanez e De Rus, 2007). 
But as for the effect of the reform, the analysis are still limited (Friebel, 
2008; Quinet, 2006; Schmutzler and Lalive, 2008) and also from a 
theoretical point of view, only few papers consider the railway industry 
(De Villemeur et al. 2003). 
Therefore, the aim of the thesis is to investigate some interesting and 
important aspects of the railway sector. In particular, I first focus on the 
role of private or public ownership to incentive investments in rolling 
stock and second on the issue of public service obligations.  
The thesis is organized as follows: the introduction illustrates main 
provisions of the European reform and highlights the characteristics of 
the sector. 
The first chapter reviews the literature on public-private partnerships 
with reference to the issue of bundling or unbundling of different 
phases of a project. The interest for this kind of arrangement is related 
to the question of how to solve the problem of scarcity of rolling stock 
that appears to affect the competitive selection of the service provider. 
In the second chapter I present a model to study what the effect of the 
ownership of the rolling stock is on the incentive of the provider of the 
service to invest also in the case of asymmetric information over the 
cost. In this latter case a trade off emerges between the effect of the 
investment and the rent from asymmetric information 
In the second part of the thesis I analyze the issue of public service 
obligation. In chapter three I present a review of the literature about the 
universal service, a concept close to public service obligation but 
formally applied only in the telecommunications and in the postal 
sector. In the forth chapter, I consider the effect of PSO on total welfare 
according to different market structures and in particular when a PSO 
fund is set up. I analyze welfare effect both under complete information 
and under asymmetric information over demand. It appears that the set 
up of a PSO fund grants welfare gains also under asymmetric 
information.  
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Introduction 
At the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s some member States of the 
European Union started to restructure the railway sector and to reform 
the regulatory framework in order to open up rail markets. 
In order to understand the rationale for European reform, a brief 
overview of the characteristics of the sector is useful. 
The demand for rail transport is usually defined as a derived demand, 
as it derives from the more general need of mobility. The utility of the 
consumers depends on both the preferences for the characteristics of 
the service, such as speed, comfort and reliability and also on the travel 
purpose. In economic analysis, consumers are usually distinguished 
into time sensitive or price sensitive, roughly corresponding to business 
traveller and leisure traveller. 
Empirical studies on demand elasticity (see for example Winston, 1985; 
Oum et al., 1990) show very low values, at least in the short-run and 
this is true both when considering only rail services and competing 
mode of transport. This result suggests that once the consumer has 
chosen a type of service, he is not willing to change it in the short run. 
However, in the long run demand elasticities are higher. An evidence 
of this result is the decrease in the share of railway in the transport 
sector, but it is difficult to understand how much of this change is due 
to modification of relative prices or to travel times. 
The supply side is characterized by a high product differentiation and 
substitutability, as each route can be defined as a single product, but 
there also exist alternative as (in most of the cases) the same origin-
destination can be connected using another path.   
As for costs, variable costs are mainly fuel and maintenance 
expenditure, which depend on the speed and on the number of 
wagons, a proxy for the number of passengers. Fixed costs are related 
for example to crew wages, depreciation of the rolling stock and 
infrastructure costs charged to the train operator. 
The literature distinguishes between economies of densities and 
economies of size (Seabright et al., 2003). 
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The first refer to the change in costs due to the increase in traffic, given 
the network. The latter represents the change in costs given the density, 
but varying the network. 
Empirical analysis highlights the existence of economies of density, as 
if traffic increases on a certain network, the passenger – kilometre cost 
decreases, while the results for economies of size are not clear cut. For 
example, Cantos (2001) find that returns to density for the main 
European operators vary from 1.42 to 2.04, while returns to scale vary 
between 0.45 to 1.4. 
Another important feature of railways are externalities, such as 
environmental and congestion externalities. If it is quite clear what we 
are referring to with environmental externalities, it is probably less 
obvious the concept of congestion. 
Congestion occurs when the delay of a train induces delays for the 
other trains and it could be due to accidents or incidents on a line and it 
is strictly related to the rail capacity, whose use depends on the 
allocation among trains with different speed. 
We now turn to the provisions of European directives. 
At the European Community level, the White Paper in 1996 on rail 
transport laid down the strategic principles aimed at revitalising the 
railway sector in order to increase its competitiveness and 
attractiveness with customers. The Community Transport White Paper 
of 2001 defined a political target of maintaining the 1998 rail modal 
share by the year 2010. In order to reach this target the Community rail 
policy aims at ensuring non-discriminatory market access and 
transparent market structures, providing incentives for an efficient 
infrastructure use, contributing to a sustainable financial restructuring 
of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers, triggering a 
positive rail market development. 
European Union countries agreed on the opening and integration of the 
formerly closed monopoly railway markets. In freight transport, an 
open access approach was chosen in order to obtain competition “on 
the tracks”. In passenger transport, the approach proposed by the 
European Commission consisted in open access for international 
services and in regulated competition, for instance, for urban services 
through the tendering of franchises or public service contracts 
(competition for the tracks). 
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Moreover, separation between infrastructure management and 
transport service provision is required: as a minimum, this separation 
must be done for the essential functions so as to ensure non-
discriminatory network access such as capacity allocation and setting of 
track access charges. 
In the European Union, the first step made to achieve fully open and 
integrated rail markets was the rail interoperability and rail 
infrastructure package directives of 2001. 
The directive on interoperability of conventional rail systems (Directive 
2001/16/EC) describes, similarly to the high-speed rail directive 
(Directive 96/48/EC), a process of technical harmonisation of the 
railway based on Technical Specifications for Interoperability. 
The three directives of the infrastructure package (the first railway 
package), defined the access rights to use rail infrastructure for 
international freight services, the various conditions railway firms must 
fulfil to be able to benefit from the access rights, the independence of 
functions essential for ensuring non-discriminatory access and the 
possibilities of appeal that the market actors should have. 
The second legislative railway package was adopted in 2004; it 
provided for full open access for all kinds of rail freight services, a 
common approach to European rail safety, extending the scope of the 
interoperability directives and the setting up of a European Railway 
Agency (ERA) with the aim of driving forward the technical 
implementation of the EU safety and interoperability approach. 
In 2007, the European Commission adopted the third railway package, 
for the opening up of international passenger services. This package 
wants to improve the rights of passengers using international services, 
establishes a certification system for locomotive drivers and steps up 
the quality of freight services.  
Each EU member can choose how to implement the regulatory 
framework, but they certainly have to respect basic principles as 
transparency and independence of essential infrastructure management 
functions for non-discriminatory access (e.g. capacity allocation, setting 
of track access charges). 
A lot of studies compare and illustrate different kind of organization 
chosen by countries (Seabright, 2003; Newbery, 1999; Gomez-Ibanez, 
2003; Gomez-Ibanez e De Rus, 2007).  
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As for the effect of the reform, the analyses are still limited. From a 
qualitative point of view, the liberalization index elaborated by IBM 
(2002, 2004, and 2007) gives a measure of how much markets have been 
liberalized. The liberalization index takes into account the level of 
access both in terms of what the law provides for and what the law in 
action is. According to this index all countries improved their 
liberalization level, even if there are strong differences among them.  
The group of advanced countries is composed of Great Britain, 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
There are only few empirical studies about the effect of the reform. 
Friebel et al. (2008) use World Bank data from 1980 to 2003 to estimate 
the effect of open access, independent regulation and vertical 
separation on railway operators’ performance. They find a positive 
effect on technical efficiency around 0.5% per year and they also 
highlight the importance of sequential adoption of the reforms. The 
intuition for this latter result is quite clear as the sequential 
implementation gives the opportunity to better adapt the organization 
to the need of the sector. Unfortunately this data cannot measure the 
opening of the markets concretely, but only according to provisions of 
law.  
Friebel et al. also study the evolution of the relative efficiency of 
European countries along time and it appears that The Netherlands are 
the most advanced countries. Together with The Netherlands, France, 
Denmark and Spain, Italy is among the countries that maintain a high 
position throughout the period. 
Quinet’s analysis (2006) also controls for the effect of the high speed 
trains but the results are not far from Friebel et al.. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze some aspects of the railway industry 
using the tools of the theory of incentives, because the relation between 
the regulator or a transport authority and the railway operator involves 
a delegation problem. In particular, we examine the issue of how to 
how to incentive investment in rolling stocks and how to satisfy public 
service obligations. Both this issues are subject to a problem of 
asymmetric information. In the first case the railway operator has 
private information over cost and in the second over demand. 
The thesis is organized as follows: the first chapter presents a review of 
the literature about public-private partnership with particular reference 
to the case for separation or bundling of different phases of a project. In 
  5
the second chapter, we consider the incentive to invest in the railway 
industry if the rolling stocks are owned by the operator or by the public 
authority. The study is presented both in the case of complete 
information and with a problem of adverse selection concerning the 
operator selected to provide the service. It appears that it is not possible 
to define ex ante if public or private ownership induces more 
investment as it depends on the trade off between the cost of public 
funds and the distortion induced by asymmetric information. 
The last two chapters are dedicated to the issue of public service 
obligations (PSO). 
We first review the literature about universal service, mainly referred 
to the telecommunications and the postal sector and then present a 
model to illustrate the effect on welfare of different market structures if 
one of the firms is constrained by public service obligation.  
One of the proposed solutions to the financing issue of the obligations 
is the set up of a public service obligations fund, where all the 
operators contribute with a share of their profits. Even under 
asymmetric information, the PSO fund leads to higher welfare. 
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Chapter 1 
Public-Private Partnerships 
1. Introduction 
A public-private partnership1 (PPP) is a contractual agreement between 
the public and the private sectors, whereby the private operator 
commits to provide public services that have traditionally been 
supplied or financed by public institutions.  
The rationale for using PPPs is usually claimed to be a series of 
advantages as, among others, the more efficient allocation of risk, faster 
implementation and the improvement in the quality of services. The 
adoption of PPP is also linked to the opportunity to exploit the specific 
abilities and efficiency of private sector, but controlling for the quality 
level of the service. 
The adoption of PPPs is increasing. In the European Union (Riess, 2005) 
PPPs for roads, bridges, and tunnels account for  about 83% of all PPP 
total value (• 31.5 billion for the period 1995-2003), with rail transport 
and airports making up 5% and 7%, respectively. Data from U.K. show 
that in railway sector PPPs account for about 51% of the total value of 
contracts and more than one third (37%) is represented by the three 
London Underground projects2. 
Even if from a quantitative point of view, public-private partnerships 
do not represent a substantial part of total investments, they certainly 
are very interesting from a qualitative point of view.  
In what follows, we first propose an overview of the different models 
of partnerships. Then focus on the main insights of the literature about 
the bundling or unbundling of various phases of the project and finally 
look at how theory fits with empirical evidence. 
                                                                 
1 DG Internal Policies of the Union, 2006 
2 The Channel Tunnel Rail Link account for about 12% , but it is no 
longer listed as PPP by the U.K. government 
  7
2. Models of PPP 
There exists a wide range of agreements belonging to PPPs. According 
to the Green Paper (2004) they can be divided into institutional and 
contractual PPPs.  
The first type of agreement entails the creation of a new entity which is 
jointly held by the public and the private operators. 
If there is only an agreement between the private and the public sector 
to provide a service in exchange for some form of compensation, then it 
is a contractual PPP.  
One of the main features is how the risk is shared between private and 
public sector and in general among parties. 
The assessment of what kind of risk is involved at which stage is 
central in the evaluation of the project. 
In the building stage, concerns may emerge about the delay of 
completion of the project and therefore of the beginning of cash flows 
or about cost overruns. 
At the operating phase difficulties may emerge because of traffic or 
revenues not in line with previous forecasts or because of international 
contingencies that affect interest rate or exchange rate. 
To sum up, with the expression risk we refer not only to the demand or 
the financial risk, but also to the construction risk, related to the design 
and construction phase, to the performance or availability risk related 
to the delivery or availability of the assets as defined by the contract 
and the residual value risk related to the future market price of the 
assets.  
Besides these business risks, there are risks associated with the 
interactions with the public sector as for example changes in regulatory 
or legal environment.  
In the rest of this section, we describe the phases that usually compose 
a PPP and which are the feasible arrangements. 
2.1. The steps of a Public-Private Partnership 
Different models of PPPs can be set up. Even if each of them has its 
specificities, we can identify the main steps and which issues can arise. 
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 The entire process can by divided into: 
• tendering, 
• building and financing, 
• operational phase, 
• renegotiation. 
In the tendering phase, the public partner has to define exactly which 
service or assets have to be delivered. It has to give a description of 
both the outcome and of the quality. 
If the quality is measurable then it should establish standards or 
benchmarks. 
But in some cases it is not possible to measure it, so a valid alternative 
is the so-called competitive dialogue. With this procedure, introduced 
with Directive 2004/18/EC, all bidders have to submit their own 
solution to deliver the assets or the service. Main concerns with 
competitive dialogue are related to the incentive for the bidder to 
reveal detailed information if he thinks that the idea will be 
implemented by one of the other bidder. This issue explains why 
competitive dialogue is often a very long and complex procedure. 
In the building phase the main problem is related to possible wrong 
estimation of costs, while the financing phase is more complex and 
subject to numerous risks as we will see in more details later. 
In the operational phase, the private party usually plays the main role, 
but the public sector keeps on monitoring the activity. 
Finally, consider the renegotiation phase. It could be a scheduled or an 
unforeseen renegotiation. Scheduled renegotiations take place on the 
basis of the original arrangements between parties; unforeseen 
renegotiation depends on contingencies, as for example when there are 
problems of overestimation of demand. 
2.2. Alternative forms of Public-Private Partnership 
To have an idea of the large variety of agreements that can occur, 
consider that the European Commission lists the main categories as 
service contract, operation and management contracts, leasing 
agreements, Build-Operate-Transfer and Design-Build-Finance-Operate 
(DBFO) (DG Internal Policies, 2006). 
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• Service contract 
The private partner of a service contract is usually required to procure, 
operate and maintain assets for a short period of time. It is the case for 
example of the provision and maintenance of technical activities or of 
toll collection service. 
The public sector bears the financial and the residual value risk, so that 
its main advantage resides in the possibility to benefit from specific 
skills of the private operator. 
• Operation and management contract 
If the responsibility of assets operation and management is passed to 
the public sector, then the agreement is of the second type: operation 
and management contract. 
Public sector still retains investment and financial risk. The advantage 
of this agreement is that the private party is paid according to a fixed 
fee or to an incentive basis linked to specific performance targets. 
Therefore, the private partner is strongly interested in improving 
service quality to reduce both overall costs and the demand risk.  
• Leasing agreement 
The third kind of arrangement is the leasing agreement: the private 
agent benefits of the income streams generated by publicly owned 
assets in exchange for a fixed lease payment and the obligation to 
operate and maintain the assets. 
In this case, the private provider bears the commercial and the demand 
risk and this explain why it has an incentive to achieve operational 
efficiency. It is also in charge of the risks related to network expansion, 
capital improvements and financing.  
• Build-Operate-Transfer 
With the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) (or Turnkey procurement) the 
public party is still in charge of the financial risk and the private 
partner has to build and operate the assets and then transfer it to the 
public authority. The bundle of different stages induces the operator to 
carefully consider the operating cost and the design and operation 
phase. On the other hand, as the public partner gives up control rights 
until the transfer at the end of the contract, it is essential that output 
and quality specifications are well defined. 
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• Design-Build Finance-Operate 
Finally in Design-Build Finance-Operate (DBFO), the private partner 
designs the project on the basis of the requirements set by the public 
entity, ensures and finances the completion of the assets and operates 
the facility. 
As soon as the contract expires, the service or assets can be transferred 
to the public sector as initially established or the agreement can be 
renegotiated. This kind of PPP has the advantages of BOT and also 
provides for the source of capital. 
Within the DBFO agreement it is possible to distinguish concession and 
private divestiture. 
With a DBFO concession the private investor obtains the right to collect 
the revenues over a specified period of time. Ownership of the assets 
remains with the public sector. 
To the contrary, in private divestiture the assets are partially or entirely 
sold to the private sector. The government has a regulatory role aimed 
at protecting consumers from monopolistic prices and output 
restrictions.  
As the above classification highlights, there are different models of 
PPPs and each of them can be adapted to the need of the sector. 
Moreover, the agreement is not only sector specific but also activity 
specific: some models are better suited than other in reaching certain 
objectives and managing the risk characterizing the project. 
A central role in the PPPs in the transport sector is played by project 
finance, “typically used in those sectors that require large capital 
expenditures, that have long-lived assets, and that require long periods 
to amortize investment costs and generate required rates of return for 
both creditors and equity holders.”(Estache et al., 2007) 
In most of the cases, the source of finance is not unique and can take 
different forms, such as equity, commercial lending, bond finance, etc. 
The adoption of project finance is obviously linked to the existence of 
some benefits that affect the partners according to their role in the 
project. For example, firms can limit their financial risk in a project to 
the amount of their equity investment. Moreover, as the PPP requires a 
very careful assessment of the project, the risk among parties is shared 
more appropriately, than in other kind of arrangements. 
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On the other hand the complexity of the project and the high number of 
parties involved definitely increases transaction costs, both before 
(agreement of parties, consultancy, etc.) and after the building stage 
(monitoring). 
Estache et al. (2007) highlight that the role of the public sector is not 
limited to the contractual partnership, as it also acts as provider of 
guarantees and to monitor contractual commitments. 
As for guarantees, a wide range of mechanisms can be implemented: 
equity and debt guarantees gives respectively to the private operator 
and to the lenders the option to be bought out by the government at a 
price that guarantees a minimum return on equity.  
Specific clauses can also be set in order to reduce demand risk, 
especially in toll roads projects: with traffic or a revenue guarantee, the 
government compensates the private partner if traffic or revenues fall 
below a defined threshold. An alternative is a variable length of the 
contract. 
Another role of the public sector is to monitor PPP. It could be the case 
that an ad hoc institution is set up or more frequently that the sector 
specific agency also supervises the project. 
3. Bundling and ownership 
The large variety of PPPs and the complexity of such agreements give 
the possibility to study numerous contractual issues. 
Attention has been devoted for example to the question of how to 
finance an infrastructure (Caillaud and Tirole, 2004), how to allocate 
risk transfer (Martimort and Zantman, 2006) and which the implication 
of contract flexibility are (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Ellman, 2006). 
In this section we focus of the issue of bundling or separation 
(unbundling) of different phases of a project. In particular, we consider 
the relation with the type of ownership. 
This choice is driven by the aim of giving the main theoretical insights 
of the literature related to the analysis we present in chapter 2, where 
we study the incentive of a railway provider to invest in rolling stock 
according to the ownership of the assets. 
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3.1. Bundling or separation of phases 
As we illustrated in the previous section, a project is composed of 
different stages. 
Consider for example the realization of an infrastructure as a high-
speed railway line. First in the design phase both main principles and 
all the details of how to build tracks and wagons are established. 
Then, the building of all components takes place and the service is 
finally available.  
To let the travellers using it, it is necessary implement a reservation and 
a payment system. Of course, all the procedure related to maintenance 
and safety must be applied and monitored. 
Even if this was a simplified description of the process, it is easy to 
understand the general complexity of realizing projects of this kind and 
to think about the specific professional skills that each phase requires.  
Therefore, one of the main issues to consider when defining a project is 
to choose between bundling and unbundling: in order to achieve a 
certain objective, which is the best organizational form? Bundle 
activities together and let one firm doing everything or contract 
separately with different firms? 
Moreover, the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
bundling can be combined with the analysis of the role of the 
ownership. Recall that in a public-private partnership, all the tasks are 
bundled and performed by a private firm or consortium of firms. 
We can identify two streams in the literature according to the approach 
used that is an incomplete or complete contract approach. 
3.1.1. Incomplete contract approach 
As for the incomplete contract approach, we mainly consider to Hart 
(2003) and Bennett and Iossa (2006). Both these paper refer to the 
property rights literature à la Grossman and Hart (1986). 
The main result of these papers is that when the partner building 
and/or running a facility can undertake an effort that affects quality 
and/or costs, there will be distortions with respects to the first best. 
The distortions depend on the impossibility to write ex ante a contract, 
so that negotiation ex post takes place. 
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Moreover, the existence of a positive externality between stages is what 
(or at least mainly) calls for bundling activities. The intuition for this 
result is that if the tasks are undertaken by the same firm, then the 
positive effect of the effort can be internalized. 
If there is a negative externality (see Bennett and Iossa, 2006), then the 
results are less clear-cut. 
In what follows, we see in more details the frameworks used to analyze 
this issue and highlights when bundling is to be preferred and the role 
of the ownership. The latter point has been deepened by Bennett and 
Iossa. In fact, while in Hart unbundling corresponds to public 
ownership and bundling to private ownership, Bennett and Iossa 
consider private ownership by the builder, by the management firm 
and by a consortium of firms. 
Hart (2003) studies the case of the private provision of a public service 
and the effect on social benefits of two different types of arrangements, 
bundling and unbundling of building and running the facility. 
The model is of the type of Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997), where the 
provider of the service can be either the government or a private 
contractor and it is also the owner of the facility. The manager can 
undertake an investment in improving quality or an investment that 
reduces both cost and quality. 
Because of the distortions with respect to first best level, private 
ownership is to be preferred when the reduction in quality is small or 
when cost reduction is unlikely and the public manager has low 
incentives (i.e. his gains from the activity is low). 
In a manner similar to Hart Schleifer and Vishny, Hart develops a 
model in three stages: first the government decides who to contract 
with, then the facility is built and finally the service is operated. 
When building the facility, two types of unverifiable investments can 
be chosen: a productive investment i that makes the facility more 
attractive and easier to run and/or an unproductive investment e that 
reduces total costs but also quality.  Both types of investment affect 
social benefits generated by the provision of the service: i increases 
benefits and e decreases them. 
The government can choose between contracting separately with a 
builder and a managing firm or bundling the activities of building and 
operating the facility (PPP). 
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The comparison of the two choices leads to underline the existence of a 
trade-off when choosing between bundling and unbundling. 
Under unbundling, neither the social benefits nor the effect on operating cost 
are internalized by the builder. 
The appropriate level of unproductive investment is achieved. On the other 
hand, he is investing less in the productive activity, relative to the social 
optimum. 
Under PPP, the social benefits are still not internalized but now the builder 
internalizes the operating costs and chooses a larger amount both of the 
unproductive and of the productive investment. 
Bennett and Iossa (2006) focus on a specific kind of agreement that is 
private finance initiative (PFI), in which a consortium of private firms is 
in charge of all the phases from designing to operating the project. This 
type of arrangement is usually valid for a very long period of time (25-
30 years) and the government defines output specifications, so that the 
public sector specifies the basic standards of the project and then the 
private partner decides how to satisfy them. 
The framework is quite similar to Hart, but they assume that 
investments are non contractible ex ante and verifiable ex post. 
The initial contract specifies some basic standard requirements and 
their satisfaction is observable and verifiable. 
At the beginning of each stage, the firm can decide to invest in some 
innovation and such investment has the previously said characteristics, 
non contractible ex ante and verifiable ex post. 
The two types of investment a and e positively affect the social benefits: 
a can be done at the beginning of the building stage and affects the 
costs of that stage as well as the cost in the management stage and the 
residual value; e can be undertaken at the beginning of the 
management stage and has an impact only on management costs. 
Only the owner of the facility during the contract period has the power 
to decide whether any given innovative activity can be implemented or 
not, so that Nash bargaining occurs between the owner and the firm 
willing to undertake the investment. 
A very interesting point is that the investment at the building stage a 
can have either a positive or a negative externality across stages.  
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With a positive externality, bundling is always optimal regardless of the 
ownership. 
This result is due to the ability of bundling to internalize the positive 
externality across stages. 
The choice of the type of ownership to induce the optimal level of 
investments depends on the effect of a on managing costs and on the 
residual value, compared with the effect on social benefits: if social 
benefits are larger, then PFI is optimal for the investment at the building stage. 
Similarly, PFI is optimal for the investment at the managing stage if the 
benefits of the innovation dominate social benefits. 
Consider now these results if the investments were not verifiable as in 
Hart: bargaining never occurs and each party simply cares about 
maximizing its own profit.  
Under private ownership, investments in the building stage only occur 
under PPP and when the builder is the owner of the facility. On the 
other hand, investments in the management stage only occur under 
PPP and when the firm operating the service owns the facility. 
Under public ownership investments never take place. Therefore, even 
if investments are not verifiable, bundling is still optimal and PFI 
dominates each other arrangement.  
The key component of Bennett and Iossa result is the sign of the 
externality: as there exists a positive externality, the aim is to 
internalize its effects. But in case of a negative externality, the result no 
longer holds. 
In case of a not too strong negative externality, the optimal level for a is 
reached through unbundling and in particular the ownership should be public 
if the marginal social benefit is larger than the marginal effect on the residual 
value. Vice versa, ownership should be assigned to the builder.  
Clear cut results cannot be obtained if the negative externality is strong. 
Under both PFI and traditional procurement there is a problem of 
overinvestment. Therefore, the choice between bundling and 
unbundling depends on the relative sizes of the effects on welfare.  
An important aspect of the contractual agreement is the treatment of 
the residual value of the assets when the contract expires. Different 
clauses can be included in the contract and state who owns the facility 
at the end of the management stage. Therefore, an important issue is to 
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understand the role of a change in the ownership when the contract 
expires. 
One of the most common provisions is the automatic transfer of 
ownership to the public sector. Bennett and Iossa show that under PFI, 
this condition is welfare reducing if there is a positive externality, as 
the anticipation of the transfer of ownership at the end of the contract 
diminishes the incentive to invest, while if there is an option for 
negotiation, then the case for PFI is strengthened.  
3.1.2. Complete contract approach 
The matter of bundling different tasks together when there is moral 
hazard (see Holmström and Milgrom, 1990 and 1991) suggests that a 
positive externality across stages leads to the choice of bundling the 
activities, while a negative externality calls for a separation of the 
activities. 
As for the specific issues of PPP in a moral hazard environment we 
mainly refer to Martimort and Pouyet (2008), Iossa and Martimort 
(2008) and for an application to the transport sector to Iossa and 
Martimort (2009). 
Similar to the incomplete contract approach, also in the complete 
contract approach the incentive to invest is different according to the 
choice of bundling or splitting tasks. In particular, this effect is strictly 
related to the type of externality that the investment has on costs 
and/or quality. Moreover, bundling is optimal if there exists a positive 
externality.  
In Martimort and Pouyet (2008) firms can exert a non–verifiable effort, 
which affects the quality of the project (for example, an infrastructure) 
and thereby the operating costs. They show that what drives the choice 
of the organizational structure is the sign of the externality: if the effort 
decreases the costs, i.e. with a positive externality, when all the phases are 
performed by the consortium, the moral hazard problem is alleviated. 
Moreover, it appears that bundling almost always dominates 
unbundling. In particular under public ownership bundling and 
unbundling are equivalent with a negative externality, but bundling 
dominates with a positive externality. 
If the ownership is private, then bundling strictly dominates unbundling if 
there is a positive externality the private value of infrastructure is low. 
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A general framework for the analyses of public-private partnerships is 
given by Iossa and Martimort (2008). 
They consider the relationship between the public sector and a risk 
averse agent, which can choose unobservable efforts reducing costs and 
enhancing the quality of the project. Among the extensions of the 
model, they consider the issue of bundling of stages. 
From a welfare point of view, they show that bundling leads to higher welfare 
then separation of stages if the externality of efforts is positive. If the 
externality is negative, there is no difference between the two arrangements. 
They also show that if the infrastructure has a residual value at the end of 
the contract, then PPP strictly welfare dominates traditional contracting if 
and only if the externality between the design and the operation phases is 
positive. 
Based on this model, Iossa and Martimort (2009) analyze when PPPs 
provide adequate incentives to the private providers to invest in the 
improvement of quality in the transport sector. 
Suppose that demand is stochastic and depends on firm efforts in 
lowering costs and increasing the quality of the infrastructure.  
The ability of the consortium to internalize the effect of the quality 
enhancing investment grants gains in welfare. Total welfare under 
bundling is strictly larger than under unbundling and the positive gap 
increases with the externality due to the quality of the infrastructure. 
The bundle of activities shifts more risk to the consortium and gives it 
more incentive to invest in quality enhancing, explaining why PPP 
projects are characterized by more risk transfer than traditional 
procurement. 
As Iossa and Martimort underline, the advantage of a public-private 
partnership is stronger if a better quality of the infrastructure 
significantly benefits the operational phase and when the demand is 
stable, as for example in the transport sector (at lest in the short run). 
They also consider the role of contract length and underline that it 
should be longer when demand risk is lower and capital investment is 
greater, as for example in the railway industry. 
In the next chapter we tackle the issue of bundling and ownership, 
applied to transport sector, in particular to the rolling stock market in 
the railway industry. A transportation authority willing to allow more 
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competitors to take part into the selection could decide to provide the 
operator with rolling stock, which appears to be a source of 
disadvantage for potential competitors. 
The decision about bundling or unbundling, corresponding 
respectively to private and public ownership of the rolling stock is 
taken by a regulator that has to select the provider of a service when a 
firm is already active and another firm compete for the market. 
Differently from Iossa and Martimort we consider an adverse selection 
problem over the cost parameter of firms. Moreover, there is only one 
type of investment undertaken by the operator that reduces costs and 
positively affects the value of rolling stock. 
It appears that the choice of the ownership in order to obtain the higher 
level of investment is mainly related to the its effects on rolling stock 
and costs and to the cost of public funds. 
4. Theory and empirical evidence 
As seen above, according to Hart (2003) the advantage of choosing one 
type of provision against the other depends on the characteristics of the 
service at glance. 
The argument in favour of unbundling is stronger the more difficult to 
specify the quality of the service. 
If the quality of the facility can be well specified, whereas the quality of 
the service cannot, then traditional provision seems more appropriate 
since there is less concern about the underinvestment in i under 
unbundling than about overinvestment in e under bundling. 
In contrast, PPP is more appropriate if the quality of the service can be 
well specified in the initial contract, whereas the quality of the building 
cannot be: underinvestment in i in traditional procurement may be a 
serious issue, while overinvestment in e under PPP is not. 
This result seems coherent with the evidence of some projects and 
could also be applied to interpret the applicability of PPP to core and 
non-core services (Riess, 2005). Consider two examples: hospitals and 
schools. In the case of hospitals, the clinical treatments and the clinical 
support services (like laboratories) are core services and all other 
services (such as cleaning) can be considered non-core activities. In the 
case of schools, the core service is the education provided by the 
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teachers and all the “accommodation” service are non-core. What can 
be expected is that when applying traditional procurement to clinical or 
school core-service better results are obtained, than under PPP as the 
outcome of the provision of services can’t be well specified. 
Evidence from U.K. (Bennett and Iossa, 2006) is that PFI did not work 
so well for schools and hospitals and the above interpretation may (at 
least partially) explain it.  
Bennett and Iossa also show that the results obtained in their research 
are consistent with empirical evidence in the U.K.: average estimated 
savings of PFI projects are larger then savings in traditional 
procurement. For some sectors is also evident the existence of positive 
externalities across stages, which were exploited by PFI. For example, 
under PFI prisons with innovative design also show a reduced cost of 
running them; highway projects include long-term initiatives when 
building, for improving the service in term of noise reduction. Instead, 
for other projects which involve continuous adaptation, as IT provision, 
public ownership may be preferred. 
As for PPP in the transport sector, investments in safety of rail and air 
transportation can be interpreted as investment a in Bennett and Iossa 
model (investment at the building stage that could have either a 
positive or a negative externality): some innovations about safety are 
not foreseeable when the contract is signed and once investments are 
undertaken at the building stage, they also unavoidably affect the 
management stage. More safety enhances public utility but also raises 
costs of maintaining tracks and all the structures needed. If the raising 
in costs is not too high, then according to the previous results, 
unbundling eases the problem of underinvestment and the choice of 
the ownership depends on the magnitude of the effect on residual 
value compared with the social benefit.  But if the investment in safety 
implies very high increase in operating costs, then the argument in 
favour of bundling or unbundling and type of ownership is not 
conclusive.  
 
 
 
 
 
  20 
Chapter 2 
The Role of Public or Private Ownership and the 
Incentive to Invest in the Railway Industry 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the transportation sector has foregone important 
changes. The European Union is strongly keen on completing the 
internal market for transport and most of the changes in the sector are 
due to its deregulation interventions.  
At the end of Nineties3, the Member States laid down the strategic 
principles to revitalise the railway sector, to increase its 
competitiveness and attractiveness with customers. 
In passenger transport, the approach proposed by the European 
Commission consists in open access for international services and in 
regulated competition, for instance, for urban services through the 
tendering of franchises or public service contracts (competition for the 
tracks). Moreover, a separation between infrastructure management 
and transport service provision is required: this separation must be 
done to ensure at least non-discriminatory network access, such as 
capacity allocation and setting of track access charges. 
Different types of organization were adopted across countries 
(Seabright et al., 2003) also depending on the type of service, i.e. long 
distance v. local passenger service. 
For example, in Germany, the Länder created agencies, with the aim of 
managing the procurement of local passenger rail transport. Each 
agency can freely choose the provider of the service: for example, it can 
negotiate directly with the incumbent without involving other 
competing firms or can announce a tender. As a result of the 
introduction of competition for the market, Deutsche Bahn competitors 
increased substantially their market share (Lalive and Schmutzler, 
2008).  
                                                                 
3 White Paper on Rail Transport, 1996. 
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It is probably too early to have a precise view of the effect of the 
deregulation, but according to Friebel et al (2008) the reform has 
positively affected the level of technical efficiency of the market for 
passenger transportation in Europe, increasing the productivity trend 
by 0.5% per year on average.  
Even if one of the aim of these reforms is to induce the creation of a 
competitive environment, in which many firms compete for the market, 
in most cases the transportation service is still provided by the 
historical incumbent. 
A first question that can be raised immediately is why, even if there 
exists competition for the market, the (local) railroad market is mainly 
dominated by the presence of the historical incumbent. 
An entrant willing to provide transportation service does not have an 
easy access to the market of rolling stock, which is an essential input to 
provide the service. Rolling stock have special features that do not 
allow firms to obtain them easily; this is mainly due to the specificity of 
the demand, the absence of a secondary market and the long 
production time. 
The technical and operational characteristics of rolling stock within the 
country and its specificity for certain routes results in limited 
interchange ability between different types of stocks. 
The absence of a secondary market does not allow firms operating (or 
willing to operate) the service to obtain good quality rolling stock, 
partly because of the previous point and partly because of the 
qualitative standards required, which are not always achievable if the 
rolling stock are old. Finally, the time needed for the production is 
usually long, between two and four years. 
Different solutions have been attempted to solve this problem. The 
most famous is probably the British system, where the Rolling Stock 
Leasing Companies (ROSCOs) lease the rolling stock material to the 
companies in charge of the provision of the service (Train Operating 
Companies, TOCs). The ROSCOs were created with the privatization of 
British Rail in 1996, when its rolling stock were distributed to three 
specialized companies, with the aim of promoting competition both 
among the TOCs and among the ROSCOs. 
In Sweden, the local Public Transport Authorities are responsible for 
setting up the auction and decide which operator will provide the 
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service. The rolling stock material is supplied by AB Transitio, a 
company founded in 1998, whose shareholders are the six Public 
Transit Authorities, which are under local public ownership. 
In Italy, the rolling stock are almost entirely owned by Trenitalia. The 
national antitrust authority recognized4 the difficulties in obtaining the 
rolling stock, but it decided not to define it as an “essential facility”, 
because of the lack of non-duplicability at reasonable social cost. The 
proposed solution is to allow the selected supplier to begin with the 
provision of the service after it has obtained the necessary assets or the 
acquisition of the rolling stock by the local authority.  
If the local authority auctioning off the service buys the rolling stock, it 
ensures that a company not owning the assets can take part into the 
selection too and reduces the advantage of the incumbent. 
The issue we focus on is what the effect of the ownership of the rolling 
stock is on the incentive of the provider of the service to invest. 
The model has two periods. In the first one, the incumbent is the only 
firm in the market and he has its own rolling stock. In the second 
period, the local authority selects the provider. 
We consider two different frameworks: private ownership and public 
ownership, where the expression private or public refers to who is the 
owner of the rolling stock in the second period. As suggested, a 
possible solution to the problem of the rolling stock is that the local 
authority supplies the provider of the service with the assets and we 
define this framework as public ownership. On the other hand, if the firm 
has to be equipped with its own assets, then it operates in the private 
ownership framework. 
The provider of the service undertakes an investment that reduces its 
costs and increases the value of the rolling stock. This is an important 
feature, because the firm cannot decide to affect only one of the two 
aspects (i.e. only the costs or only the value of the rolling stock) as we 
will explain in detail afterwards. 
                                                                 
4 AGCM AS262 “Reperimento del materiale rotabile ferroviario necessario per 
l’espletamento delle gare per l’aggiudicazione dei servizi ferroviari di 
competenza regionale”, 26/06/2003. An Italian region asked the antitrust 
authority an opinion on how to get rolling stock for a procurement 
process. 
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The difference between the two frameworks is not only who the owner 
of the rolling stock is, but also how the investment affects the assets 
and the social utility. 
We compare the levels of investment and study the probability of the 
incumbent to remain active in the second period. 
Under complete information, the cost of public funds and the 
transferable part of the investment play an important role in 
determining the gap between the investment under private ownership 
and under public ownership. In the second period together with the 
cost of public funds it is necessary to consider the increase in social 
utility under public ownership.  
If there is a problem of asymmetric information over costs, then the 
local authority grants a rent to the provider in order to incentive the 
truthful revelation of its cost parameter and this effect could overcome 
the difference between the levels of investments in the two 
frameworks. Therefore, a priori it is not possible to define in which 
context the level of investment is higher. 
Moreover, we consider the probability for the incumbent to remain 
active in the second period and it appears that the investment made in 
the first period gives him an advantage also at the selection stage, 
because the choice of the authority also accounts for the effect of the 
incumbent’s first period investment. 
This paper is close to the analysis of Bennett and Iossa (2006), Hart 
(2003) and Laffont and Tirole (1993)5. 
The first paper considers the choice between private or public 
ownership and bundling or not of the different stages to build and 
manage a facility. Differently from their analysis, we assume that there 
is a selection among firms and that it is affected by an asymmetric 
information problem over the cost parameter of the firms. Besides, we 
do not have negotiation between parties, as when the authority decides 
to buy the rolling stock, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the 
incumbent. 
                                                                 
5 Laffont J.J., Tirole J., Theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, 
The MIT Press, 1993, Ch. 8 “Repeated auctions of incentive contracts, 
investment and bidding parity”. 
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Our approach is closer to Laffont and Tirole, even if we have only an 
adverse selection problem and no moral hazard. We consider a firm 
that can undertake an investment, but here the effect of it on the firms’ 
and on the regulator’s utility is more composite. In this respect, the 
effect of our investment is similar to what illustrated by Bennett and 
Iossa. But while Bennett and Iossa assume that the effect of the 
investment on the payoffs is always the same, regardless of the kind of 
arrangement, here the effect depends on the framework in which the 
firm operates. Part of the investment is assumed to be transferable 
together with the use of the rolling stock: under private ownership it 
will always be exploited only by the incumbent if it is active in the 
second period, but under public ownership it could be exploited by the 
competitor if it is selected. 
The paper is organized as follows: after a brief review of the literature, 
section 3 presents the baseline model to illustrate the framework before 
the reform that is when only the incumbent operates the transportation 
service. Section 4 studies two possible scenarios in which the firm can 
operate, that is under private ownership or under public ownership.  
The models under private and under public ownership are developed 
in section 5 with complete information and in section 6 with 
asymmetric information. 
Section 7 characterizes the optimal rule chosen by the authority for the 
selection of the provider in both frameworks when there is asymmetric 
information. 
Section 8 concludes and offers possible extensions to the analysis. 
2. Literature review 
The introduction of the selection among different providers and the 
cooperation between the private and the public sector are related to the 
issue of the public-private partnerships (PPPs).   
The partnership between the private and the public sector has been 
used as an alternative to traditional procurement in many countries 
and in many sectors.  
In the U.K. and in Portugal, PPPs are really a significant source of 
provision of infrastructure and service: in the U.K. these types of 
arrangements are used for rail or road projects, in the building and 
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managing of schools, hospitals and prisons, while in Portugal the 
partnerships are almost restricted to the road sector. 
In this paper we compare two frameworks. The first one is labelled 
private ownership framework, and it can be interpreted as a period of 
concession followed by a PPP agreement, because there is a selection 
among firms providing the service with their own assets. The second 
one is the public ownership framework, where at the end of the first 
period there is an automatic transfer to the public authority of the 
assets and in the second period a selection among firms takes place. 
The selected supplier provides the service but use the public assets, so 
that there is a traditional provision of the public service. 
We mainly refer to the work of Hart (2003), of Bennett and Iossa (2006) 
and of Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
Both the work by Hart and by Bennett and Iossa are developed in an 
incomplete contract framework: Hart assumes that investments are 
never verifiable and Bennett and Iossa assume that there exists 
negotiation between the parties6. 
Hart (2003) considers the case where building a facility and managing it 
can be contracted out together (a situation defined as “bundling”, or 
PPP) or separately (“unbundling”). In the building stage, two types of 
unverifiable investments can be undertaken: a productive investment 
that makes the facility more attractive and easier to run (“good” 
investment) and an unproductive investment that saves on total costs 
but reduces quality (“bad” investment). The comparison between 
bundling and unbundling leads to underline the existence of a trade-off 
between internalization of benefits and costs and the level of 
investments. Under unbundling, neither the benefits nor the operating 
costs are internalized by the builder, so that the optimal level of 
unproductive investment is achieved, but there is an underinvestment 
problem in the “good” investment. Under PPP, the benefits are not 
internalized but now the builder internalizes the costs and chooses a 
larger amount both of the unproductive and of the productive 
investment. 
Bennett and Iossa (2006) consider the case of Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI), a form of PPP in which typically all the phases from designing to 
                                                                 
6 They show that they would achieve the same results under Hart 
assumption 
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operating the project are contracted out to a consortium of private firms 
for a long period of time (usually 25-30 years) and the government 
defines output specifications.  
There are two types of investment that positively affect the social 
benefits. One type can be undertaken at the beginning of the building 
stage: it reduces the costs of that stage, rises the residual value of the 
assets and reduces (positive externality) or increases (negative 
externality) the cost in the management stage. Another type of 
investment can be done at the beginning of the management phase and 
reduces only the cost of that stage. 
Assuming the residual value of the facility to be independent of its use 
when the contract expires, the bundling of the two stages is always 
optimal in the case of a positive externality (and in the case of a not too 
strong negative externality), because it induces the internalization of 
the externality. The choice between public and private ownership to 
achieve the optimal level of investment in each period, depends on 
whether the effect on costs and residual value are larger than the effect 
on social benefit: if it is the case, then PFI is optimal.  
When there is a strong negative externality, i.e. when the investment in 
the building stage increases the cost in the managing stage, then the 
results are not clear as both under PFI and traditional procurement 
there is a problem of overinvestment. Therefore, the choice between 
bundling and unbundling depends on the relative sizes of the effects on 
welfare. 
Differently from Bennett and Iossa we introduce a selection procedure 
for the second period provider and an adverse selection problem. The 
local authority offers the firms a menu of contracts among which to 
choose, in order to overcome the asymmetric information over cost. 
Moreover, at the end of the first period the authority may choose a new 
partner. If the local authority decides to acquire the incumbent’s rolling 
stock (public ownership framework), then it makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the incumbent that partially depends on the level of investment 
undertaking during the first period. Therefore, differently from Bennett 
and Iossa, there is no negotiation between the parties over the benefits 
of the investment. 
The introduction of the selection and the asymmetric information 
problem makes our analysis similar to Laffont and Tirole (1993, ch. 8), 
who develop a two-period model in a complete contract framework. 
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They consider an incumbent who operates as a monopolist in a market 
and in the second period it has to compete with another firm for the 
market. 
In a specification of the general model, the monopolist can undertake 
an effort – learning by doing. The effort reduces the costs of the same 
period in which it is undertaken and the first period effort of the 
incumbent reduces the second period costs if he is active and can also 
lower the competitor’s second period costs in case she is selected by the 
regulator. 
Laffont and Tirole also study the choice of the optimal “breakout” rule 
that is the cost threshold defined by the regulator to select the second 
period provider: if the entrant’s cost is lower than this threshold, she 
will be preferred. 
In the model by Laffont and Tirole the effort has an impact only on the 
cost function of the firms, while in our model, the investment lowers 
only the incumbent’s costs and affects the competitor’s payoff only 
through the usage of the rolling stock in the public ownership case.  
In contrast to Hart and to Bennett and Iossa, in the present paper there 
is only one type of investment. It acts along two dimensions as it 
reduces the costs and increases the value of the rolling stock, which 
looks quite similar to Bennett and Iossa investment at the building 
stage with positive externality. However, in our case the magnitude of 
the effect is strictly related to the framework in which the firm operates. 
As we describe in the next sections, it is crucial to distinguish the effect 
on the rolling stock under private ownership from the effect under public 
ownership, because while in the first case only the incumbent can take 
advantage of his investment, in the latter case part of the benefit can be 
exploited by the second period provider, regardless of which firm is 
selected. 
An important characteristic of the kind of investment we are 
considering is that it has two simultaneous effects so that the firm 
cannot decide to strategically affect only one dimension that is it is not 
able to only lower the costs or only increase value of the rolling stock.  
3. The baseline model: two-periods monopoly 
Let us now illustrate investment decisions in the two different 
frameworks that we define as private ownership and public ownership.  
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In order to set the basic characteristic of the model, we begin with 
considering first the case of a local authority in charge of regulating the 
transportation service on a certain route. There exists only a monopolist 
I that operates a fixed amount of rail transport for two periods and 
receives a transfer. 
By providing the service, the incumbent invests in order to better 
organize his activity on that route. Therefore, we assume that in both 
stages, the incumbent can undertake an investment that has a double 
effect: it lowers the incumbent’s costs and increases the value of his 
rolling stock. Note that there are two positive simultaneous effects and 
the firm cannot choose to affect only the costs or the assets side. In this 
baseline model, this aspect is not particularly significant, but as we will 
stress in the following sections, when the incumbent has to compete for 
the market, then it emerges that having operated the line, the 
incumbent has an advantage due to past investment7. 
Consider for example the incumbent that invests in order to find a 
better way to organize the workforce, so that the cost of labour 
dedicated to the maintenance is reduced both in the first period and in 
the second one. 
Moreover, thank to a better organisation, the maintenance is more 
effective and the quality of the rolling stock is increased. 
In the following period, there still exists a positive effect on the quality, 
that we define as partly transferable and partly non transferable (or 
specific).  In fact, a share of the investment is strictly linked to the assets 
– for example, seat covers are cleaner and less damaged, so that do not 
need to be renewed – and is therefore transferable together with the 
rolling stock. On the other hand, another part is specific or non 
transferable, so that only the incumbent can take advantage of it – for 
example, operating the line gives the incumbent the possibility to 
understand how to better organize cleaning service.  
The effect on the assets in the same period in which the investment 
takes place represents the advantage for the firm operating the line. His 
experience and knowledge will have an impact on the selection rule of 
the authority, as we will see in the next paragraphs.  
                                                                 
7 The effects of the investment on the incumbent’s and the competitor’s 
payoff are different according to the type of ownership chosen by the 
authority. 
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The incumbent’s costs of providing the service depend on his cost 
parameter Iβ  and on the positive effect Ita  of the investment he 
undertakes at time t. In the first period the costs are: 
IIIII aaC 111 ),( −= ββ  
and in the second period are 
IIIIIII akaaaC 21212 ),,( −−= ββ , 
where k  is the part of the effect of the first period investment that also 
lowers second period costs. We assume that )1,0(∈k , because the effect 
in the second stage is lower then in the first one. 
The investment is costly and his disutility at time t is )( Itad 8. 
The effect of the investment on the rolling stock in each period is 
represented by )( Itab 9, which we define direct effect. 
The incumbent also benefits of an indirect effect, that is an increase in the 
second period of the value of the assets by ( ) )( 1Iabhg + , where g  is the 
transferable part and h  is the specific or non transferable part. The 
indirect effect is smaller then the direct effect, so that ( )hg +  )1,0(∈ .  
As we are now considering the baseline model, the incumbent fully 
internalizes the effect of the first period investment. In general, the user 
of the rolling stock in the second period can take advantage of )( 1Iagb , 
but only the incumbent can exploit )( 1Iahb . 
The local authority provides the incumbent with )( IItF β  in addiction 
to the incumbent’s costs ItC , so that the total amount of transfers is 
I
t
I
t
I
t CFT += .  
The monopolist maximizes his payoff IIII PwPP 21 δ+= , in which δ  is 
the discount factor  and Iw  is the probability that the incumbent 
provides the service in the second period, which in this baseline model 
is equal to one. 
                                                                 
8 0'>d , 0>′′d   
9 0'>b , 0<′′b , '' bd >  
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In detail, the incumbent maximizes: 
[ ])()()()(),,(
)()(),(
2122122
11111
IIIIIIIII
IIIIIII
ababhgadaaCTw
abadaCTP
+++−−+
++−−=
βδ
β
 
under the participation constraint 0≥IP . 
The provision of the transportation service generates a positive social 
value S , such that it is always socially desirable to provide the service. 
The local authority maximizes the following welfare function: 
( )III TTPSW 21)1()1( δλδ ++−++=   
where 0>λ  is the cost of public funds. 
3.1. Optimal levels of investment 
Under complete information, the local authority knows the cost 
parameter Iβ  and observes the costs in each period ItC . The 
maximization of the welfare function subject to the participation 
constraint of the incumbent 0≥IP  determines the optimal levels of 
investment: 
[ ])(')()('1)(': 1111 IIIII abhgkwabada ++++= δ             (1) 
)('1)(': 222 III abada +=                (2) 
In each period, the optimal level of investment is set such that the 
marginal cost of the investment is equal to the marginal benefit of cost 
savings and of the increase in the value of the rolling stock. 
In the first period, the optimal level accounts for the expected marginal 
benefits in the second period of reducing the costs and of the increase 
in the value of the rolling stock due to the indirect effect (recall that 
here 1=Iw ). 
The expected gain from the second period has a positive effect on the 
choice of first period investment, so that the higher the savings in 
second period costs and/or the higher the indirect effect on the value of 
the rolling stock, the higher the level of optimal investment. 
Finally, notice that the level of investment positively depends on the 
probability of providing the service in the next period: the higher the 
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probability, the higher the expected benefits the incumbent is able to 
internalize. 
4. Regulation and competition: the selection of 
the second period supplier 
According to the European Directives, the regional rail transport has 
been opened up to competition and regions should issue public tenders 
in order to choose the provider of local rail services for a period of 
exclusive franchising. 
It is interesting to understand what happens to the investments if the 
incumbent knows that in the next period the authority will choose the 
provider of the service according to a certain selection procedure.  
Consider a two period model: in the first period, the incumbent is in 
charge of the transportation service and receives transfers in return; the 
monopolist knows that at the beginning of the second period a 
provider is selected by the local authority. 
In the first period, the incumbent uses his own rolling stock, while in 
the second period there are two possible frameworks: the private (PR) 
or the public (PUB) ownership framework.  
The concept of private or public refers to the ownership of the rolling 
stock in the second period: if the second period provider uses its own 
assets, then it operates in the private ownership framework; if the local 
authority provides the firm with the assets, then the second period 
provider operates in the public ownership  framework.  
For simplicity, we consider an initial stage (t=0), where the local 
authority announces in which framework the firm will operate in the 
second period and gives information about the selection. 
The local authority decides if the transportation service in the second 
period is provided using private or public assets and offers a menu of 
contract from which the incumbent can choose at the beginning of the 
first period. Moreover, it defines the breakout rule, that is the rule 
according to which the second period supplier is chosen. 
If the local authority opts for the private ownership, then the second 
period provider must be equipped with its own assets. Note that a firm 
can take part to the selection at no cost, but will buy or will adapt the 
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rolling stock to the need of the specific routes - if necessary - only once 
it is chosen10. 
If the local authority opts for the public ownership, then it buys the 
rolling stock of the incumbent at the end of the first period and lends 
them to the second period provider.   
The incumbent I and the competitor C are characterized by the cost 
parameter iβ – Iβ  for the incumbent and Cβ  for the competitor – 
which are independently drawn from the same distribution )(βf  on 
[ ]ββ , . 
In order to choose the firm that grants the highest level of welfare, the 
local authority has to define a threshold for the cost parameter below 
which it will prefer to switch from the incumbent to the competitor. We 
call this threshold “breakout rule” and we denote it as **jβ , where j= 
PR, PUB according to the framework, i.e. private or public. The threshold 
is calculated to maximizes the welfare function and the competitor is 
selected if her cost parameter **j
C ββ < . 
In the first period (t=1), the incumbent provides the service: the costs he 
bears, the investment he undertakes and the effect on next period costs 
and on the rolling stock are (qualitatively) the same as in the baseline 
model. 
Under public ownership, the local authority pays a price (that will be 
defined later) to the incumbent to obtain the rolling stock  at the end of 
the first period.  
At the beginning of the second stage (t=2), the local authority chooses 
the provider according to its threshold **jβ . 
In the public ownership framework, the authority rents the assets to the 
selected firm; under private ownership, the provider uses its own 
rolling stock, so that if it is not already equipped, it has to acquire the 
assets.  
We assume that if a firm is not selected, it obtains zero profit. The 
authority is in charge of the service only at the local level, so that it is 
                                                                 
10 Recall that it takes time to both buy or adapt the rolling stock to the 
route. 
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interested only in maximizing the “local” welfare and considers the 
outside option for the firms equal to zero.  
In the second period, only one out of the two firms is selected. Similarly 
to what explained in the baseline model, the firm active in the second 
period can undertake an investment that positively affects both its own 
costs and the value of the rolling stock. 
If the incumbent is active in the second period, then he bears costs 
I
j
I
j
II
j
I
j
II
j akaaaC ,2,1,2,1,2 ),,( −−= ββ .  
while  if the competitor is active, her costs are: 
C
j
CC
j
CC
j aaC ,2,2,2 ),( −= ββ . 
The cost functions of the two firms are different, because the incumbent 
enjoys the positive effect of the first period investment, so that his costs 
are decreased by I jka ,1 . 
As for the effect on the rolling stock, each firm is able to internalize it in 
different ways, according to the kind of ownership under which the 
provider operates. We describe how this effect has an impact on the 
utility function of the firms in the next sections. 
Finally, if the ownership is public, the local authority compensates the 
provider with a reward that depends on the level of investment it 
undertakes. 
The timing of the game can be summarized as follows: 
 
We analyze the incentive to invest under private and under public 
ownership, both in the case of complete information and of asymmetric 
information. 
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5. Selection under complete information 
Under complete information, the authority observes the costs at the end 
of the period and also knows the cost parameter of each firm. 
5.1. Private ownership of the assets 
In the framework with private ownership, the incumbent operates the 
service in the first period and at the beginning of the second period the 
local authority selects a provider, that can be either the incumbent I or 
the competitor C. 
In particular, we consider the case of the incumbent facing a 
competitor, which does not own the suitable rolling stock and has 
therefore to bear a higher fix cost than the incumbent to obtain the 
appropriate assets, if she is selected. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, a difficulty in the supply of the 
assets is due to the specificity of the demand, so that it is not unusual to 
have the provider spending on the modification of the rolling stock11. 
In general, this “extra-cost” is a measure of the disadvantage of the 
competitor in comparison with the incumbent. We assume that the 
incumbent fix costs are zero and for the entrant are 0R .  
The incumbent undertakes the investment in the first period and he 
reduces the costs and increases the  value of the rolling stock. The effect 
on the second period costs and value of the assets is realized and 
internalized only by the incumbent, if he remains active. 
In the second period, the provider can make the investment and obtain 
again positive effects on costs and assets. 
As we noticed in the baseline model, the investment in the first period 
has a double effect and the firm cannot choose to affect only the value 
of the rolling stock or only next period costs. Therefore, we are 
implicitly assuming that the incumbent has an advantage over the 
competitor due to past investment. 
The following table summarizes the effect of the investments on the 
value of the rolling stock for the firms and for the local authority: 
                                                                 
11 The higher cost could also be interpreted as the difference between 
the annual cost of the rolling stock for the competitor and for the 
incumbent.  
  35 
 
 Private Ownership - Value of rolling stock 
 t=1 t=2 
Incumbent )(
,1
I
PRab  ( ) )()( ,2,1 I PRI PR ababhg ++ if I is active 
Competitor  )(
,2
C
PRab  if C is active 
Local Authority   
 
Under private ownership, the hypothesis about the double effect of 
investment is not particularly relevant, because the incumbent knows 
that he could be the only one who gains from it. But under public 
ownership, the rolling stock are available to the second period provider 
and the competitor could also benefit from the investment, in case the 
incumbent is not chosen by the authority. 
The incumbent maximizes his expected payoff I PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR PwPP ,2,1 δ+= , 
where δ  is the discount factor and IPRw  is the probability that the 
incumbent remains active in the second period operating with his own 
assets: 
[
])()()()(),,(
)()(),(
,2,1,2,2,1,2
,2,1,1,1,1,1
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
II
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
II
PR
I
PR
I
PR
ababhgadaaC
TwabadaCTP
+++−−
+++−−=
β
δβ
       (1.1) 
The participation constraint is 0≥IPRP           (1.2) 
The competitor’s payoff, if she is active in the second period is: 
0,2,2,2,2,2 )()(),( RabadaCTP C PRC PRC PRCCPRCPRCPR −+−−= β         (1.3) 
and the participation constraint is 0≥CPRP          (1.4) 
Under complete information, the regulator maximizes the sum of net 
consumers surplus and firms payoffs: 
[ ] i PRIPRi PRIPRPR PPTTSW ,2,1,2,1)1()1( δδλδ ++++−+=   with i =I, C 
 subject to (1.2) and (1.4) binding: 
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( )[
]ccC PRCCPRCPR
C
PR
CI
PR
I
PRPR
I
PR
I
PR
II
PR
I
PRPR
dfaCF
aCFF
aaCFSW
PR βββ
ββλδ
βλδ
β
β )()),((
)),(()(1)1(
)),,()(1()1(
**
,2,2,2
,2,2,2
**
,2,1,1,1
 ++
++−+−
+++−+=
          (1.5) 
where **PRβ  is the breakout rule under private ownership, i.e. the 
threshold that determines the second period provider.  
Under complete information, the authority chooses the breakout rule 
maximizing (1.5) with respect to **PRβ . Therefore, the competitor is 
chosen if her cost parameter is lower than **PRβ  such that:  
)()(
,1,10
** I
PR
I
PR
I
PR abhgkaR +−−≤+ ββ .  
Not surprisingly, the authority wants to choose the firm whose cost 
parameter leads to the lower costs and it accounts for the advantages 
that the incumbent obtains from the first period investment. 
The maximization program of the authority becomes: 
( ) ( )
( )[{
]
( )[ ]


+−+−+
+−+−
++−−−+−
+−+−+−+

ccC
PR
C
PR
C
PR
C
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR
dfRabada
ababhg
adkaaF
abadaS
PR βββ
ββλδ
βλδ
β
β
**
)()()(
)()()(
)()(1)1(
)()()1(1
0,2,2,2
,2,1
,2,1,2
**
,1,1,1
        (1.6) 
Therefore, the socially optimal levels of investment are: 
( )[ ])(')()(1)('1)(':
,1
**
,1,1,1
I
PRPR
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR abhgkFabada ++−++= βδ        (1.7) 
)('1)(':
,2,2,2
I
PR
I
PR
I
PR abada +=            (1.8) 
)('1)(':
,2,2,2
C
PR
C
PR
C
PR abada +=            (1.9) 
In the complete information framework, the optimal levels of 
investment are set, such that in each period the provider of the service 
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equates the marginal cost of the investment to its marginal benefit in 
terms of cost savings and of the increase in the value of the rolling 
stock. 
In the first period, the optimal level of the investment also accounts for 
the expected gain from the investment in the case of the incumbent 
remaining active in the second period: the marginal benefit of reducing 
the cost in the second period and the marginal increase in the value of 
the rolling stock due to first period investment. 
Comparing this results to those obtained in the baseline model (i.e. (1) 
vs. (1.7) and (2) vs. (1.8) and (1.9)), we obtain the following result: 
Proposition 1.A. Under private ownership of the assets, the 
introduction of the selection lowers the incentive to invest in 
the first period: the lower the probability to be active in the 
second period, the lower the investment. 
This result is due to the uncertainty over the fact that the incumbent 
will be active in the second period, so that he could not be able to 
internalize entirely the effects of his investment. The choice of the 
second period investment is not affected. 
5.2. Public ownership of the assets 
We analyze the case in which the authority decides to buy the rolling 
stock of the incumbent. In the first period, the service is operated by the 
monopolist using his own assets. The incumbent knows that at the end 
of the first stage, the assets are transferred to the local authority, who 
pays a price – here normalized to zero – plus a reward for the 
investment undertaken that positively affects the value of the rolling 
stock. 
In the second period, the selected firm provides the service using 
public rolling stock. The payoff of the not selected firm is zero. 
Consider now the effect of the investment for each party, i.e. the 
incumbent, the competitor and the local authority. 
As for the decrease in costs, nothing changes relative to the baseline 
model or under private ownership: the firm invests and lowers the 
costs and increases the value of rolling stock in the same period and 
also generates an effect in the next stage. 
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The role of the investment on the rolling stock is different in some 
respects than we described in the previous frameworks. 
If the authority decides to acquire the assets (public ownership), it pays a 
price to the incumbent at the end of the first period: a fixed part, 
normalized to zero, plus a reward which depends on  the effect of the 
investment on the rolling stock )(
,1
I
PUBax
12. We assume that the 
authority offers )()(
,1,1
I
PUB
I
PUB abax ≤ , so that the incumbent cannot 
obtain more than under private ownership. 
Moreover, at the end of the second period, the authority pays a reward 
)(
,2
i
PUBax  to the provider i of the service to compensate it for the 
investment that affects the value of the public rolling stock. 
As the authority can supply the provider with rolling stock, it creates a 
potentially more competitive environment in the next periods, because 
also firms not owning the assets at all can compete for the market. In 
order to take into account this benefit, we consider an increase in the 
social value of the service of )(
,2
i
PUBau
13, i.e. consumers benefit of the 
investment in the public owned rolling stock.  
Under public ownership, the incumbent obtains )(
,1
I
PUBax in the first 
period and if he remains active, he enjoys entirely the indirect effect 
( ) )(
,1
I
PUBabhg +  and is paid )( ,2I PUBax  for the second period investment. 
If the competitor is selected, then she benefits of the transferable part 
)(
,1
I
PUBagb , because she uses the public assets and receives the reward 
)(
,2
C
PUBax , if she invests. 
The following table summarizes the effect of the investment on the 
value of the rolling stock for the firms and for the authority: 
 
 
 
                                                                 
12 0'>x , 0<′′x . The model does not include negotiation between parties: x 
can  be understood as a take it or leave it offer. 
13 0,0' <′′> uu  
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 Public Ownership - Value of rolling stock 
 t=1 t=2 
Incumbent )(
,1
I
PUBax  
( ) )()(
,2,1
I
PUB
I
PUB axabhg ++  
if I is  active 
Competitor  )()( ,2,1
C
PUB
I
PUB axagb +  
if C is active 
Local Authority )()1()(
,1,1
I
PUB
I
PUB axab λ+−  )()()1()( ,2,2,2 i PUBi PUBi PUB auaxab ++− λ  
 
The objective function of the authority is: 
[ ]
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,1,1,1,1
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I
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The incumbent maximizes his expected payoff  
I
PUB
I
PUB
I
PUB
I
PUB PwPP ,2,1 δ+= , 
where IPUBw  is the probability that the incumbent remains active in the 
second period and operates with public assets: 
[
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TwaxadaCTP
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β
δβ
   (2.1) 
and the participation constraint is 0≥IPUBP          (2.2) 
The competitor’s payoff if she is active in the second period is: 
)()()(),(
,2,1,2,2,2,2
C
PUB
I
PUB
C
PUB
I
PUB
CC
PUB
C
PUB
C
PUB axagbadaCTP ++−−= β        (2.3) 
and the participation constraint is 0≥CPUBP          (2.4) 
Under complete information, the regulator maximizes the objective 
function subject to (2.2) and (2.4): 
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where **PUBβ  is the breakout rule under public ownership, i.e. the 
threshold that determines the second period provider. 
Under complete information, the authority chooses the (optimal)  
breakout rule maximizing (2.5) with respect to **PUBβ . Therefore, the 
competitor is selected if her cost parameter is lower than **PUBβ , such 
that:  )(
,1,1
** I
PUB
I
PUB
I
PUB ahbka −−≤ ββ .  
As we noticed in the private ownership framework, the local authority 
selects the firm whose cost parameter grants the lower level of costs 
and also accounts for the advantage that only the incumbent can enjoy. 
Hence, the program becomes: 
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The optimal levels of investment are: 
( )( ))(')(1)(')('
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+−++
+
+= βδδλ
(2.7) 
When the authority acquires the rolling stock, the optimal level of the 
investment is such that the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit of 
cost savings and of increased quality. The direct effect of the 
investment on the rolling stock is discounted for the value of public 
funds, because in this framework the authority grants a reward to the 
incumbent undertaking the investment. 
The investment in the first period affects the second period utility of the 
provider, so the authority also considers the benefits in the second 
stage. Part of the them is certain and it corresponds to the transferable 
part: it is strictly linked to the rolling stock and the second period 
provider benefits of it, regardless of who the provider is. Part of the 
benefits is considered in expectation: the reduction in the second period 
cost and the non transferable effect on rolling stock is realized only if 
the incumbent keep on being the monopolist. 
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In the second period, the optimal levels of investment are determined 
by the equality of the marginal cost to the marginal benefit of cost 
savings and of the increase in the value of assets and in social utility. As 
in the first period, the authority accounts for the cost of public funds.  
Compare these results with the baseline results ((1) v. (2.7) and (2) v. 
(2.8) and (2.9)): 
Proposition 1.B. Under public ownership, the selection lowers 
first period investment. This effect is larger, the lower the 
probability for the incumbent to remain active and the larger 
the cost of public funds. 
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In the second period,  if 
[ ])()('
1
1)('
,2,22
i
PUB
i
PUB
I
auabab ′+
+
> λ   
then the level of investment with the selection is lower. This is 
more likely to hold, the larger the cost of public funds and the 
smaller the marginal increase in the social utility. 
In the first period, the investment is lower because part of the benefits 
is not certain but is only expected. Moreover, the local authority 
requires a lower level if the cost of public funds is high, because it has 
to pay for the rolling stock a price which is partly related to the 
investment. 
In the second period, the public ownership generates an additional 
social utility and if it is high enough, it could overwhelm the effect of 
the costs of public funds and lead to higher investment.  
5.3. Ownership and investment levels under complete 
information 
After the introduction of the selection, the uncertainty over the 
possibility of being active in the second period lowers the optimal level 
of investment in the first period both under private and under public 
ownership. Moreover, under public ownership the cost of public funds 
plays an important role on the choice of investment, because the larger 
the cost, the higher the probability to have lower investment in both 
periods, even if the social utility increases thank to the possibility of 
supplying next period competitor with the rolling stock. 
Let us now compare what happens to the level of investment once the 
competitive selection is enforced, according to the type of ownership 
(i.e. consider the first order conditions (1.7) v. (2.7), (1.8) v. (2.8) and 
(1.9) v. (2.9)):  
Proposition 1.C. In the first period, the investment under 
private ownership is larger than under public ownership, the 
larger the cost of public funds and the probability for the 
incumbent to be selected and the smaller the transferable part of 
the investment. 
In the second period, the investment under private ownership 
may be larger or smaller than under public ownership. The 
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investment is larger under private ownerships if the cost of 
public funds is high and the marginal effect of public ownership 
on the social utility is small. 
Under public ownership, the local authority acquires the incumbent’s 
rolling stock and pays in both periods a reward which is function of 
the effect of the investment. Therefore, the higher the cost of public 
funds, the lower is the incentive of the authority to promote the 
investment. 
The gap between the private and public investment decreases 
(increases) the larger (the smaller) the transferable part of the 
investment. Recall that under public ownership the second period 
provider enjoys the transferable part of the investment and this is true 
regardless of who the provider is. If this part is very significant, i.e. if  g 
is large, then the local authority wants the incumbent to invest more 
because it is sure that the second period provider will benefit of it (vice 
versa for low value of  g). 
Finally, in the second period some ambiguity emerges. If the 
additional social utility generated by the public ownership of the assets 
does not overcome the effect of the cost of public funds, then the 
investment required is still lower than in the private ownership 
framework. 
6. Selection under asymmetric information 
Let us now assume that the local authority does not know the cost 
parameter of each firm iβ . It only knows that the two cost parameters 
are independently drawn from the same distribution )(βf over the 
interval [ ]ββ ,  with cumulative distribution )(βF . The local authority 
offers a menu of contract { }itit CF ,  among which each firm can choose14. 
                                                                 
14 For notational simplicity, we do not always substitute to Ia1  the 
expression )(
,1
II
PR
I C ββ − and similarly for ia2  
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6.1. Private ownership 
Under asymmetric information, the authority has to take into account 
both the incentive and the individual rationality constraints of the 
incumbent. 
The incentive constraint represents the decrease in the rent for the 
incumbent when the cost parameter is marginally increased:  
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The participation constraint ensures that all type of firm can take part 
into the selection. The following participation constraint states that the 
least efficient type gets no rent at the optimum: 
0)( =IPRIPRP β              (3.2) 
The same constraints have to be considered for the competitor. The 
incentives constraint is: 
( ) ( ))(')(')(
,2,2
CC
PR
CCC
PR
CCC
PR CbCdP βββββ −+−−=         (3.3) 
The participation constraint is such that the most inefficient type does 
not obtain a rent. 
0))(( * =IIPRCPRP βββ             (3.4) 
The most inefficient competitor is the one with cost parameter *PRβ , that 
is the highest value of the cost parameter that the local authority is 
willing to accept. 
Hence, the authority’s maximization program is: 
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subject to constraints from (3.1) to (3.4) 
The optimal levels of investment are: 
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The same observations made in the case of complete information apply, 
but here the local authority considers the distortion from asymmetric 
information. Compare the results with those obtained under complete 
information: the investment required to an inefficient type is always 
distorted downwards and only if the provider is the most efficient, than 
the level of the investment is the first best solution.  
It is interesting to notice that in the second period, even if the 
incumbent and the competitor were equally efficient, the optimal level 
of investment for the incumbent is higher as his distortion is lower due 
to the first period investment. 
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6.2. Public ownership 
As in the previous case, the authority accounts for the incentive and 
individual rationality constraints of the firms. 
The incentive constraint of the incumbent is: 
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The individual participation constraints is written, so that no rents are 
left to the most inefficient type: 
0)( =IIPUBP β              (4.2) 
The incentive and individual rationality constraint for the competitor 
are respectively: 
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The authority’s maximization program becomes: 
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subject to constraints from (4.1) to (4.4). 
The optimal levels of the investment are such that 
( )[ ]
( )[ ( )( ) ])()(1)()()( )(1
)()(1)()(
1
11)('
:
*
,1
**
,1
*
,1
*
,1
**
,1
*
,1
*
,1
*
,1
I
PUBPUB
I
PUB
I
PUBI
I
I
PUBPUB
I
PUB
I
PUB
I
PUB
I
PUB
abhgFaxadf
F
abhkFabgabad
a
′′+−−′′−′′
+
−
+′+−+′+′
+
+=
βδβ
β
λ
λ
βδδλ     (4.6) 
in the first period and in the second period: 
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As we noticed in the private ownership framework, asymmetric 
information distorts the level of investment downwards, except for the 
most efficient firm, while the level of investment of the incumbent is 
higher than the one exerted by the competitor. 
In the next section we compare the levels of investment in the two 
frameworks. 
6.3. Ownership and investment levels under 
asymmetric information 
Let us compare the levels of investment under private and under public 
ownership in case of asymmetric information. We have already seen 
that – absent asymmetric information – in the first period the public 
ownership regime requires lower investment, while for the second 
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period investment some ambiguities arise. Here, we have an additional 
trade-off between the effect of the investment and the rent from 
asymmetric information. 
Consider the first order conditions that define the levels of investment 
(from (3.6) to (3.8) and from (4.6) to (4.8)) and in particular the right 
hand side. 
Let’s first analyze the total marginal benefit (i.e. everything in the right 
hand side of first order conditions) except the rent from asymmetric 
information) The optimal investment of the incumbent is higher under 
private ownership than under public ownership for similar reasons as 
under complete information, i.e. for high value of the cost of public 
funds and of the probability for the incumbent to remain active and for 
low marginal increase in the additional social utility. 
As for the rent effect, we notice that in both periods, the distortion due 
to the asymmetric information under private ownership is larger then 
under public ownership as we assumed that the reward is at most 
equal to the value that the firm assigns to the investment. The smaller 
the reward, the lower the distortion, the higher the level of investment. 
Therefore, even if due to the effect on costs and rolling stock the level of 
investment with private ownership were larger than with public 
ownership, the difference between the rent under public ownership 
and the rent under private ownership could prevail and overturn the 
result. 
Therefore, in comparing the level of investment in the two frameworks, 
both the reward and the increase in the social utility are fundamental in 
determining  when the investment is higher. 
Thus, we can summarize:  
Proposition 2. Under asymmetric information, it is not 
possible to define which ownership leads to higher level of 
investment, because it depends on whether the effect on costs 
and rolling stock or the distortion due to asymmetric 
information prevails. 
If the first is stronger, then the investment is higher under 
private ownership, otherwise if the distortion is larger, the 
investment is higher under public ownership. 
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Therefore, it is not possible to obtain clear-cut results:  there is a trade-
off between the effect of the investment and the distortion from 
asymmetric information, which determines in which framework the 
investment is higher. 
7. Choosing the second period supplier 
In the previous section, we have compared the levels of investment 
considering the probability for the incumbent to be the second period 
provider as given, but the criterion of the selection (breakout rule) is 
endogenously defined. The local authority determines the maximum 
cost parameter *jβ  that can characterize the competitor selected as 
second period supplier. 
Recall that the higher *jβ , the lower the probability for the incumbent 
to be active in the second period.  
Understanding how the local authority chooses the rule is important 
because it is a tool that the authority can use to incentive investment in 
the first period: the higher the probability to be active in the second 
period, the more the incumbent is induced to invest even if he will not 
benefit of the effect on second period costs or of the indirect effect on 
the rolling stock. 
The local authority defines the breakout rule that maximizes its utility 
function, that is it defines for which level of the cost parameter it is 
willing to switch from the incumbent to the competitor: if the 
competitor has a cost parameter at most equal to the one defined by the 
rule, then she is selected as the second period supplier for the 
transportation service.  
In what follows, we want to explore under which conditions the 
incumbent remains active in the second period, because as mentioned 
in the introduction, this is the most frequent case across countries.  
We also characterize the breakout rule under private and under public 
ownership in case of asymmetric information over the cost parameter 
of the firms: we study if the incumbent or the competitor is favoured. 
The competitor is favoured if the threshold is higher than under 
complete information and vice versa, the incumbent is favoured if the 
breakout rule is lower than under complete information. 
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In order to carry out the analysis, we specify the model and observe the 
effect in the change of the different parameters on the threshold. 
7.1. Choice criteria under private ownership 
The threshold *PRβ  is the value of the cost parameter defined by the 
breakout rule under private ownership with asymmetric information. It 
is determined by the local authority, maximizing its welfare function 
(3.5) with respect to *PRβ . 
The competitor is selected if the following inequality holds: 
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     (5.1) 
According to the cost parameter of the incumbent, what is the 
probability of him to keep on being the second period supplier? And 
does asymmetric information favours the incumbent or the competitor? 
One firm is favoured under asymmetric information if it has greater 
probability to be active in the second period than under complete 
information. The incumbent is favoured if *** PRPR ββ < , while the 
competitor is favoured if *** PRPR ββ > , where **PRβ  is the threshold under 
complete information. 
Recall that **PRβ  is such that ( )I PRI PRIPR abhgkaR ,1,10** )( +−−≤+ ββ . 
In order to perform the comparison, it is convenient to specify the 
model as follows: we assume that the cost parameters of the firms are 
uniformly distributed over the interval [1,2]. 
Moreover, the disutility of the investment is 2
,,
)()( i PRti PRt aad =  and the 
benefit on the rolling stock is i PRt
i
PRt aab ,, 5
1)( = . 
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We use some graphs to illustrate the probability for the incumbent to 
be selected and to show when the breakout rule favours the incumbent 
and when it favours the competitor15. 
The graphs marked by A. represent for each value of the incumbent’s 
cost parameter Iβ (on the horizontal axis) the probability to be selected, 
according to different values of a certain parameter. 
The figure denoted by B. represents for each value of Iβ (on the 
horizontal axis) the value of PR∆ , defined as the difference between the 
threshold under asymmetric information *PRβ  and the one under 
complete information **PRβ : *** PRPRPR ββ −=∆ . 
If PR∆  is positive, then the competitor is favoured by asymmetric 
information ( *** PRPR ββ > ), while if it is negative ( *** PRPR ββ < ), then the 
incumbent is favoured.  
Keeping constant all other parameters, we examine how  PR∆  changes 
when the following parameter changes: 
“Extra” cost of  the competitor 
The selected competitor has to bear an extra cost relative to the 
incumbent. The larger this cost, the lower the breakout rule that the 
authority chooses at the beginning of the game, so that the incumbent 
has more probability to be the second period provider (Figure 1.A.). 
When the extra cost is large, the authority is willing to change the 
provider of the service only if it is very efficient. 
Figure 1.B. represents the difference between the cost threshold defined 
under asymmetric and under complete information. If the competitor 
has a cost parameter equal to the threshold, then she is favoured under 
asymmetric information. 
Consider for example when the extra cost is equal to 0.2, then if the cost 
parameter of the incumbent 3.1≤Iβ  the threshold is so low that the 
competitor is not selected. For 3.1>Iβ , the breakout rule allows a 
competitor to enter and the asymmetric information favours her, 
                                                                 
15 The numerical value of some of the simulations are in the appendix 
A.1. 
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because under complete information the authority would choose a 
lower threshold, that is it would lower the probability of the competitor 
to enter. 
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Figure 1.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the extra cost of the competitor ( 0R ) 
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Figure 1.B.: effect of  the extra cost of the competitor ( 0R ) on  PR∆ , according 
to Iβ  
 
  53 
Remark 1.A.: The larger the extra-cost of the 
competitor, the larger the probability for the 
incumbent to provide the service in the second period. 
If the competitor is efficient enough, then she is 
favoured under asymmetric information. 
Cost of public funds: 
The increase in the cost of public funds induces the authority to lower 
the probability for the incumbent to be selected (Figure 2.A.). 
The cost of public funds affects the rent from asymmetric information 
in both periods: the higher the cost, the higher the rent. 
The probability to be selected as second period provider has a double 
effect on the choice of  first period investment: it raises the level of 
investment through the total marginal benefit but it decreases it 
through the rent. In this specification of the model, the second effect 
seems to prevail so that the local authority prefers to lower the 
probability for the incumbent to be active to mitigate the rent effect. 
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Figure 2.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the cost of public funds ( λ ) 
 
If the competitor has a cost parameter “low enough”, the larger the cost 
of public funds, the more the competitor is favoured. (Figure 2.B.). 
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Effect of the Cost of Public Funds
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Figure 2.B.: effect of  the cost of public funds ( λ ) on  PR∆ , according to Iβ  
 
Remark 2.A.: The larger the cost of public funds, the 
lower the probability for the incumbent to be active in 
the second period. Under asymmetric information, the 
competitor is favoured. 
 
Discount factor: 
If the discount factor increases, the probability to keep the incumbent in 
the second period is larger (Figure 3.A.).  
Once the competitor is efficient enough, then the breakout rule under 
asymmetric information favours the competitor (Figure 3.B.). 
Remark 3.A.: The larger the discount factor, the 
higher the probability to keep the incumbent. Under 
asymmetric information, the competitor is favoured. 
  55 
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
0.2
0.4
0.8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
to
 
re
m
ai
n
 
ac
tiv
e 
fo
r 
I
Cost parameter of I
Discount Factor
Effect of the Discount Factor
0.2 0.4 0.8
 
Figure 3.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the discount factor ( δ ) 
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Figure 3.B.: effect of  the discount factor ( δ ) on  PR∆ , according to Iβ  
 
Transferable and non transferable part of the investment: 
The increase in the indirect effect – either in the transferable or in the 
non transferable part – reduces the cost parameter chosen as threshold 
in the breakout rule (Figure 4.A.). 
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Figure 4.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the indirect effect ( hg + ) 
 
The competitor is favoured by the asymmetric information: 
Effect of the Transferable and Non-Transferable Part
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Figure 4.B.: effect of the indirect effect ( hg + ) on PR∆ , according to Iβ  
 
Remark 4.A.: the larger the indirect effect, the larger 
the probability for the incumbent to provide the 
service in the second period. Asymmetric information 
favours the competitor. 
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The larger the indirect effect, the larger the advantage that only the 
incumbent can internalize in the second period. Therefore, the 
authority prefers not to switch the provider, unless the competitor is 
very efficient. 
Reduction in second period costs: 
Let us now consider the effect of first period investment on the second 
period costs. As for the indirect effect on the rolling stock, the authority 
is willing to change the service provider only if the entrant is very 
efficient, because the incumbent is able to save on costs in the second 
period. (Figure 5.A.) 
 
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
to
 
re
m
ai
n
 
ac
tiv
e 
fo
r 
I
Cost parameter of I
k
Effect of the Reduction in Costs
0.2 0.4 0.6
 
Figure 5.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the reduction in second period costs due to first period investment 
(k) 
 
Asymmetric information, does not always favour the competitor 
(Figure 5.B.). 
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Effect of the Reduction in Costs
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Figure 5.B.: effect of the reduction in second period costs due to first period 
investment (k) on PR∆ ,according to Iβ  
 
Remark 5.A.: the incumbent has higher probability 
to provide the service, the larger the effect of the first 
period investment on the second period costs. 
Under asymmetric information, it is more probable to 
have the competitor favoured. 
 
We have obtained these results for a particular specification of the 
model. Nevertheless, we can observe that under private ownership the 
first period investment grants to the incumbent an advantage in the 
second period selection. The incumbent seems to have higher 
probability to remain the monopolist of the local market in the second 
period, the higher the effect of his investment on the costs and on the 
rolling stock. 
Under private ownership, the local authority does not own the assets so 
that it cannot benefit directly of the investment and does not obtain an 
increase in the social utility as it happens under public ownership. 
Therefore, the authority is more willing to favour the firm that is more 
efficient, and this efficiency is measured also including the effect on 
costs and rolling stock. 
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Only the cost of public funds plays the opposite role, as it lowers the 
probability of the incumbent to continue to be the monopolist. 
The local authority is ready to entrust the competitor with the service 
only if she has a very low cost parameter. The competitor has higher 
probability to become the second period provider under asymmetric 
information, than under complete information. 
7.2. Choice criteria under public ownership 
As for the private ownership framework, we determine the optimal 
breakout rule maximizing the local authority program (4.5) with 
respect to *PUBβ . The competitor is selected if the following disequality 
holds: 
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    (5.2) 
 
Following the same line of the analysis of the breakout rule under 
private ownership, we specify the model for the public ownership 
framework. 
The cost parameter that characterizes each firm is independently drawn 
from a uniform distribution in the interval [1,2]. 
The disutility of the effect of the investment is 2
,,
)()( i PUBti PUBt aad =  and 
the benefit on the rolling stock is i PUBt
i
PUBt aab ,, 5
1)( = . 
As the ownership is public, the local authority pays a reward 
)()(
,,
i
PUBt
i
PUBt abax θ=  
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and gains )()(
,2,2
i
PUB
i
PUB abau ω= , where [ ]1,0, ∈ωθ . 
As before, we use some graphs to illustrate the probability for the 
incumbent to be selected and to show when the breakout rule favours 
the incumbent and when it favours the competitor16. 
The graphs defined by A. report for each value of the incumbent’s cost 
parameter Iβ (on the horizontal axis) the probability to be selected, 
according to different values of the parameter at hand. 
The graphs B. illustrate the value of PUB∆ , for any given 
Iβ  (on the 
horizontal axis) and PUB∆  is the difference between the threshold under 
asymmetric information *PUBβ  and the threshold under complete 
information **PUBβ . **PUBβ  is such that )( ,1,1** I PUBI PUBIPUB ahbka −−≤ ββ . 
Therefore, *** PUBPUBPUB ββ −=∆ . If PUB∆  is positive, then the competitor 
is favoured ( *** PUBPUB ββ > ), while if it is negative, then the incumbent is 
favoured ( *** PUBPUB ββ < ).  
We keep constant all other parameter and examine the effect of the 
variation of the following parameter: 
Cost of public funds 
The larger the cost of public funds, the larger the rent from asymmetric 
information; therefore, the local authority lowers the probability for the 
incumbent to remain active (Figure 6.A.).  
If the cost of public funds increases, the probability of having a 
breakout rule that under asymmetric information favours the 
competitor increases (Figure 6.B.). In contrast to what seen for the 
private ownership, above a certain level of the cost parameter, the 
threshold favours the incumbent. 
 
Remark 1.B: the larger the cost of public funds, the 
lower the probability for the incumbent to be the 
second period provider. 
                                                                 
16 The numerical value of some of the simulations are in the appendix 
A.1. 
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The probability that the  breakout rule favours the 
competitor is higher, the higher the cost of public 
funds. 
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Figure 6.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the cost of public funds ( λ ) on PUB∆  according to Iβ  
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Figure 6.B.: effect of  the cost of public funds ( λ ) on PUB∆  according to Iβ  
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Discount factor 
The increase in the value of the discount factor leads the authority to 
choose a lower threshold, so that the incumbent has more probability to 
be selected (Figure 7.A.). The competitor is more often favoured when 
the discount factor increases (Figure 7.B.). 
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Figure 7.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the discount factor ( δ ) 
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Figure 7.B.: effect of  the discount factor  ( δ ) on PUB∆ , according to Iβ  
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Remark 2.B: the probability to select the incumbent 
is higher for high values of the discount factor. 
The  breakout rule favours the competitor more often 
for high discount factor. 
Indirect effect of the investment on the rolling stock  
Under public ownership, regardless of who is the provider in the 
second period, the firm benefits of the transferable part g, while only if 
the incumbent remains active he enjoys the non transferable part h. 
The authority is able to internalize the benefits of the investment on the 
rolling stock even if in an indirect manner, acquiring the incumbent 
assets. Hence, in order to induce more investment in the first period, 
the selection is biased in favour of the incumbent, the larger the 
transferable effect on the rolling stock (Figure 8.A.). 
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Figure 8.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of effect of  transferable investment (g) on PUB∆  according to 
Iβ  
 
Moreover, the larger the transferable part the lower the probability to 
have the competitor favoured (Figure 8.B.). 
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Effect of theTransferable Part
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Figure 8.B.: effect of transferable part of the investment (g) on PUB∆  
according to Iβ  
 
Remark 3.B: if the first period investment has a high 
transferable effect on the rolling stock, then the 
incumbent has higher probability to remain active. 
Asymmetric information favours the competitor less, 
the larger the transferable effect.    
 
Consider now the non transferable part of the investment.  
If the share of non-transferable effect increases, the incumbent enjoys 
again an advantage (Figure 9.A.), because the lower is the breakout rule 
chosen by the authority, that is the incumbent has a higher probability 
to be active in the second period. 
Contrary to what found for the transferable part of the investment, 
once the competitor is efficient enough, the probability of having the 
competitor favoured increases with the share of non-transferable effect. 
The authority does not need to induce more investment because only 
the incumbent benefits of it and already has an incentive in investing. 
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Figure 9.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the transferable part of the investment (h) 
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Figure 9.B.: effect of non transferable part of the investment (h) on PUB∆  
according to Iβ  
 
Remark 4.B:  the greater the non-transferable part of 
the effect on the rolling stock, the larger the 
probability for the incumbent to keep on providing the 
service and the larger the probability of having the 
competitor favoured.    
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Effect on the second period cost 
If the incumbent invests in the first period, then he can exploit a 
reduction in second period costs. The higher is this effect, the lower is 
the threshold chosen by the authority: if the investment has a high 
impact on the second period costs, then the authority is willing to 
accept only very efficient competitor (Figure 10.A.). If the competitor 
has a cost parameter equal to the threshold, then she is more favoured, 
the larger the effect on second period costs (Figure 10.B.). 
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Figure 10.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the reduction in second period costs due to first period investment 
(k) 
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Effect of the Reduction in Costs
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Figure 10.B.: effect of  the reduction in second period costs due to first period 
investment (k) on  PUB∆ , according to
Iβ  
  
Remark 5.B: if the reduction in second period cost is 
high, the authority chooses a low threshold. If the cost 
parameter of C equals the threshold, the larger the 
effect on the second period cost, the higher the 
probability to have the competitor favoured.  
 
Effect of the reward 
In the specification of the model we considered the reward for the 
incumbent in the first period and for the second period provider to be a 
share (θ ) of the value that the firm would assign to the rolling stock in 
case of private ownership. Under asymmetric information, the reward 
that the authority grants has an effect on the rent, so that the higher the 
reward, the higher the rent, the lower the investment required. The 
authority incentives the investment by increasing the probability of 
being active in the second period (Figure 11.A.). 
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Figure 11.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of  the reward  (θ ) 
 
Asymmetric information favours the competitor more, the lower the 
reward (Figure 11.B.). 
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Figure 11.B.: effect of  the reward  (θ ) on  PUB∆ , according to Iβ  
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Remark 6.B:  the larger the reward the incumbent 
receives, the larger the probability to select the 
incumbent. Asymmetric information favours the 
competitor for low reward. 
Effect of  the impact on social utility 
The public ownership in the second period positively affects the social 
utility and the effect depends on the investment undertaken in that 
period. In our specification the parameter that represents this increase 
as a part of the effect on the rolling stock is ω . 
If the impact is per se already strong, i.e. even in case of a small 
investment the society gains a lot, then the authority prefers to bias the 
selection in favour of the competitor in order to exploit the advantage 
from a lower rent to the incumbent in the first period (Figure 12.A.): 
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Figure 12.A.: probability for I to be active in t=2, according to Iβ for different 
values of the impact on the social utility ( ω )   
 
The larger is the effect on social utility, the more the competitor is 
favoured (Figure 12.B.). 
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Effect of the Impact on Social Utility
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Figure 12.B.: effect of the impact on the social utility  (ω ) on PUB∆ , according 
to Iβ  
 
Remark 7.B:  the larger the impact on the social 
utility, the lower the probability to be active in the 
second period for the incumbent and the larger the 
probability to have the competitor favoured.   
 
To summarize, under public ownership the larger the effect of the 
investment on the costs or on the rolling stock, the larger is the 
probability for the incumbent to remain active. As highlighted in the 
private ownership context, the first period activity of the monopolist 
gives him an advantage over the competitor. 
Only the increase in the cost of public funds or of the impact on social 
utility lowers the probability for the incumbent to be chosen. 
Finally, notice that the asymmetric information over the cost parameter 
of the firm tends sometimes to favour the competitor and sometimes to 
favour the incumbent. 
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8. Concluding remarks and possible extensions 
Having the aim of a potentially more competitive environment for the 
local rail market, the problem of the rolling stock supply has to be 
tackled. The assessment of the solutions proposed certainly has to take 
into account the incentive to invest, because maintenance and 
investment in security represent consistent financial investments for the 
firm but also does the investment in the quality of the service. 
As seen in the model above, the optimal levels of investment is sensible 
to the choice of the ownership of the rolling stock in the second period 
as in the two frameworks the firms and the authority are able to 
internalize the effect on costs and rolling stock different ways. 
In the case of complete information, the cost of public funds and the 
benefit the society obtains from having the local authority as the owner 
of the assets play a crucial role in defining in which context there is a 
higher level of investment. 
If the cost of public funds are low enough and the marginal increase in 
the additional utility is high, then the public ownership leads to larger 
amount of investment. 
Unfortunately, the local authority does not have all the information 
about the costs of the firm.  
Under asymmetric information, there is a trade-off between the effect 
of the investment and the rent from asymmetric information and it is 
not possible to obtain clear-cut results. 
As this model refers to the local markets, it leads us to conclude that a 
one-fit-all solution cannot be applied. If the aim is to increase the 
investment of the provider to supply a better service in terms of quality 
(i.e. well maintained rolling stock, cleaning service, etc), it is necessary 
to evaluate the market and decide how to solve rolling stock issue in 
that particular market, according to its characteristics. 
It is necessary to consider carefully the cost of public funds, because a 
high cost reduces the optimal level of investment and the effect is 
probably stronger under public ownership, because the local authority 
acquires the rolling stock and also pays a reward for the investment 
undertaken by the provider. 
Therefore, the local authority has to decide if the benefits generated by 
the investment are able to overcome the cost of buying the assets.  In 
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our model we assumed that the public ownership of the assets 
generates an additional  social utility: if it is large enough, then buying 
the rolling stock would be an appropriate answer to the need of 
increasing investment. 
Studying the probability for the incumbent to be selected in the second 
period – even if for a particular specification of the model – we found 
that the first period investment increases the probability to be active in 
the second period for the incumbent and this is true both under private 
and under public ownership. This finding is in line with what we 
observe at least in Italy: the company operating the line is very often 
the same that will be active for the next period contract. 
Only the increase in the cost of public funds  lowers the probability for 
the incumbent to be selected. 
In this paper we did not consider the level of subsidies but it would be 
interesting to check which framework calls for lower transfers (or at 
least for which characteristics of the market) and study the impact of 
each arrangement on total welfare. 
In the model, the game is designed such that the authority announces 
at the beginning of the first period in which framework the provider 
operates. But consider the case in which even if the incumbent knows 
that in the next period the supplier will be selected, the authority does 
not reveal its choice about the type of ownership. What we expect is to 
have the incumbent investing less in the first period. When the 
incumbent invests in the first period, he is no longer uncertain only 
over the result of the selection but also over the probability of being 
active in the second period as the rule of the selection is not known. 
Finally, we considered only one type of investment that positively 
affects both the costs and the value of rolling stock. What else if the 
incumbent could undertake an investment which lowers cost but also 
quality (as Hart 2003 or as the negative externality in Bennett and 
Iossa)? If the authority announces that it will buy the assets, then it 
might be the case that the incumbent lowers the quality of the rolling 
stock, in case he has low probability to be active in the second period. 
 
  73 
Chapter 3 
Universal and Public Service Obligations 
1. Introduction 
The concepts of universal service (US) and of public service obligations 
(PSO) refer to general economic interest service that is services that 
public authorities consider of general interest but which would not be 
provided if left to the commercial interest of firms. 
The liberalization of the railway sector requires a particular attention to 
the issue of universal and public service obligation. The entry of new 
firms is likely to happen in profitable segments. Therefore, the previous 
monopolist is probably no longer able to cross subsidize between 
profitable and unprofitable provisions of services. 
Once a Member State recognizes the general interest connected to an 
activity, it can implement a special discipline in order to achieve its 
objective that is the provision of the service under specific conditions. 
A possible device is to provide for public service obligation. There is 
not a unique definition of this concept, but according to some authors17 
it is a specific provision or a specific way of providing an activity (in 
terms of regularity, continuity, quality, security, etc.) in line with what 
public authority recognizes to be of public interest. 
The universal service is a way of implementing this obligation. The 
European Commission (2001) defines the universal service obligation 
as the obligation to provide a specific service on the entire territory at 
accessible prices and at similar quality, regardless of the profitability of 
the operation. 
The universal service obligation is referred to in the European 
legislation only in the telecommunications and postal sector. 
Each Member State evaluates the need for service obligations according 
to its domestic conditions and therefore there is not a unique definition 
and implementation of USO. For example, in Italy for both the 
telecommunication and the postal sector the law implementing EU 
                                                                 
17 See Sorace, 1999 
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directives defines in details the services subject to universal service 
obligations and provide for the set up of a fund to finance US where the 
operators contribute according to certain rule18. 
The railway sector is not subject to a discipline of universal service 
obligations, even if according to some authors (Cartei, 2002) the 
reference to “sufficient services”, “particular tariff conditions” and to 
“specific passengers’ categories”, could represent the key elements to 
define a universal service discipline also in the railway sector. 
As for the transport sector, the European and the national legislation 
only refer to public service obligation that is “obligations which the 
transport undertaking in question, if it were considering its own 
commercial interests, would not assume or would not assume to the 
same extent or under the same conditions” (Reg. 1191/69). There are 
three components to consider: the obligation to operate, the obligation 
to carry and tariff obligations. 
The obligation to operate mainly refers to any obligation imposed on an 
operator to ensure the provision of a transport service satisfying fixed 
standard of continuity, regularity and capacity. 
The obligation to carry means that the undertaking is obliged to accept 
and carry passengers at specific rates and conditions. 
Finally, the tariff obligation requires the undertakings to apply special 
tariffs to certain categories of passengers or on certain routes.  
It is interesting to note that neither the USO nor the PSO are static 
concepts as the European Commissions establishes that in the telecoms 
and in the postal sector the set of services has to be defined according 
to technological process, market evolution and consumers demand. 
Also for the railway sector PSOs can be revised as obligations can be 
ceased if a different intermodal service is active. 
Therefore, the evaluation of which routes are subject to public service 
obligations is necessarily forward looking, that is public authority takes 
into account which routes could be abandoned in the absence of 
adequate incentives and the existence of alternative mode of transport. 
The demand side analysis is fundamental: the liberalization of a sector 
in which the demand is slowly increasing or is declining leads to the 
                                                                 
18 For the telecommunication sector see Laffont and Tirole 2000 and 
Cambini, 2002. For the postal sector see Visco, 2003 
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serious threat for the incumbent subject to service obligations of loosing 
revenues with the opening up of the market. As underlined at the 
beginning of this section, new entrants will compete for the profitable 
market, reducing the incumbent’s revenues and possibly increasing his 
deficit due to PSOs. 
Moreover, the definition of the obligations has to look at the economies 
of the service. In railways, we distinguish between economies of 
densities and economies of size (Seabright et al., 2003). The first refer to 
the change in costs due to the increase in traffic, given the network. The 
latter represents the change in costs given the density, but varying the 
network. Empirical analyses highlight the existence of economies of 
density, as if traffic increases on a certain network, the passenger – 
kilometre cost decreases, while the results for economies of size are not 
clear cut. For example, Cantos (2001) find that returns to density for the 
main European operators vary from 1.42 to 2.04, while returns to scale 
vary between 0.45 to 1.4. 
If the sector is characterized by technological progress, then it is more 
likely to observe the raise of new profitable niches or segments in the 
market. This aspect could reduce the impact of service obligations on 
the costs. The railway industry does not show technological advances 
as in telecommunications, but is not as static as the postal sector. 
Consider for example, the high speed transport, whose development 
calls for new revenues.  
The use of universal service concept only in telecoms and postal service 
justifies the extensive literature applied to these two sectors. 
Studies on railways are still limited and the existing ones are mainly 
reports about the solutions adopted by different countries as for 
example the information gathered in the Liberalization Index Studies 
(2002, 2004, and 2007) and in the CER19 report (2005). 
In the next sections we review some of the main studies about 
universal service obligation. 
2. Rationale for USO and costs 
The rationale for the existence of the USO is often attributed (Cremer et 
al., 1998 and 2001) to the existence of network externalities, to a 
                                                                 
19 Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies 
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redistributive objective of the public authorities and to the public good 
characteristics of some services. 
If an activity has network externality, the promotion of its diffusion 
avoid that the participation is too low, depressing the development of 
the network. But network externalities do not completely support the 
imposition of USO because not in all sectors characterized by network 
externalities it is possible to justify the implementation of USO and 
because some of the USO constraints do not appear to have the 
promotion of network externalities as object. 
USO can also be interpreted as a redistributive device towards high 
cost consumers when prices only partially represent cost differentials 
and towards low-income individuals if special tariffs are designed for 
specific social categories. 
Finally, the service at glance often has the characteristics of public 
good, so that from a social point of view its existence is worthy per se. 
It is also important to notice that universal service obligation (USO) can 
be an instrument of regional policy, especially if the spread of services 
helps in sustaining the development of the region or prevent from the 
decline particular areas. 
Extensive attention was devoted to the issue of how to measure the cost 
of USO. 
One possible way is to consider the profitability cost that is defined as 
the loss in profits incurred by the operator due to the USO, as the Net 
Avoidable Cost. On the other hand, one can consider the welfare cost, 
defined as the deadweight loss implied by USO.  
Panzar (2000) defines the method to measure the cost of fulfilling a 
universal service obligation, based on the computation of additional 
resource costs incurred and foregone revenues. 
The process starts with the definition of the set of services included in 
USO, bearing in mind some characteristics, such as the strength of 
network effects, the costs and the redistributive goals. Customers have 
to be divided into two groups according to the fact that they would or 
would not buy without service obligations. 
To understand the cost of PSO it is necessary to consider an 
hypothetical competitive market alternative and check the incremental 
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costs due to service obligations and the foregone revenues, which 
depend on the subsidy mechanism.  
Even if from a logical point of view this is a correct method, it requires 
a lot of information which are rarely available, such as a specific 
information about customers (for example, would customer x buy 
without USO or not?). 
Therefore, Panzar suggests a more direct way of determining the cost 
of USO, equal to the losses due to the connection of subscribers for 
whom the incremental cost of connection exceeds the socially 
determined maximum allowable rate. 
As for the costs, Panzar proposes to rely on the costs that would 
actually be incurred by the provision of additional service relative to 
the unsubsidized market benchmark, to define the floor for the 
subsidies, while the ceiling on subsidy is measured by the stand-alone 
cost of providing the services. 
Rodriguez and Storer (2000) suggest using the Entry Pricing approach. 
They analyse the postal sector and compare the Net Avoided Cost 
(NAC) approach with the Entry Pricing (EP) approach. The advantage 
of the latter one accounts not only for the avoidable costs but also for 
the effect of changing in the market structure. 
Recall that in the postal sector there exists an area of reserved activities 
that cross - subsidize USOs. The constraint is represented by uniform 
prices and geographical constraint so that all consumers must be 
connected to the network. 
The authors argue that if the market structure is stable, then the NAC is 
an appropriate measure, even if when – as in the postal sector - there 
exists a reservation area it is of little practical use. 
The EP approach appears to be more appropriate if the sector is subject 
to ongoing modifications, due for example to liberalization as 
competition and entry could occur, because while NAC assumes a 
value, EP cost varies according to market condition. The larger the 
number of competitors, the lower the profits for the US provider on 
profitable routes. Therefore, the use of NAC to evaluate the cost of 
universal service if entry occurs could underestimate the real cost of 
providing the service at the same uniform price pre entry. 
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3. Allocation and funding of service obligations 
In this section we review the main insights of the literature about the 
allocation and financing of universal service obligations. 
We are aware that the concept of universal service applies only to the 
telecommunication and postal sector, but as there are strong similarities 
with public service obligations, this literature represents the 
appropriate reference also for the railway sector. 
Recall that the increasing attention to the issue of service obligations is 
linked to the opening of sectors previously served by a monopolist able 
to cross subsidize between profitable and non profitable markets. As 
soon as the market is open to new firms, concerns about entry and 
financing arise. As for entry, one can expect “too much” entry in the 
profitable segments and “too little” in the unprofitable one, unless 
there is some mechanism inducing firms to compete for the segment 
subject to service obligations (Armstrong, 2001). Moreover, there is also 
a difficulty in financing if entry occurs only in the profitable market as 
this would limit the ability of the incumbent to cross subsidize across 
markets. 
Therefore, at least two main areas can be analyzed: how to allocate 
service obligations among providers and how to finance the deficit. 
As for the first issue, it could be the case that there is a single 
designated operator that provides the service or that the operator is 
selected through an auction. 
In most of the countries, the firm providing the USO before 
liberalization keeps on providing it, but it can also happen that the 
authority responsible for service obligation chooses a different firm. We 
refer to this framework as restricted entry regulation that is the 
competitor is not allowed to serve USO area. 
However, a franchising system is a feasible alternative and it would 
have the advantage of potentially assign the USO to the most efficient 
provider.  
In betweens restricted entry and franchising, extensive attention has 
been devoted to pay or play (PoP) system, in which the entrant can 
decide not to pay the fee or tax required to finance the USO and serve 
non profitable consumers.  
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As for the financing issue, the mechanism could rely on funds raised by 
taxpayers either connected to the activity or not. 
If the mechanism is self funded, the deficit is covered by cross subsidies 
or taxes levied on consumers or firms involved in the markets. For 
example, the regulator can set up a fund where operators of the sector 
participate paying a fix fee or a specific tax levied on sales or through 
access surcharges. 
The other possibility is to finance the transfers through taxes levied on 
taxpayers, not necessarily participating into the market. This is the case 
for general taxation or for a fund common to the entire sector. Consider 
railways: not only railway operators could be require to contribute to 
the fund, but all transport operators, regardless of the mode of 
transport, contribute on the basis of a defined criterion as for example a 
measure of the negative environmental externalities they produce. 
A comparison of different financing mechanisms has been proposed by 
Gasmi et al. (2000). They use a forward looking engineering model to 
simulate possible market equilibria and welfare under different entry 
scenarios and regulatory intervention in the telecommunication sector. 
They show that for value of the cost of public funds above a certain 
threshold the use of cross subsidy still grant a higher welfare then 
when universal service is funded through cross subsidy. This is an 
interesting result, especially for developing countries, which often 
satisfy these thresholds. 
Service obligations are a constraint on the firm activity and have an 
impact on all connected markets. 
The relation between the markets is almost always modelled by the 
imposition of a uniform price for all the consumers regardless of the 
profitability of the segment. This kind of constraint is sometimes 
referred to as non discrimination constraint: the same tariff should be 
proposed to all consumers, whatever their location or their connection 
cost. 
But according to the definition of USO, also a ubiquity constraint can be 
imposed. The ubiquity constraint states that all consumers should be 
connected to a network, whatever their location and can be imposed 
together or independently of the non discrimination constraint. 
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Moreover, it could also be the case that special low tariffs that can be 
imposed for specific consumers, as for example for the customers in the 
rural area in telecommunications.  
In what follows we illustrate the main results of the literature and 
consider first the allocation and financing of service obligations for a 
given quality and size of the area subject to constraints and then 
consider the case for firms deciding the extension of obligations and 
quality of the service. 
In order to make the comparison of results easier, we refer to a general 
unified framework. Consider a market M characterized by 
heterogeneous consumers, which can be grouped in two different 
classes on the basis of their connection costs: the low cost group µ  and 
the high cost group µ , whose proportion in the population is 
respectively α  andα . 
Market M is divided into two segments: M  where the service 
obligation is imposed because of the presence of group µ  and M  
where all consumers are of type µ and firms are not constrained by 
USO. 
3.1. Allocation and financing with fixed quality and 
USO extension 
The most frequently case analyzed in the literature involves a regulator 
deciding how to allocate and finance service obligation for a service of 
a given quality on a certain area, i.e. to a defined group of consumers. 
A general finding is that when a firm operates both in a market with 
service obligations and in a competitive market, which are strategically 
linked, then it is less aggressive in the latter one. 
If the obligation is imposed on a certain operator, than the welfare 
effects depend both on the interplay between allocation mechanism 
and financing.  
If the USO provider is chosen on the basis of an auction, then it is 
usually possible to obtain an increase in welfare under not too 
restrictive conditions. 
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Hoering et al (2002) study the relation between regulation and 
competition if the aim is to promote competition and implement 
universal service. 
The existence of USO induces some distortions when competition takes 
place. First of all, inefficient entry may occur and in this case, they 
show that the set up of universal service fund can align private with 
social incentives. Secondly, the entry of a new provider reduces the 
profits in profitable market and this calls for a higher level of subsidy. 
Finally, if the link between markets is given by uniform pricing, then 
firms’ competition is less aggressive, so that equilibrium prices are 
higher and the deadweight loss increases. 
Chonè et al (2000) analyze the welfare effect of restricted entry (RE) 
regulation and pay or play rule (PoP), when service obligations are 
characterized by ubiquity (U) and/or spatial non discrimination 
constraints (UND/ND). 
With restricted entry regulation, the USOs are financed through taxes t 
levied on the profitable unit sold, so that for the incumbent it is an 
internal transfer and creates no distortion, while if the competitor 
serves the profitable market, then taxes are levied on his units sold and 
transfers to the incumbent take place. 
Under pay or play regulation, the competitor can serve non profitable 
consumers, but does not pay nor receive taxes, so that PSOs are funded 
by cross subsidies - either by the incumbent or by the competitor - or by 
a taxation as described for the restricted entry regulation. 
Chonè et al. (2002) extend the analysis considering also the possibility 
for the regulator to use transfers T. 
The results about which funding system leads to best results in terms of 
welfare W, depends both on the regulatory mechanism and on the 
constraints imposed. 
From consumers points of view, if service obligations require only the 
ubiquity constraint, high cost consumers prefer the PoP regulation both 
when the incumbent cross subsidizes between the two markets and 
when the taxation regime is implemented. But if the competitor cross 
subsidizes both segments, then the result is less clear cut because there 
is a multiplicity of equilibria, allocating differently the share of surplus 
between consumers and the firm. 
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As for total welfare, when only ubiquity constraint is imposed, they 
show that it is at least higher under pay or play regulation than under 
restricted entry regulation. The result is due to the possibility that 
under PoP, both markets are served by an entrant more efficient than 
the incumbent. 
Consider now the case of service obligations characterized both by the 
ubiquity and the non discrimination constraint: the result about welfare 
comparison no longer holds. 
When USO is characterized by the ubiquity constraint, then at equilibrium 
REPoP WW ≥ . If USO also satisfies the non discrimination constraint, then 
the same result holds if the tax rate is lower than a threshold t~ . 
By contrast to the case in which only ubiquity constraint is imposed, if 
also non discrimination has to be fulfilled, than the welfare under PoP 
can be strictly lower than under restricted entry regulation if the tax 
rate is above a certain threshold. 
The analysis thus highlights that the goodness of a certain funding or 
allocation mechanism cannot be evaluated per se, but it is necessary to 
consider the implementation conditions and the specific constraint 
imposed for USOs. 
Mirabel et al. (2008) focus on the compensation scheme in the funding 
mechanism. They show that a mix of unit and lump sum subsidy can help 
to reduce the distortions induced by USO. 
They also extend the analysis to the case of endogenous choice of the 
universal service provider. The subsidy mix solution appears to be 
welfare equivalent to play or pay regulation and superior to franchise 
bidding. 
The allocation of service obligation can take place also through 
auctions. Sorana (2000) compares the use of the Carrier of Last Resort 
(COLR) auctions with a traditional uniform subsidy scheme (EPOS) 
paying the same subsidy for any consumer served in the area under 
consideration at no more than the regulated price. The objective of 
these auctions is the provision of specified services at a given 
maximum price. Consider only the high cost group µ , which is now 
composed of M types, ranked on the basis of their connection costs. 
Therefore, MMh µµµµ <<<<< −11 ..... , with Mh ,..,1= . Moreover, 
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we consider the case of firms with approximately the same cost 
structure. 
The analysis shows that the COLR auctions grant a reduction in the 
level of subsidy required. The intuition is related to the impossibility 
for the regulator to use its knowledge about the different costs of 
serving the consumers under EPOS: the uniform subsidy must cover 
the cost of the highest costly customer, while with the auction bidders 
average through consumers’ costs. 
Consider firms with similar cost structure. If there exists at least a type of 
consumer that cannot be served for less than the second lowest average cost, a 
second price COLR auction asks for lower subsidy T, than the uniform subsidy 
scheme: EPOSCOLR TT ≤ . The result holds both when subcontracting is 
allowed and when it is not. 
In general, the previous result holds without subcontracting even if 
firms do not have the same cost structure. With subcontracting, COLR 
is cheaper than EPOS also under other conditions as a sufficient 
heterogeneity of consumers with respect to firms costs or if the winner 
of the auction can obtain a sufficiently large share of the gain from 
subcontracting. 
As for total welfare, a sufficient condition for EPOSCOLR WW > is that the cost 
of public funds is higher than the weights assigned to both consumers surplus 
and firms profits. 
The issue of the allocation of USO through auction is also addressed by 
Anton et al. (2000, 2002), but they consider a different constraint: firms 
bid for the subsidy needed to fulfil USO over an area and the price of 
the service is determined by competition in another market. More 
precisely, the winner of the auction has the obligation to provide the 
service at the same price prevailing in the profitable segment, where 
competition in quantities between firms takes place. 
The firm serving both markets M and M  becomes a softer competitor, so that 
the equilibrium prices are higher than under unconstrained competition in 
quantities. More precisely, the equilibrium is not symmetric and the 
firm providing service in both markets obtains a lower profit than 
when it operates only in M . 
Thus the equilibrium subsidy compensate for the strategic 
disadvantage. 
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The presence of a firm in both markets, put her at a strategic 
disadvantage and therefore the equilibrium subsidy contains a 
premium to compensate for the strategic disadvantage. 
Total welfare increases when the auction takes place and price constraint is 
imposed, if the regulator gives to profitable and non profitable market similar 
weights. 
The analysis is extended to the case of outside firms, i.e. firms not 
operating in the profitable market, allowed to bid for the rural market. 
This extension is interesting because the outside firm cannot affect the 
price in the profitable market, so that if it wins the auction, there is no 
longer a strategic link between markets. Therefore, the negative effect 
on consumers’ welfare can be neutralized if the outside firm wins the 
auction. 
3.2. Allocation and financing of USO: the role of 
quality and coverage 
In the previous subsection, we considered the case of USO when the 
quality θ  and the coverage x is fixed. Now we check for main results 
when the two characteristics θ  and x  are to be determined. 
According to Valletti et al. (2002) and Hoering et al (2002) if a coverage 
constraint is imposed together with uniform pricing, then equilibrium prices 
and coverages are higher. 
If we analyze the welfare components, it appears that firms profits have 
an opposite path: the incumbent profits decrease, while the entrant 
profits increase. The consumers surplus increases only if fixed costs 
connected to the activity in an area do not increase too fast. 
Suppose that each firm can choose the level of coverage. With respect to 
the benchmark case in which no USO is imposed, if the incumbent I is subject 
to uniform price UP, he chooses a lower coverage in order to weaken 
competition USOnoI
UP
I xx < . The entrant E may also choose to cover a less 
extended area. 
The same result holds if not too tight price cap is imposed. 
Calzada (2009) extends the study of the coverage to the relation with 
quality θ . 
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If the incumbent can choose both coverage and level of quality, then he would 
choose a larger area than when quality is fixed: UPI
UP
I xx >)(θ . 
On the other hand, the entrant can strategically choose either the extension of 
the coverage or the product differentiation to weaken competition. 
In order to countervail the strategic effect, the regulator could impose 
minimum coverage or quality standards.  
Mirabel et al (2008) consider choice of the government about a 
monopoly area that maximizes welfare. 
Instead of defining the area subject to USO according to the connection cost, 
the regulator chooses to identify it on the basis of total welfare. This choice 
allows reaching the second best allocation if the unit subsidy instrument is 
available. 
Sorana (2000) analyses COLR auctions organized to compete in the 
market, so that the quality of the service plays a role. The main issue in 
this case is that auction is vulnerable to collusion. 
In a per-subscriber subsidy action, bidders are more likely to collude, than in 
standard procurement auction or COLR auction for lump sum subsidy. 
The intuition for this result is that as there exist more than one provider 
of the service, in case of defection the punishment occurs immediately 
and firms do not have to wait next auction. 
Sorana shows that a device for reducing concerning on collusion is to 
let the number of providers be endogenously determined. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we briefly assess some of the main insights of the 
literature about universal service obligations. 
As underlined at the beginning, in the European Union the concept 
only refers to telecommunication and postal sector. 
As for the railway industry, the European directives refer to public 
service obligation. Even if from a normative point of view they are two 
different concepts, the economic analysis can be performed almost in 
the same way. 
We focused on two issues, the allocation and the funding of service 
obligations both when the quality is given and when it is not. 
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The main result is that the existence of USO creates distortions and that 
a firm operating also in a competitive market tends to be less 
aggressive. 
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Chapter 4 
Public Service Obligations and Unknown 
Demand 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of public service obligations 
on total welfare according to different kind of regulation. 
The reform of the railway industry has to account for the possibility 
that the liberalization induces railway operator to dismiss some 
unprofitable lines. Therefore, it could be necessary to intervene at State 
level in order to ensure that socially valuable routes keep on being 
supplied. In this case, each Member State can implement Public Service 
Obligations (PSO). 
“Public service obligations means obligations which the transport 
undertaking in question, if it were considering its own commercial 
interests, would not assume or would not assume to the same extent or 
under the same conditions”20. 
The main questions about PSOs are relative to how to allocate these 
obligations and how to finance them. 
As for the first issue, the obligation can be imposed on an operator 
designated by the public authority (restricted entry regulation) or a 
franchise bidding can take place. An alternative is the pay or play 
mechanism, in which the entrant can decide either to pay a tax to 
finance USO or to serve the unprofitable segment. 
As for the financing issue, the deficit is usually covered by cross 
subsidies or by taxes on consumers or operator participating to the 
market. 
Chonè et al. (2000 and 2002) analyze the allocation of the obligation 
through pay or play and restricted entry regulation considering 
different kind of universal service constraint. The allocation of service 
obligation through actions is studied by Sorana (2000) and Anton et al. 
(2000 and 2002). The main result of these papers is that the existence of 
                                                                 
20 Reg. EC 1191/69, art. 2 
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service obligations leads to distortion in the other markets, where the 
US provider operates. Moreover, the appropriate choice of financing 
mechanism can improve welfare in all allocation mechanism.   
In the past, the incumbent firm was a regulated monopolist that 
provided all kind of services, receiving transfers in return. Therefore, 
we start analyzing this framework.  
But the opening up of the market requires a new organization of the 
sector. In particular, we consider first the case of a Transportation 
Authority in charge of defining only the transfers that ensure non 
negative profit to the incumbent when he is constrained by PSOs and 
has to compete with another firm. 
Finally, we introduce a form of participation by all firms in the industry 
to cover the deficit generated by PSOs: each of them pays a share of the 
profits on the competitive segment into a common fund. 
This kind of solution to the problem of PSO financing has already been 
adopted both in the telecommunications and in the postal sector. 
Moreover, we add an asymmetric information issue. A feature of the 
railway sector is the difficulties encountered in gathering disaggregate 
data which are necessary to establish the exact financial need of routes 
under PSO. Collecting data over passengers travelling on a certain 
route by somebody else than the provider of the service is very costly 
and seems to be almost impossible. Even if railways operators or 
association of operators or transport authorities publish data, such as 
passenger kilometres, train kilometres or number of passengers, at the 
aggregate level, it appears that nobody else but the operator of a line 
knows how many passengers have travelled on that route. 
Therefore, in the second part of the paper we introduce asymmetric 
information over demand in one of the market and study how welfare 
is affected. 
The literature about asymmetric information is really vast (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993, Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Armstrong and Vickers, 
2000; Armstrong 1998) but not many papers relate the question of 
asymmetric information over demand and optimal market structure 
(Iossa, 1999). 
Moreover, the concept, the aspects and the constraints imposed by 
universal service in telecommunications and in the postal sector has 
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been deeply analyzed. A characteristic of these papers is that the link 
between markets is almost always due to a uniform price constraint. 
In this paper we consider a different approach, instead: a price 
constraint is imposed only on one market, but the existence of 
imperfect substitutes for the service under PSO, makes this constraint 
affecting also the outcome of the other markets. 
It appears that the PSO induces distortions also in the other markets 
due to the substitutability among services. Moreover, using some 
simulations we show that the implementation of the PSO fund grants 
an increase in total welfare, relative to the multiproduct regulated 
monopolist and to the case of simple introduction of competition. 
In the next section we present the model and analyze what happens 
under complete information when first there is a multiproduct 
regulated firm, then when there is competition in one market and 
finally when the PSO fund is set up. Section 3 proposes a comparison of 
the equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 introduces and solves the problem 
of asymmetric information over demand. Section 5 illustrates the effects 
on firms’ choice and on welfare. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The model 
A railway network connecting the same origin-destination is composed 
of three different lines. 
Consider for example three feasible choices to go from Milan to Rome: 
passengers can travel passing through Genoa with a Western line or 
they can almost vertically cross the country using a North-to-South 
connection or finally they get to Rome through Bologna on the Eastern 
route. The three services are imperfect substitutes because of, for 
example different travel time. In general, passenger transportation 
involves both complementarity and substitutability among services, 
but in this paper we want to focus on their substitutability. 
As explained in the introduction, the PSO in the railway industry is an 
existing constraint on the activity of the operators. Suppose that the 
provider of the Western line (service 1) has to fulfil PSO: the need for 
this obligation is determined according to the evaluation of the positive 
social surplus that it produces. Therefore, the regulator defines a price 
for this service and grants transfers to the operator. By definition, the 
price for this service 1p  is smaller than its marginal cost 1c , 11 cp < . 
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However, we do not investigate how this price is decided upon and 
take it as exogenous. This is not too far from the situation observed in 
real life as the price seems to be decided according both to 
political/social objectives and to economic reasoning, where the first 
objectives are weighted more than the second. Moreover, prices are 
usually defined on the basis of the operated train kilometres, but the 
number of tickets sold is known only ex post and it is obviously an 
important variable for train operators. 
The authority in charge of establishing the price for public service 
obligation directly negotiates with the incumbent on prices and we 
consider it fixed at level 1p . 
The constraint on this market and its management operated by the 
incumbent firm I is unchanged throughout the paper. 
We will define this price as the percentage of the constant marginal cost 
1c  that the authority wants to be covered by prices, i.e. establishing  1p  
the authority decides how much it is willing to subsidize each unit of 
output. 
The other two services – in our previous example North-to-South and 
Eastern line - are provided either under price regulation by a single 
monopolist or under competition over prices. We denote these services 
as service 2 and 3.  
We consider different market structures and analyze the equilibrium 
outcome in terms of prices and transfers. In particular, assuming 
service 1 under PSO, with 11 cp <  and operated by the incumbent, we 
analyze first the case in which both services 2 and 3 are provided by the 
regulated incumbent I, who receives transfers in return. 
Then we study what happens if competition between services 2 and 3 
takes place, so that they are respectively provided by the incumbent I 
and by a new firm E. 
In a first scenario, firms compete in prices and the regulator is in charge 
of defining the price for PSO and the transfers. 
In a second competitive scenario a PSO fund is set up. Each provider 
operating in one of the competitive segments has to contribute with a 
share of his net profits. In this case, the regulator defines the percentage 
of contribution to the fund k and the transfers. 
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The example above is only a way of explaining how our framework 
applies to the railway industry. But it could also be interpreted as 
different kind of services operating on the same line and with different 
qualities, for example high speed train v. traditional train. In what 
follows we stick to our first example as we do not introduce the 
evaluation of quality. 
In order to understand the effects of the different market structures, we 
specify the demand functions with some symmetry between products: 
Market 1, PSO market: )( 321111 ppgpbaq ++−=   (a) 
Market 2: 312222 hpgppbaq ++−⋅= θ     (b) 
Market 3: 213333 hpgppbaq ++−=     (c) 
where ghbi >> .  
In the second part of the paper, we analyze how asymmetric 
information over demand (more precisely, overθ ) in market 2 can 
affect the previous results.  
2.1. Multiproduct regulated monopolist 
Consider first the case that more closely represents what the 
organization of the sector has traditionally been: the incumbent 
provided the transportation service as a monopolist on the entire 
network on the basis of some kind of regulation. 
The operator I is in charge of supplying service 1 according to PSO, so 
that the price in this market is fixed at 1p  and he receives transfers. 
Note (see the above demand specifications) that even if the price in this 
market is fixed, the quantity is not, as it depends on the prices of the 
other two markets: the increase in the price of one of the other markets, 
positively affects the quantity of the PSO service. 
Firm I operates in all markets as a monopolist, but the prices for market 
2 and 3 are regulated by the Transportation Authority. 
The cost function to provide service i is iii qcqC =)(  (i=1, 2, 3). 
Define )( iqS  the surplus that the consumers obtain using service i and 
0≥λ  the cost of public funds.  
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The utility function of the multiproduct regulated monopolist I is the 
sum of the utility it obtains from each service and of the transfers it 
receives: 
 
TUUUU I +++= 321               (1.) 
 
or TqCqpqCqpqCqpU I +−+−+−= )()()( 333322221111  
 
The regulator maximises the welfare function W  given by the sum of 
net consumer surplus, utility of the firm and transfers paid by the 
regulator [ ] TUqpqSW i Iiii )1()(3 1 λ+−+−= = . 
The objective function can be rewritten as: 
[ ] Ii iiiii UqpqCqSW λλλ −++−= =3 1 )()1()( .           (2.) 
Under complete information, the regulator can maximize the welfare 
function, setting 0=IU . 
Proposition 1: 
In case of a multiproduct regulated monopolist, when there 
exists a PSO on market 1, the prices on market 2 and 3 are such 
that: 
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The transfers T are such that 0321 =+++≡ TUUUU
I .    (4.) 
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As 011 <− cp , the second part on the right hand side of (3.) is 
negative. The obligation to serve market 1 at a price lower than the 
marginal cost creates a distortion not only for this service, but also for 
all other services, as they are imperfect substitutes. 
If the Transportation Authority is willing to heavily subsidize public 
service obligations, than she also affects the outcome of the other two 
markets, decreasing their optimal prices. 
Obviously, the lower the unit subsidy )( 11 cp − , i.e. the closer the price 
to the marginal cost, the lower the distortion induced on the other 
markets. 
Notice also that the distortion of the price i depends on the ratio 
between the deficit due to PSO and the revenues from market i, so that 
other thing equal the more profitable the market, the smaller is the 
distortion. 
2.2. Multiproduct firm and single product competitor 
In this section we consider the effect of the introduction of competition. 
One of the principles of the European reform is the opening of the 
sector to all the firms able to provide transportation service. Each 
country can decide to keep some area of the activity under PSO, on the 
basis of the objectives we recall in the introduction. So it is interesting 
to understand the effect of competition when one of the markets is 
constrained by PSO. 
In this framework, we assume that the regulator cannot implement any 
regulation except the definition of 1p  and the transfer. Notice that in 
this framework the regulator does not have a mechanism that induces 
the revelation of the true θ  under asymmetric information over this 
parameter. She simply has the role of paying for the incumbent deficit. 
The incumbent still operates the service subject to public service 
obligation (market 1) and now also on market 2, without any 
constraint. Service in market 3 is supplied by a new firm E, which 
compete in prices with the incumbent. 
The game takes place as follows: in the first stage, the incumbent learns 
the level of demand in market 2, i.e. he observes θ  and chooses the 
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suitable level of subsidy offered by the regulator. The regulator 
publicly announces the value of θ . In the second stage, firms compete 
over prices.  
We start solving the game under complete information, so that both the 
Transportation Authority and the firms know the demand in all 
markets. 
In the second stage, firms compete in prices. As the incumbent 
provides services 1 and 2, it maximizes the total utility of the two 
segments including the lump sum transfer T decided in the first period: 
TUUU I ++= 21               (5.) 
or TqcpqcpU I +−+−= 222111 )()(  
The other firm E operates only in market 3, so that his utility function 
is:  
3UU
E
=                (6.) 
or 333 )( qcpU E −= . 
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The reaction function of the multiproduct firm I is directly affected by 
the level of per unit subsidy )( 11 cp − , while the effect on market 3 is 
indirect, as it happens through the price of market 2. 
In the first stage, the regulator defines the level of transfer that ensures 
the incumbent has a non negative utility 0≥IU . Under complete 
information, the regulator chooses T such that 0=IU : 
Proposition 2: 
If a multiproduct firm I, subject to PSO and active in market 2, 
competes in prices with another firm E active in market 3, the 
equilibrium prices are such that: 
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The transfers T  are such that 021 =++≡ TUUU
I .         (10.) 
Recall that there exists imperfect substitutability among services, 
therefore the elasticities in expressions (8.) and (9.) are affected by 
prices in each market. For example, condition (9.) refers to the elasticity 
of the residual demand for market 3. 
As underlined for the multiproduct regulated firm, the price is lower 
than it would be without that constraint. 
2.3. PSO fund and competition 
One of the proposed solutions to the financing of PSO is the set up of a 
fund, in which all the operators of the industry address part of the 
profits they obtain on competitive markets. This mechanism exists for 
example for telecommunications and for the postal sector, but it has not 
been applied to the railways.  
In the first stage, the regulator defines the share of profits k and the 
lump sum transfer T for the operator in charge of PSO. 
In the next period, the prices for service 2 and 3 are determined by the 
competition between firms. 
As usual, we solve the problem backward, starting from the 
competitive outcome in the second period. 
The utility function of the incumbent is given not only by the profits of 
the markets in which he is active, but also from the value of  the PSO 
fund: 
TqcpkqcpkPSOFund +−+−= 333222 )()(            (11.) 
So, the incumbent maximizes: 
PSOFundUkUU I +−+= 21 )1(            (12.) 
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that simplifies to TqcpkqcpqcpU I +−+−+−= 333222111 )()()( . 
 
The entrant operates only on market 3, so that he maximizes: 
3)1( UkU E −=                  (13.) 
or 333 ))(1( qcpkU E −−=  
Only the reaction function of the incumbent is directly affected by k as 
he internalises the share of profit that the entrant grants to the fund, as 
you can see from expressions in (14): 
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In the first stage, the regulator has to define the optimal share of profits 
and the transfer T, maximizing the total welfare: 
TUUqpqSqpqSqpqS EI )1()()()( 333222111 λ+−++−+−+−          
subject to the participation constraint of the incumbent: 0≥IU . 
Rewriting the objective function and substituting for T, we obtain: 
IUqkpqpqp
qckqcqcqSqSqS
λλλ
λλ
−+++
++−++−++
332211
332211321
)(
)1())(1()()()(         (15.) 
where 0=IU , as the game is under complete information. 
The optimal *kk =  is obtained by the derivative of (15.) computed for 
the equilibrium outcome.  
Proposition 3: 
Consider the case of a PSO fund where firms pay a share k of the 
profits they obtain from competitive markets. If a multiproduct 
firm I, subject to PSO and active in market 2, competes in prices 
with firm E active in market 3, the equilibrium prices are such 
that: 
 
22
33*
23
2,3
22
111
2
2,1
22
22 )(1
qp
qpk
qp
qcp
p
cp
εε
ε
ε
ε
ε
+
−
+=
−
             (16.) 
  97 
   
33
33 1
ε
=
−
p
cp
                     (17.) 
*k  is the optimal share of profits determined maximizing the 
welfare function and is defined by the following condition: 
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The transfers T  are such that 
0)1( 21 =+−+≡ PSOFundUkUU I               (19.) 
 
The value ∗k  that solves the previous first order condition in (18.) is the 
percentage of the profit that each operator has to pay into the PSO 
fund. We consider only the cases in which demand and cost functions 
satisfy ( )1,0∈∗k , otherwise the use of PSO fund would not be feasible 
for the regulator. 
In fact, if 0=∗k  then there is no need for PSO fund and if 1=∗k , it 
would not be socially feasible, as it would appear as an expropriation 
of all profits21. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the case in 
which ( )1,0∈∗k . 
It is interesting to notice that even if a profit tax is usually considered 
not distortionary, this is not the case here. In fact, for the incumbent the 
contribution to the fund is an internal transfer between two sectors of 
his activity that leaves his utility unaffected. But then he also gains 
from the share of profit of the entrant. Finally, as there exists a link of 
substitutability between services, also the choice of the entrant is 
affected by k through the incumbent price. 
                                                                 
21 With unconstrained optimization, if 0<∗k , then the regulator is 
subsidizing the competitive markets, but this case is ruled out by law 
and if 1>∗k , then the entrant’s utility would be lower than zero, so 
that it can’t be a solution. 
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3. Comparison of equilibrium outcomes under 
complete information 
In this section we compare the different frameworks presented, using 
the demand functions in (a) to (c). 
In order to perform the analysis, we compute the equilibrium outcomes 
according to some parameters chosen in such a way that it is possible to 
obtain positive prices and quantities in all market structures and that 
the characteristics of the market calls for the need of transfers22. 
For example, referring to the intercept ia  we choose market 1 under 
PSO to be the biggest one, market 2 and 3 are respectively one half and 
one third of PSO market. 
Moreover, we consider differences in the marginal costs to operate the 
services and different values of unit subsidy )( 11 cp − . 
As for prices, it is possible to obtain a hierarchy of the frameworks (see 
for example Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: prices for different values of the parameter θ  
                                                                 
22 Numerical values of some of the simulations performed are in the 
Appendix A.2.2. 
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If the sector is entirely regulated, so that the Transportation Authority 
decides the prices for market 2 and 3, together with fixing the prices for 
PSOs, then those prices are the lowest. 
From the equilibrium conditions we understood that the constraint on 
market 1 leads to a distortion of the prices in the other markets, but the 
downward distortion with a multiproduct regulated firm is larger than 
in the frameworks with competition, so that prices are lower. 
On the other hand, when firms contribute to the PSO fund, they choose 
higher prices. The value of the participation share positively affects the 
reaction function of the incumbent directly so that he chooses higher 
prices, then in the absence of the fund and as services are substitutes, 
then also the price of market 3 increases.  
Consider also that the regulator has to pay for transfer to the firm 
providing service under PSOs. When the PSO fund is implemented, the 
transfers required are smaller than in the other two frameworks (Figure 
14 and Figure 15). 
 
Transfers
PSO price = 30% of marginal cost
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Figure 14: Transfers for different values of θ : 11 30.0 cp =  
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Transfers
PSO price = 35% of marginal cost
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Figure 15: Transfers for different values of θ : 11 35.0 cp =  
 
The comparison between the transfers in the multiproduct regulated 
firm and the competing multiproduct firm does not lead to a definite 
result as it depends on the share of cost covered with the price. 
Define )1,0(,
1
1 ∈= x
c
p
x the share of cost covered with the price, then 
there exists x~ , such that for xx ~> , the transfers under multiproduct 
regulation are lower, while if xx ~< , the opposite is true.  
A low x corresponds to a low price on PSO market, that is, it 
corresponds to a high per unit subsidy )( 11 cp − . 
The higher is this subsidy, the lower is the distortion induced on the 
other markets in both frameworks at glance. But the increase in prices 
on market 2 and 3 leads to higher quantity 1q  in market under PSO, so 
that the need for transfer increases. The point is that the for xx ~< , 
1q increase is larger with a multiproduct regulated monopolist than 
when  the incumbent has to compete with another firm, so that the 
transfers needed are larger in the first case than in the latter one. 
We computed the total welfare and it appears that it is higher when the 
PSO is financed using the fund. Moreover, also the introduction of 
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competition enhances welfare compared to the regulated framework 
(Figure 16).  
Total Welfare
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Figure 16: Total welfare for different values of θ . 
 
Recall that we are considering the total welfare: even if the prices are 
lower if the services are provided by a multiproduct regulated 
monopolist, the welfare in the other two frameworks is higher because 
by construction of the model, the regulator cannot set the entrant’s 
utility at zero as it happens if there is a single firm. Moreover, there is 
less need for transfers and this implies a saving as they are costly. 
To sum up, denote A the framework with multiproduct regulated 
monopolist, B the scenario with multiproduct firm and a competitor, C 
the case for PSO fund. 
Result 1: 
Given 1p , the price for the service subject to public service 
obligation, then: 
(i) CiBiAi ppp << ,  with 3,2=i  
(ii) AC TT <  and BC TT <  
(iii)  BA TT <  iff xx
~>  
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(iv) CBA WWW <<  
In the next section we consider the market structures illustrated above 
in case of asymmetric information over demand. 
4. Market structures under asymmetric 
information 
In the previous section we studied the effect on welfare of three 
possible kind of organization for a sector in which one of the firm has 
to fulfil public service obligations. 
In what follows, we consider the same scenarios when the incumbent 
firm is the only one knowing the demand in market 2. In particular, 
there is asymmetric information over the parameter θ . The regulator 
knows that θ  is distributed according to the density function )(θf in [ ]θθ , , with cumulative distribution )(θF . 
The inability to observe or compute the true value of 2q  affects both 
the choice of the regulator (prices, transfers, share of profits for the PSO 
fund) but also the choice of the entrant E as he cannot observe θ  too 
and relies on the regulator announcement in both competitive 
frameworks. 
4.1. Multiproduct regulated monopolist 
Under asymmetric information, neither the Transportation Authority 
nor the entrant know the level of the demand in market 2. Therefore 
she has to design a regulatory mechanism that induces the firm 
providing the service to reveal the level of demand. 
The incumbent observes θ  and chooses among the menu of contracts 
composed of prices and transfers. 
The regulator maximizes the expected profit 
[ ]  = −++−θθ θθλλλ )()()1()(3 1 dfUpqqcqSi iiiiii          (20.) 
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation 
constraint. 
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The first constraint grants that the firm tells the truth as the utility it 
obtains is larger then the utility obtained reporting a different θ : 
θ∂
∂
−=
2
22 )(
q
cpU             (21.) 
The participation constraint ensures that also when demand in low, the 
firm is willing to participate to the market: 
0)( =θU              (22.) 
Therefore, the regulator maximizes: 
[ ] ( ) 





	
∂
∂
−−−++−
=
θ
θ θθ
θλθλλ )()()(1)()1()( 2223 1 d
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The solution for 2p  and 3p  are as those determined under complete 
information but also accounting for a downward information 
distortion. Only if the demand is at its maximum θ , then there is no 
distortion. 
Proposition 4: 
Consider the case of asymmetric information over θ . 
If all services are provided by a multiproduct regulated 
monopolist, when there exists a PSO on market 1, the prices in 
market 2 and 3 are downward distorted relative to those under 
complete information (3.) and (4.). 
The distorsion iΛ  induced by asymmetric information in 
market i  is: 
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The incumbent’s rent is  





∂
∂
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θ
θ θθ
dqcp 222 )(          (24.) 
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4.2. Multiproduct firm and single product competitor 
Under asymmetric information, neither the regulator, nor the 
competitor know the value of the parameter θ  that characterizes 
market 2. 
Recall that in this framework, the regulator does not have a mechanism 
at hand that leads to truthful revelation of  θ . 
Therefore, in the first stage, the Transportation Authority asks the 
incumbent for the level of demand in market 2 to define the lump sum 
transfer T and announces θ  to the entrant, who will decide his price 
according to it. We denote this value as θˆ . 
In the second stage firms compete in prices: the entrant reacts 
according to his best response on the basis of the θˆ  announced by the 
regulator, while the incumbent also accounts for the true value of 
demand if it is different from the θˆ  reported to the Authority. 
Define 2qˆ , 2pˆ  the quantity and price in market 2 atθˆ .  
The competitor’s choice is: 
))ˆ(ˆ( 233 θppp =              (25.) 
while the incumbent’s reaction function is: 
))ˆ(,( 322 θθ ppp =             (26.) 
And the equilibrium outcome is given by the intersection of these 
reaction functions. 
In the first stage, the incumbent reports to the regulator θˆ , such that his 
second period utility is maximized: 
Proposition 5: 
If the incumbent is the only one knowing the value of θ  and he 
competes with an entrant, then he asks for a level of transfers 
)ˆ(θT  that maximizes his utility knowing that ))ˆ(ˆ( 233 θppp = . 
Define IUmaxarg~ =θ , then θˆ  is: 
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Transfers are such that 0)ˆ( =θIU            (28.) 
4.3. PSO fund 
The last scheme we want to examine is the set up of the PSO fund. 
Recall that the timing of the game is as follows: in the first stage the 
incumbent chooses among the menu of contracts made up of the share 
of contribution to the PSO fund and the transfers. The regulator 
publicly announces the value of θ , so that in the second period firms 
compete in prices according to that announcement and regulation is 
enforced. 
Therefore, the competitor computes his best response function on the 
basis of θˆ  announced by the regulator. 
As usual we solve the game backward. 
Define 2qˆ , 2pˆ  the quantity and price in market 2 given the value of 
demand reportedθˆ .  
The competitor’s best response is: 
))ˆ(ˆ( 233 θppp =              (29.) 
while the incumbent reacts according to θˆ  and θ : 
))ˆ(,( 322 θθ ppp =             (30.) 
And the equilibrium outcome is given by the intersection of these 
reaction functions. 
In the first period23, the regulator proposes a menu of contract to the 
incumbent I, designed to maximize the total expected welfare (28.) with 
respect to k and T: 
                                                                 
23 To safe notation, we do not denote the equilibrium outcome in a 
particular manner, but all the variables are those of second period 
competition 
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The maximization is subject to the incentive constraint that ensures 
truthtelling, )|ˆ()|( θθθθ II UU ≥ : 
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Using our demand specification, we can check that the incentive 
constraint is positive. 
Moreover, the regulator also has to ensure that the participation 
constraint is satisfied also for the lowest value of demand: 0)( =θU  
The regulator maximizes: 
{
( ) } )()(1)(])(
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Considering the second period outcome, the share k that satisfies the 
first order condition is downward distorted with respect to that defined 
under complete information: 
Proposition 6: 
If the incumbent is the only one knowing the value of θ  and the 
PSO fund is implemented,  
(i.) the optimal share of profit to be addressed to the PSO fund is 
downward distorted w.r.t. the complete information case and the 
distortion is 
( )
k
U
f
F I
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θλ          (34.) 
(ii.) the equilibrium prices are also lower than under complete 
information 
(iii.) the incumbent’s rent is 
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  107 
5. Comparison of equilibrium outcomes under 
asymmetric information 
In order to compare the equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric 
information we compute prices, transfers and total welfare in the 
different market structures. The demand functions are (a) to (c). 
As for the complete information case, we choose the parameters in 
order to have feasible outcomes for prices and quantities24. Moreover, 
the characteristic of the markets are such that there is the need for 
transfers to cover market 1 deficit (the intercept for market 2 and 3 are 
approximately one forth on the PSO market). The parameter θ  is 
observed only by the incumbent and the regulator only knows that is 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval [ ]2,1 . 
The prices chosen by the regulator, if the monopolist is entirely 
regulated are still the lowest then the prices of the other two 
frameworks. 
The implementation of the PSO fund increases the prices in the 
competitive markets, so that under this market structure consumers 
pay more (Figure 17) 
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Figure 17: Prices for different values of θ  
 
                                                                 
24 Numerical values of some of the simulations performed are in the 
Appendix A.2.2. 
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Differently from what obtained under complete information, there is no 
longer an issue about which market structure requires the lower level 
of transfers (see Figure 18). We saw that depending on the level of unit 
subsidy to the PSO, it could happen that the transfers for a 
multiproduct regulated monopolist could be lower or higher than those 
required in case of  competition. With asymmetric information, the 
transfers are always lower under monopoly and this is due to the 
absence of an incentive mechanism that induces throughful revelation 
of θ . Moreover, PSO fund keep on being the structure with the lowest 
level of transfers. 
Transfers
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Figure 18: Transfers for different values of θ  
 
As for total welfare (Figure 19), it appears that the implementation of 
the PSO fund grants higher welfare than the other frameworks. 
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Figure 19: Total welfare for different values of θ  
To sum up the results we obtained, denote A the multiproduct 
regulated monopoly, B the scenario with multiproduct firm and a 
competitor, C the case for PSO fund. 
Result 2: 
Given 1p , the price for the service subject to public service 
obligation, then: 
(i) CiBiAi ppp << ,  with 3,2=i  
(ii) BAC TTT <<  
(iv) CBA WWW <<  
6. The share of participation to PSO fund 
In this paper, the PSO fund mechanism requires both firms 
contributing with the same share of profit and in particular, we 
considered k as the optimal share from the social point of view. 
But in the telecommunications and postal sector, where the PSO fund is 
already active, the share of contribution is decided according to a 
measure of the market share of each firm. 
Therefore, it is interesting to understand how prices are affected by the 
rule chosen to determine the percentage of profit to pay. 
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Moreover, it is also important at which stage k is determined. If k is 
known only after competition has taken place, it is the case that firms 
internalize the effect of prices on k when they compete. 
We briefly consider this issue focusing on the effect of k on market 2 
and 3, as competition takes place in these markets. 
The demand function of each service is linear and the services are 
imperfect substitutes. As for the cost function, there are no fixed costs 
and the marginal cost is constant. 
The share ik in market i can be defined before of after the competition. 
We refer to the first case as  ante competition and to the second as  post 
competition. 
Moreover, ik  is computed either on the basis of revenues or of 
quantities. We first consider it as the ratio between the quantity of the 
firm we are considering (firm i) and the total quantity of the 
competitive segment and then as the ratio between revenues. 
When k is defined ex ante, the timing of the game is the following: in 
the first stage, the regulator announces k and a lump sum transfer T for 
the provider of PSOs; in the second stage firms compete in prices. 
On the other hand, if k is defined ex post, then in the first stage, the 
regulator announces the rule to define k and the transfer T. Firms 
compete in prices. In the second stage the regulator asks for 
contribution into PSO fund, according to the rule for k. 
Define the utility function of the firms as: 
TUkUU I ++= 332      
33)1( UkU E −=  
in which iU  is the utility of the firm in market i. 
Therefore, the reaction functions of the firms are such that for the 
incumbent 
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and for the competitor 
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If k is the ratio between quantities, then 3k  is decreasing in 3p  and 
increasing in 2p . 
On the other hand, if k is computed according to the revenues, then 3k  
is still increasing in 2p , but it is not possible to define the sign of the 
effect of 3p  on 3k . 
Therefore, comparing the equilibrium prices when k is decided before 
or after competition gives a definite answer only if the share of 
participation to the PSO fund is computed on the basis of quantities.  
 
Result 1: If the share of participation to the PSO fund is defined 
as the ratio between quantities after competition has taken place, 
then firms compete less aggressively then when k is defined 
before competition. 
If k is decided according to revenues, then prices could be either 
higher or lower. 
 
This result highlights that both the timing and the rule to determine the 
share of participation to the PSO fund has to be carefully considered, 
because as explained above deciding it before or after competition 
obviously affects the equilibrium outcome. More important, if the rule 
is the ratio between quantities, then the effect is clear: firms choose 
higher prices to detriment of consumers. But if k is computed on the 
basis of revenues, then the effect is not clear and depends on demand 
and cost functions. 
7. Concluding remarks and possible extensions 
In this paper we focus on the issue of how to organize the railway 
industry in order to satisfy the reform requirements and keep on 
providing services belonging to PSO. 
We compared three market structures: a multiproduct regulated 
monopolist, the introduction of competition without any regulation 
except PSO and finally the set up of a PSO fund. 
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In order to have an idea about the effect of these structures on the total 
welfare we computed equilibrium outcomes according to different 
values of the parameters. 
It appears that even if the multiproduct regulated monopolist leads to 
lower prices, the total welfare is higher when a PSO fund is 
implemented. This result is related to the lower level of transfers 
required to cover the PSO deficit if all the providers contribute to the 
fund. 
This result holds also under asymmetric information over demand in 
one of the market. The symmetry of information affects the comparison 
between the multiproduct regulated monopolist framework and the 
case of introduction of competition. In fact, while under complete 
information it is not clear which framework asks for lower transfers, 
under asymmetric information, if the regulator has only to pay for the 
PSO deficit, then the transfers required by the incumbent will be 
higher. This result is due to the fact that the regulator does not have 
any incentive device to induce truthful revelation of the demand. 
An interesting extension is related to the budget constraint of the 
regulator. Instead of taking care of the entire utility of the incumbent, 
the regulator could also decide to grant only the transfers that cover 
PSO. There is an ongoing discussion about this point as according to 
some opinion it should be the case that the regulator only control that 
PSOs are fulfilled and that the PSO provider is not at disadvantage 
relative to the other provider. Obviously, other sustain the opposite, 
that is, the regulator should look at the total profit of the firm. 
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Conclusions 
The reform of the railway industry calls for more specific analysis of 
the sector and of the effect of liberalization in this industry. 
As highlighted at the beginning, even if a large number of studies 
propose qualitative analysis of the phenomenon, only a few adopt an 
empirical or theoretical approach. 
The objective of this thesis was to give some insights about two special 
characteristics of railways, the problem of rolling stock and the 
existence of public service obligations. 
The efforts of the European Union to promote competition do not fit 
with the evidence that in most of the countries the service is still 
provided only by the historical incumbent. 
We identify in the difficulty to obtain rolling stock one of the possible 
explanation. The solutions adopted across countries vary from ROSCOs 
to public owned rolling stock rent to the provider. 
The choice between private or public ownership of the rolling stock 
leads to different level of investment that have to be evaluated in light 
of some market conditions such as the cost of public funds and the 
effect of the investment on costs and rolling stocks.  If the public 
authority does not have all the information about the costs of the firm, 
than the question of which framework grants higher investment does 
not have a clear cut answer. 
We specified the model to study the probability of the incumbent to be 
selected and we found that the positive effect of the first period 
investment increases the probability for the incumbent to keep on being 
the provider of the service. This finding is in line with what we observe 
in many countries, including Italy: the company operating the line is 
very often the same that will be active for the next period contract. 
Another interesting issue related to the opening of the railway market 
is how to manage public service obligation. The introduction of 
competition raises questions about allocation and funding of these 
obligations. 
We took a different approach from the literature of universal service 
obligation, modelling the constraint imposed on a single firm as an 
exogenous given price, below marginal cost. Moreover, the link 
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between markets depends on the imperfect substitutability among 
services. 
Comparing different market structures it appears that if the aim is to 
have public service obligations fulfilled by a firm operating also in at 
least another market, then the set up of a PSO fund grants gains in 
welfare and this is true both under complete and asymmetric 
information over demand. 
We think that these issues worth more analysis especially in light of the 
ongoing changes in the sector and of the discretion left to countries that 
calls for deep studies about which solution fits best in which context. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Appendix to Chapter 2 
In this appendix we report some of the simulations we run to are the 
threshold defined by the regulator to choose the second period 
provider. 
The model is specified as follows: we assume that the cost parameters 
of the firms are uniformly distributed over the interval [1,2]. 
Moreover, the disutility of the investment is 2
,,
)()( i jti jt aad =  and the 
benefit on the rolling stock is i jt
i
jt aab ,, 5
1)( = . 
As the ownership is public, the local authority pays a reward 
)()(
,,
i
PUBt
i
PUBt abax θ=  and gains )()( ,2,2 i PUBi PUB abau ω= , where [ ]1,0, ∈ωθ . 
For each simulation the table reports: 
- value of Iβ  
- the parameter whose effect we are observing 
- the threshold under asymmetric information 
- the difference between the threshold under asymmetric and under 
complete information 
***
jjj ββ −=∆ (with j = PR,PUB) 
- the first period investment ja ,1  
- the second period investment I ja ,2  if the incumbent is active 
- the second period investment C ja ,2  if a competitor matching the 
threshold is selected 
- the probability for the incumbent to be selected as second period 
provider 
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a. Private Ownership 
• Residual value  
.1.0;1.0;1.0;1.0;5.0 ===== hgkλδ  
Iβ  R 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.3 0.2 1.035 0.020 0.607 0.588 0.597 96.51% 
1.4 0.2 1.135 0.018 0.594 0.584 0.588 86.48% 
1.5 0.2 1.236 0.017 0.581 0.580 0.579 76.45% 
1.6 0.2 1.336 0.015 0.569 0.575 0.569 66.41% 
1.7 0.2 1.436 0.014 0.556 0.571 0.560 56.37% 
1.8 0.2 1.537 0.013 0.543 0.567 0.551 46.32% 
1.9 0.2 1.637 0.012 0.531 0.563 0.542 36.26% 
2 0.2 1.738 0.011 0.518 0.559 0.533 26.20% 
1.5 0.4 1.051 0.033 0.588 0.580 0.595 94.91% 
1.6 0.4 1.151 0.032 0.575 0.575 0.586 84.90% 
1.7 0.4 1.251 0.030 0.563 0.571 0.577 74.88% 
1.8 0.4 1.351 0.028 0.550 0.567 0.568 64.86% 
1.9 0.4 1.452 0.027 0.537 0.563 0.559 54.83% 
2 0.4 1.552 0.025 0.525 0.559 0.550 44.80% 
1.7 0.6 1.067 0.046 0.569 0.571 0.594 93.34% 
1.8 0.6 1.167 0.044 0.556 0.567 0.585 83.35% 
1.9 0.6 1.267 0.043 0.544 0.563 0.576 73.35% 
2 0.6 1.367 0.041 0.531 0.559 0.567 63.34% 
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• Cost of public funds 
.1.0;1.0;1.0;7.0;2.0 ===== hgkR δ  
Iβ  λ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.3 0.2 1.050 0.033 0.597 0.578 0.592 95.03% 
1.4 0.2 1.150 0.030 0.575 0.570 0.575 85.02% 
1.5 0.2 1.250 0.028 0.553 0.563 0.558 75.00% 
1.6 0.2 1.350 0.025 0.532 0.555 0.542 64.95% 
1.7 0.2 1.451 0.023 0.510 0.548 0.525 54.89% 
1.8 0.2 1.552 0.020 0.489 0.540 0.508 44.81% 
1.9 0.2 1.653 0.018 0.467 0.533 0.491 34.70% 
2 0.2 1.754 0.017 0.445 0.525 0.474 24.58% 
1.3 0.4 1.071 0.049 0.560 0.561 0.580 92.90% 
1.4 0.4 1.170 0.044 0.526 0.549 0.551 82.96% 
1.5 0.4 1.270 0.039 0.493 0.536 0.523 72.98% 
1.6 0.4 1.371 0.035 0.459 0.523 0.494 62.94% 
1.7 0.4 1.472 0.031 0.426 0.510 0.465 52.85% 
1.8 0.4 1.573 0.028 0.392 0.497 0.436 42.70% 
1.9 0.4 1.675 0.025 0.359 0.484 0.407 32.49% 
2 0.4 1.778 0.023 0.325 0.471 0.378 22.22% 
1.3 0.6 1.084 0.059 0.532 0.549 0.568 91.60% 
1.4 0.6 1.183 0.051 0.490 0.533 0.531 81.71% 
1.5 0.6 1.283 0.045 0.448 0.516 0.494 71.75% 
1.6 0.6 1.383 0.040 0.405 0.499 0.456 61.70% 
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Iβ  λ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.7 0.6 1.484 0.035 0.363 0.482 0.418 51.56% 
1.8 0.6 1.587 0.032 0.320 0.465 0.380 41.31% 
1.9 0.6 1.690 0.029 0.278 0.448 0.341 30.97% 
2 0.6 1.795 0.028 0.235 0.431 0.302 20.51% 
 
• Discount factor 
.1.0;1.0;1.0;4.0;2.0 ===== hgkR λ  
Iβ  δ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.3 0.2 1.075 0.048 0.527 0.561 0.579 92.54% 
1.4 0.2 1.174 0.043 0.497 0.549 0.550 82.64% 
1.5 0.2 1.273 0.039 0.467 0.536 0.522 72.69% 
1.6 0.2 1.373 0.034 0.437 0.523 0.493 62.69% 
1.7 0.2 1.474 0.031 0.407 0.510 0.465 52.63% 
1.8 0.2 1.575 0.028 0.377 0.497 0.436 42.52% 
1.9 0.2 1.676 0.025 0.347 0.484 0.407 32.36% 
2 0.2 1.779 0.023 0.317 0.471 0.378 22.13% 
1.3 0.4 1.073 0.049 0.540 0.561 0.579 92.68% 
1.4 0.4 1.172 0.044 0.509 0.549 0.551 82.77% 
1.5 0.4 1.272 0.039 0.478 0.536 0.522 72.81% 
1.6 0.4 1.372 0.035 0.446 0.523 0.494 62.79% 
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Iβ  δ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.7 0.4 1.473 0.031 0.415 0.510 0.465 52.72% 
1.8 0.4 1.574 0.028 0.383 0.497 0.436 42.60% 
1.9 0.4 1.676 0.025 0.352 0.484 0.407 32.41% 
2 0.4 1.778 0.023 0.320 0.471 0.378 22.17% 
1.3 0.8 1.070 0.050 0.566 0.561 0.580 92.97% 
1.4 0.8 1.170 0.044 0.532 0.549 0.552 83.03% 
1.5 0.8 1.270 0.039 0.498 0.536 0.523 73.04% 
1.6 0.8 1.370 0.035 0.464 0.523 0.494 62.99% 
1.7 0.8 1.471 0.031 0.430 0.510 0.465 52.89% 
1.8 0.8 1.573 0.028 0.395 0.497 0.436 42.74% 
1.9 0.8 1.675 0.025 0.361 0.484 0.407 32.52% 
2 0.8 1.778 0.023 0.327 0.471 0.378 22.24% 
 
• Transferable part of the investment 
.05.0;2.0;1.0;2.0;5.0 ===== hRkλδ  
Iβ  g 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.3 0.2 1.046 0.033 0.586 0.578 0.592 95.44% 
1.4 0.2 1.145 0.030 0.565 0.570 0.576 85.45% 
1.5 0.2 1.246 0.027 0.545 0.563 0.559 75.44% 
1.6 0.2 1.346 0.025 0.525 0.555 0.542 65.41% 
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Iβ  g 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.7 0.2 1.446 0.022 0.504 0.548 0.526 55.36% 
1.8 0.2 1.547 0.020 0.484 0.540 0.509 45.29% 
1.9 0.2 1.648 0.017 0.463 0.533 0.492 35.20% 
2 0.2 1.749 0.016 0.443 0.525 0.475 25.09% 
1.3 0.4 1.022 0.035 0.596 0.578 0.596 97.80% 
1.4 0.4 1.122 0.031 0.575 0.570 0.580 87.79% 
1.5 0.4 1.222 0.028 0.554 0.563 0.563 77.76% 
1.6 0.4 1.323 0.024 0.532 0.555 0.546 67.71% 
1.7 0.4 1.424 0.021 0.511 0.548 0.529 57.64% 
1.8 0.4 1.524 0.017 0.489 0.540 0.513 47.55% 
1.9 0.4 1.626 0.014 0.468 0.533 0.496 37.44% 
2 0.4 1.727 0.012 0.446 0.525 0.479 27.31% 
1.4 0.6 1.098 0.033 0.585 0.570 0.584 90.20% 
1.5 0.6 1.199 0.028 0.563 0.563 0.567 80.15% 
1.6 0.6 1.299 0.024 0.540 0.555 0.550 70.07% 
1.7 0.6 1.400 0.019 0.518 0.548 0.533 59.98% 
1.8 0.6 1.501 0.015 0.495 0.540 0.516 49.86% 
1.9 0.6 1.603 0.011 0.473 0.533 0.500 39.73% 
2 0.6 1.704 0.008 0.450 0.525 0.483 29.57% 
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• Non transferable part of the investment 
.05.0;2.0;1.0;2.0;5.0 ===== gRkλδ  
Iβ  h 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.3 0.2 1.046 0.033 0.586 0.578 0.592 95.44% 
1.4 0.2 1.145 0.030 0.565 0.570 0.576 85.45% 
1.5 0.2 1.246 0.027 0.545 0.563 0.559 75.44% 
1.6 0.2 1.346 0.025 0.525 0.555 0.542 65.41% 
1.7 0.2 1.446 0.022 0.504 0.548 0.526 55.36% 
1.8 0.2 1.547 0.020 0.484 0.540 0.509 45.29% 
1.9 0.2 1.648 0.017 0.463 0.533 0.492 35.20% 
2 0.2 1.749 0.016 0.443 0.525 0.475 25.09% 
1.3 0.4 1.022 0.035 0.596 0.578 0.596 97.80% 
1.4 0.4 1.122 0.031 0.575 0.570 0.580 87.79% 
1.5 0.4 1.222 0.028 0.554 0.563 0.563 77.76% 
1.6 0.4 1.323 0.024 0.532 0.555 0.546 67.71% 
1.7 0.4 1.424 0.021 0.511 0.548 0.529 57.64% 
1.8 0.4 1.524 0.017 0.489 0.540 0.513 47.55% 
1.9 0.4 1.626 0.014 0.468 0.533 0.496 37.44% 
2 0.4 1.727 0.012 0.446 0.525 0.479 27.31% 
1.4 0.6 1.098 0.033 0.585 0.570 0.584 90.20% 
1.5 0.6 1.199 0.028 0.563 0.563 0.567 80.15% 
1.6 0.6 1.299 0.024 0.540 0.555 0.550 70.07% 
1.7 0.6 1.400 0.019 0.518 0.548 0.533 59.98% 
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Iβ  h 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.8 0.6 1.501 0.015 0.495 0.540 0.516 49.86% 
1.9 0.6 1.603 0.011 0.473 0.533 0.500 39.73% 
2 0.6 1.704 0.008 0.450 0.525 0.483 29.57% 
 
• Effect on second period cost 
1.0;2.0;1.0;2.0;7.0 ====== ghRkλδ  
Iβ  k 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.4 0.2 1.088 0.034 0.610 0.573 0.585 91.23% 
1.5 0.2 1.189 0.029 0.585 0.567 0.568 81.09% 
1.6 0.2 1.291 0.025 0.560 0.560 0.552 70.92% 
1.7 0.2 1.393 0.021 0.534 0.553 0.535 60.73% 
1.8 0.2 1.495 0.017 0.509 0.547 0.518 50.51% 
1.9 0.2 1.597 0.014 0.484 0.540 0.500 40.26% 
2 0.2 1.700 0.010 0.459 0.533 0.483 29.98% 
1.5 0.4 1.045 0.037 0.664 0.575 0.592 95.47% 
1.6 0.4 1.151 0.029 0.631 0.570 0.575 84.88% 
1.7 0.4 1.258 0.021 0.598 0.565 0.557 74.24% 
1.8 0.4 1.364 0.013 0.565 0.560 0.539 63.56% 
1.9 0.4 1.472 0.005 0.531 0.555 0.521 52.83% 
2 0.4 1.579 -0.001 0.498 0.550 0.503 42.06% 
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Iβ  k 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PRa ,1  
I
PRa ,2  
C
PRa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.7 0.6 1.086 0.026 0.688 0.577 0.586 91.41% 
1.8 0.6 1.200 0.014 0.646 0.573 0.567 79.97% 
1.9 0.6 1.315 0.002 0.603 0.570 0.547 68.46% 
2 0.6 1.431 -0.010 0.561 0.567 0.528 56.89% 
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b. Public Ownership 
• Cost of public funds  
1.0;1.0;3.0;5.0;7.0 ====== ghkωθδ  
Iβ  λ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.2 1.036 0.009 0.614 0.601 0.602 96.44% 
1.2 0.2 1.136 0.007 0.593 0.593 0.586 86.44% 
1.3 0.2 1.236 0.004 0.572 0.586 0.569 76.43% 
1.4 0.2 1.336 0.002 0.552 0.578 0.552 66.40% 
1.5 0.2 1.437 0.000 0.531 0.571 0.536 56.34% 
1.6 0.2 1.537 -0.002 0.510 0.563 0.519 46.27% 
1.7 0.2 1.638 -0.003 0.489 0.556 0.502 36.18% 
1.8 0.2 1.739 -0.005 0.468 0.548 0.485 26.07% 
1.9 0.2 1.841 -0.006 0.447 0.541 0.468 15.94% 
2 0.2 1.942 -0.007 0.426 0.533 0.451 5.79% 
1.1 0.4 1.042 0.013 0.590 0.580 0.581 95.76% 
1.2 0.4 1.142 0.009 0.557 0.567 0.552 85.78% 
1.3 0.4 1.242 0.005 0.525 0.554 0.524 75.75% 
1.4 0.4 1.343 0.002 0.492 0.541 0.495 65.67% 
1.5 0.4 1.445 0.000 0.459 0.529 0.466 55.54% 
1.6 0.4 1.547 -0.002 0.426 0.516 0.437 45.35% 
1.7 0.4 1.649 -0.004 0.393 0.503 0.407 35.10% 
1.8 0.4 1.752 -0.005 0.360 0.490 0.378 24.79% 
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Iβ  λ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.9 0.4 1.856 -0.005 0.327 0.477 0.348 14.42% 
2 0.4 1.960 -0.004 0.294 0.464 0.319 3.98% 
1.1 0.6 1.047 0.015 0.572 0.564 0.564 95.34% 
1.2 0.6 1.146 0.010 0.530 0.548 0.526 85.36% 
1.3 0.6 1.247 0.006 0.489 0.531 0.489 75.31% 
1.4 0.6 1.348 0.002 0.447 0.514 0.451 65.16% 
1.5 0.6 1.451 -0.001 0.405 0.497 0.412 54.92% 
1.6 0.6 1.554 -0.002 0.363 0.480 0.373 44.58% 
1.7 0.6 1.659 -0.003 0.321 0.463 0.334 34.13% 
1.8 0.6 1.764 -0.002 0.279 0.446 0.295 23.57% 
1.9 0.6 1.871 0.000 0.237 0.429 0.255 12.88% 
2 0.6 1.979 0.003 0.195 0.413 0.214 2.06% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  126 
• Discount factor 
1.0;1.0;3.0;5.0;4.0 ====== ghkωθλ  
Iβ  λ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.2 1.046 0.012 0.556 0.580 0.580 95.44% 
1.2 0.2 1.145 0.008 0.527 0.567 0.551 85.49% 
1.3 0.2 1.245 0.005 0.497 0.554 0.523 75.49% 
1.4 0.2 1.346 0.002 0.467 0.541 0.494 65.43% 
1.5 0.2 1.447 -0.001 0.437 0.529 0.465 55.33% 
1.6 0.2 1.548 -0.003 0.407 0.516 0.436 45.16% 
1.7 0.2 1.651 -0.004 0.378 0.503 0.407 34.94% 
1.8 0.2 1.753 -0.005 0.348 0.490 0.378 24.66% 
1.9 0.2 1.857 -0.005 0.318 0.477 0.348 14.32% 
2 0.2 1.961 -0.005 0.288 0.464 0.318 3.91% 
1.1 0.4 1.044 0.013 0.570 0.580 0.580 95.57% 
1.2 0.4 1.144 0.009 0.539 0.567 0.552 85.61% 
1.3 0.4 1.244 0.005 0.508 0.554 0.523 75.59% 
1.4 0.4 1.345 0.002 0.477 0.541 0.494 65.53% 
1.5 0.4 1.446 -0.001 0.446 0.529 0.465 55.41% 
1.6 0.4 1.548 -0.003 0.415 0.516 0.436 45.24% 
1.7 0.4 1.650 -0.004 0.384 0.503 0.407 35.01% 
1.8 0.4 1.753 -0.005 0.353 0.490 0.378 24.71% 
1.9 0.4 1.856 -0.005 0.322 0.477 0.348 14.36% 
2 0.4 1.961 -0.004 0.291 0.464 0.318 3.94% 
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Iβ  λ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.6 1.043 0.013 0.583 0.580 0.581 95.69% 
1.2 0.6 1.143 0.009 0.551 0.567 0.552 85.72% 
1.3 0.6 1.243 0.005 0.519 0.554 0.523 75.70% 
1.4 0.6 1.344 0.002 0.487 0.541 0.495 65.62% 
1.5 0.6 1.445 0.000 0.455 0.529 0.466 55.50% 
1.6 0.6 1.547 -0.002 0.422 0.516 0.437 45.31% 
1.7 0.6 1.649 -0.004 0.390 0.503 0.407 35.07% 
1.8 0.6 1.752 -0.005 0.358 0.490 0.378 24.76% 
1.9 0.6 1.856 -0.005 0.325 0.477 0.348 14.40% 
2 0.6 1.960 -0.004 0.293 0.464 0.318 3.96% 
• Transferable part  of the investment 
05.0;1.0;3.0;5.0;2.0 ===== hkωθλ  
 
Iβ  g 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.2 1.042 0.008 0.603 0.601 0.601 95.83% 
1.2 0.2 1.141 0.005 0.584 0.593 0.585 85.88% 
1.3 0.2 1.241 0.003 0.564 0.586 0.568 75.91% 
1.4 0.2 1.341 0.001 0.545 0.578 0.552 65.92% 
1.5 0.2 1.441 -0.001 0.525 0.571 0.535 55.91% 
1.6 0.2 1.541 -0.003 0.506 0.563 0.518 45.88% 
1.7 0.2 1.642 -0.005 0.487 0.556 0.501 35.84% 
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Iβ  g 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.8 0.2 1.742 -0.006 0.467 0.548 0.485 25.77% 
1.9 0.2 1.843 -0.008 0.448 0.541 0.468 15.68% 
2 0.2 1.944 -0.009 0.428 0.533 0.451 5.58% 
1.1 0.4 1.040 0.008 0.613 0.601 0.602 95.98% 
1.2 0.4 1.139 0.004 0.594 0.593 0.585 86.08% 
1.3 0.4 1.238 0.001 0.574 0.586 0.569 76.17% 
1.4 0.4 1.338 -0.001 0.555 0.578 0.552 66.24% 
1.5 0.4 1.437 -0.004 0.535 0.571 0.535 56.29% 
1.6 0.4 1.537 -0.006 0.516 0.563 0.519 46.32% 
1.7 0.4 1.637 -0.009 0.497 0.556 0.502 36.34% 
1.8 0.4 1.737 -0.011 0.477 0.548 0.486 26.33% 
1.9 0.4 1.837 -0.013 0.458 0.541 0.469 16.31% 
2 0.4 1.937 -0.014 0.438 0.533 0.452 6.26% 
1.1 0.6 1.039 0.007 0.623 0.601 0.602 96.13% 
1.2 0.6 1.137 0.003 0.604 0.593 0.585 86.29% 
1.3 0.6 1.236 0.000 0.584 0.586 0.569 76.44% 
1.4 0.6 1.334 -0.003 0.565 0.578 0.553 66.56% 
1.5 0.6 1.433 -0.007 0.546 0.571 0.536 56.67% 
1.6 0.6 1.532 -0.010 0.526 0.563 0.520 46.77% 
1.7 0.6 1.632 -0.013 0.507 0.556 0.503 36.84% 
1.8 0.6 1.731 -0.015 0.487 0.548 0.486 26.90% 
1.9 0.6 1.831 -0.018 0.468 0.541 0.470 16.93% 
2 0.6 1.930 -0.020 0.449 0.533 0.453 6.95% 
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• Non transferable part of the investment 
05.0;1.0;3.0;5.0;2.0 ===== gkωθλ  
Iβ  g 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.2 1.026 0.011 0.603 0.601 0.604 97.36% 
1.2 0.2 1.126 0.008 0.583 0.593 0.587 87.36% 
1.3 0.2 1.227 0.005 0.563 0.586 0.571 77.33% 
1.4 0.2 1.327 0.003 0.543 0.578 0.554 67.29% 
1.5 0.2 1.428 0.001 0.523 0.571 0.537 57.23% 
1.6 0.2 1.528 -0.001 0.502 0.563 0.520 47.15% 
1.7 0.2 1.629 -0.003 0.482 0.556 0.503 37.05% 
1.8 0.2 1.731 -0.005 0.462 0.548 0.487 26.93% 
1.9 0.2 1.832 -0.006 0.442 0.541 0.470 16.79% 
2 0.2 1.934 -0.007 0.421 0.533 0.453 6.63% 
1.1 0.4 1.004 0.014 0.614 0.601 0.608 99.62% 
1.2 0.4 1.104 0.011 0.593 0.593 0.591 89.59% 
1.3 0.4 1.204 0.007 0.572 0.586 0.574 79.56% 
1.4 0.4 1.305 0.004 0.550 0.578 0.557 69.50% 
1.5 0.4 1.406 0.001 0.529 0.571 0.541 59.42% 
1.6 0.4 1.507 -0.002 0.508 0.563 0.524 49.32% 
1.7 0.4 1.608 -0.004 0.487 0.556 0.507 39.20% 
1.8 0.4 1.709 -0.007 0.466 0.548 0.490 29.06% 
1.9 0.4 1.811 -0.009 0.444 0.541 0.473 18.91% 
        
  130 
Iβ  g 
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
2 0.4 1.913 -0.011 0.423 0.533 0.456 8.73% 
1.2 0.6 1.081 0.014 0.603 0.593 0.595 91.91% 
1.3 0.6 1.182 0.009 0.581 0.586 0.578 81.84% 
1.4 0.6 1.282 0.005 0.559 0.578 0.561 71.76% 
1.5 0.6 1.383 0.001 0.536 0.571 0.544 61.66% 
1.6 0.6 1.485 -0.002 0.514 0.563 0.528 51.54% 
1.7 0.6 1.586 -0.006 0.492 0.556 0.511 41.39% 
1.8 0.6 1.688 -0.009 0.470 0.548 0.494 31.23% 
1.9 0.6 1.790 -0.012 0.447 0.541 0.477 21.05% 
2 0.6 1.892 -0.015 0.425 0.533 0.460 10.84% 
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• Reward 
05.0;1.0;3.0;5.0;2.0 ====== ghkωδλ  
Iβ  θ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.2 1.043 0.009 0.595 0.601 0.601 95.68% 
1.2 0.2 1.143 0.006 0.576 0.593 0.584 85.69% 
1.3 0.2 1.243 0.004 0.557 0.586 0.568 75.68% 
1.4 0.2 1.343 0.002 0.537 0.578 0.551 65.66% 
1.5 0.2 1.444 0.001 0.518 0.571 0.534 55.62% 
1.6 0.2 1.544 -0.001 0.498 0.563 0.518 45.55% 
1.7 0.2 1.645 -0.002 0.479 0.556 0.501 35.47% 
1.8 0.2 1.746 -0.003 0.459 0.548 0.484 25.37% 
1.9 0.2 1.848 -0.004 0.440 0.541 0.467 15.25% 
2 0.2 1.949 -0.005 0.421 0.533 0.450 5.11% 
1.1 0.4 1.043 0.008 0.595 0.601 0.601 95.70% 
1.2 0.4 1.143 0.006 0.576 0.593 0.585 85.71% 
1.3 0.4 1.243 0.004 0.557 0.586 0.568 75.70% 
1.4 0.4 1.343 0.002 0.537 0.578 0.551 65.67% 
1.5 0.4 1.444 0.001 0.518 0.571 0.534 55.62% 
1.6 0.4 1.544 -0.001 0.498 0.563 0.518 45.55% 
1.7 0.4 1.645 -0.002 0.479 0.556 0.501 35.46% 
1.8 0.4 1.746 -0.003 0.459 0.548 0.484 25.35% 
1.9 0.4 1.848 -0.004 0.440 0.541 0.467 15.23% 
2 0.4 1.949 -0.005 0.421 0.533 0.450 5.08% 
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Iβ  θ  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.8 1.042 0.008 0.596 0.601 0.601 95.76% 
1.2 0.8 1.142 0.006 0.576 0.593 0.585 85.75% 
1.3 0.8 1.243 0.004 0.557 0.586 0.568 75.73% 
1.4 0.8 1.343 0.002 0.537 0.578 0.551 65.69% 
1.5 0.8 1.444 0.001 0.518 0.571 0.534 55.63% 
1.6 0.8 1.545 -0.001 0.498 0.563 0.518 45.55% 
1.7 0.8 1.646 -0.002 0.479 0.556 0.501 35.44% 
1.8 0.8 1.747 -0.003 0.459 0.548 0.484 25.32% 
1.9 0.8 1.848 -0.003 0.440 0.541 0.467 15.18% 
• Social utility 
05.0;1.0;5.0;5.0;2.0 ====== ghkθδλ  
Iβ  ω  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
1.1 0.2 1.043 0.008 0.595 0.593 0.593 95.73% 
1.2 0.2 1.143 0.006 0.576 0.585 0.576 85.73% 
1.3 0.2 1.243 0.004 0.557 0.578 0.560 75.71% 
1.4 0.2 1.343 0.002 0.537 0.570 0.543 65.68% 
1.5 0.2 1.444 0.001 0.518 0.563 0.526 55.62% 
1.6 0.2 1.545 -0.001 0.498 0.555 0.509 45.55% 
1.7 0.2 1.645 -0.002 0.479 0.548 0.492 35.45% 
1.8 0.2 1.747 -0.003 0.459 0.540 0.476 25.34% 
1.9 0.2 1.848 -0.004 0.440 0.533 0.459 15.21% 
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Iβ  ω  
Threshold 
asymmetric info 
Delta 
threshold PUBa ,1  
I
PUBa ,2  
C
PUBa ,2  
Probability of I 
to be selected 
2 0.2 1.949 -0.004 0.421 0.525 0.442 5.05% 
1.1 0.4 1.043 0.008 0.595 0.609 0.610 95.71% 
1.2 0.4 1.143 0.006 0.576 0.602 0.593 85.71% 
1.3 0.4 1.243 0.004 0.557 0.594 0.576 75.70% 
1.4 0.4 1.343 0.002 0.537 0.587 0.559 65.67% 
1.5 0.4 1.444 0.001 0.518 0.579 0.543 55.62% 
1.6 0.4 1.544 -0.001 0.498 0.572 0.526 45.55% 
1.7 0.4 1.645 -0.002 0.479 0.564 0.509 35.46% 
1.8 0.4 1.746 -0.003 0.459 0.557 0.492 25.35% 
1.9 0.4 1.848 -0.004 0.440 0.549 0.475 15.22% 
2 0.4 1.949 -0.004 0.421 0.542 0.458 5.07% 
1.1 0.8 1.043 0.009 0.595 0.643 0.643 95.66% 
1.2 0.8 1.143 0.007 0.576 0.635 0.626 85.68% 
1.3 0.8 1.243 0.004 0.557 0.628 0.609 75.68% 
1.4 0.8 1.343 0.003 0.537 0.620 0.593 65.65% 
1.5 0.8 1.444 0.001 0.518 0.613 0.576 55.61% 
1.6 0.8 1.544 -0.001 0.498 0.605 0.559 45.56% 
1.7 0.8 1.645 -0.002 0.479 0.598 0.542 35.48% 
1.8 0.8 1.746 -0.003 0.459 0.590 0.526 25.38% 
1.9 0.8 1.847 -0.004 0.440 0.583 0.509 15.26% 
2 0.8 1.949 -0.005 0.421 0.575 0.492 5.12% 
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A.2. Appendix to Chapter 4 
A.2.1. Market structures 
c. Market structure A – Multiproduct monopoly 
Complete information 
The regulator maximizes the welfare function, with respect to prices of 
service 2 and 3, given 011 <− cp  
[ ]
=
+−+−= 3 1 )1()(i
I
iiiA TUqpqSW λ  
Simplifies to: 
[ ] Ii iiiiiA UqpqCqSW λλλ −++−= =3 1 )()1()(  
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The result of the above system is  
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Asymmetric information 
Under asymmetric information the regulator maximizes the expected 
profit 
[ ]  = −++−θθ θθλλλ )()()()1()(3 1 dfUpqqCqSi iiiiii  
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation 
constraint. 
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The first constraint grants that the firm tells the truth as the utility it 
obtains is larger then the utility obtained reporting a different θ : 
θ∂
∂
−=
2
22 )(
q
cpU  
while the participation constraint ensures that also when demand in 
low, the firm is willing to participate to the market: 
0)( =θU  
To solve this problem we use 2p  as control variable, U as state variable 
and define the costate variable µ . The Hamiltonian is: 
UWH µ+=  
The value of the costate variable is defined by )(θλµ f
U
H
=
∂
∂
−=  and the 
transversality condition at 0)( =θµ : ( )1)( −= θλµ F . 
Therefore, the regulator maximizes: 
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The solution for 2p  and 3p  are as those determined under complete 
information but also accounting for a downward information 
distortion. For market 2, the distortion is:  
3
32
3
2
2
3
3
3
2
22 )(
)(1
)1(
1
p
qq
f
F
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
qp ∂
∂
∂
∂−








∂
∂
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
θθ
θ
λ
λ
<0 
And for market 3, the distortion is: 
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In both cases there is a downward distortion with respect to complete 
information. As )(
)(1
θ
θ
f
F−
increases in θ , at θ  there is no distortion. 
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d. Market structure B – Multiproduct firm + single product 
competitor for service 3 
Complete information 
The regulator sets δ+= 11 cp and the price for services 2 and 3 are 
determined by the competition over prices between I and E. 
The incumbent maximizes its utility function: 
TqcpqcpU I +−+−= 222111 )()(  with respect to 2p : 
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For service 3, the entrant maximizes 333 )( qcpU E −= chooses: 
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e. Market structure C 
Complete information 
Under market structure C, the regulator sets only the price for service 1 
and then the firms compete on prices for service 2 and 3. 
For service 3, the entrant chooses: 
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The incumbent chooses 
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Plug the price for service 3 in the previous one: 
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In the first stage the regulator has to define the optimal share of profit 
and the transfer T, maximizing the total welfare: 
TUUqpqSqpqSqpqS EI )1()()()( 333222111 λ+−++−+−+− , subject to 
the participation constraint of the incumbent satisfied: 0≥IU . 
The objective function of the regulator can be rewritten as: 
[ ] TqcqcqcqSqSqS λ−++−++ 332211321 )()()(  
 
Substitute for T, such that the participation constraint is satisfied: 
[ ] [ ]222333111332211321 )()()()()()( qcpqcpkqcpUqcqcqcqSqSqS I −−−−−−−++−++ λ
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 Under complete information: 
0=IU  
As we are solving backward, we plug the solutions 
∗
1q ,
∗
2q ,
∗
3q ,
∗
2p ,
∗
3p previously obtained in the objective function and 
derivate it w.r.t. k. 
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Asymmetric information 
Define 2qˆ , 2pˆ  the quantity and price in market 2 given the value of 
demand reportedθˆ .  
But the incumbent maximizes its profit according to the true value of 
θ . 
[ ] 222333111 )()()( qcpTqcpkqcpU I −++−+−=  
 
Incumbent’s best response satisfies the F.O.C. as under complete 
information: 
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Therefore, the equilibrium prices are given by the solution of the 
system of the two above conditions. 
In the first period, the regulator maximizes the total expected welfare 
with respect to k and T: 
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The maximization is subject to the incentive constraint that ensures 
truthtelling: 
)|ˆ()|( θθθθ II UU ≥  
The incumbent maximizes its utility given the second period 
equilibrium outcome (denoted by *): 
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Evaluate when the reported value is the true one: 
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Using the demand specification, the incentive constraint is positive. 
0>IU  
Moreover, the participation constraint is binding for the lowest value of 
demand: 0)( =θU  
The Hamiltonian is UWH µ+=  
The costate variable µ  is: 
)(θλµ f
U
H
=
∂
∂
−=  
Using the transversality condition at 0)( =θµ we obtain 
( )1)( −= θλµ F  
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The regulator maximizes: 
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 the distortion due to asymmetric information is 
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We have a downward distortion with respect to the complete 
information case. 
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A.2.2. Equilibrium outcomes  
Table 1: Complete information  
 
The tables refer to some computations of the equilibrium outcomes.  
101 =a , 52 =a  , 33 =a , 9.1321 === bbb , 38.0=g , 52.1=h , 5.132 == cc , 3.0=λ  
a) 5.11 =c  
  Multiproduct Monopolist Competition and Pso PSO Fund 
theta x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T k W 
1 0.4 2.629 2.519 2.666 32.704 3.185 2.874 4.074 36.175 3.555 3.022 1.674 51.10% 38.604 
1.005 0.4 2.635 2.524 2.606 32.854 3.193 2.877 4.025 36.316 3.560 3.024 1.639 50.60% 38.727 
1.01 0.4 2.642 2.530 2.546 33.006 3.201 2.880 3.975 36.457 3.565 3.025 1.605 50.10% 38.851 
1.015 0.4 2.649 2.535 2.485 33.158 3.209 2.883 3.926 36.599 3.569 3.027 1.570 49.60% 38.975 
1.02 0.4 2.656 2.541 2.425 33.310 3.217 2.886 3.876 36.741 3.574 3.029 1.535 49.11% 39.099 
1.025 0.4 2.663 2.546 2.363 33.463 3.224 2.889 3.826 36.884 3.579 3.031 1.500 48.61% 39.224 
1.03 0.4 2.670 2.552 2.302 33.617 3.232 2.892 3.775 37.027 3.583 3.033 1.465 48.12% 39.350 
1.035 0.4 2.676 2.557 2.240 33.771 3.240 2.895 3.725 37.171 3.588 3.035 1.429 47.62% 39.476 
1.04 0.4 2.683 2.563 2.178 33.926 3.248 2.899 3.674 37.315 3.593 3.037 1.394 47.13% 39.602 
1.045 0.4 2.690 2.568 2.116 34.082 3.256 2.902 3.623 37.460 3.597 3.038 1.358 46.64% 39.728 
1.05 0.4 2.697 2.574 2.053 34.238 3.264 2.905 3.571 37.605 3.602 3.040 1.322 46.15% 39.856 
1 0.35 2.554 2.444 4.048 31.407 3.164 2.857 5.132 35.409 3.471 2.980 3.176 43.55% 37.414 
1.005 0.35 2.560 2.449 3.990 31.555 3.172 2.861 5.084 35.549 3.475 2.982 3.143 43.05% 37.536 
1.01 0.35 2.567 2.455 3.932 31.704 3.179 2.864 5.035 35.689 3.480 2.984 3.109 42.54% 37.658 
1.015 0.35 2.574 2.460 3.873 31.854 3.187 2.867 4.986 35.830 3.485 2.986 3.076 42.04% 37.780 
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  Multiproduct Monopolist Competition and Pso PSO Fund 
theta x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T k W 
1.02 0.35 2.581 2.466 3.814 32.004 3.195 2.870 4.937 35.971 3.489 2.988 3.042 41.54% 37.903 
1.025 0.35 2.588 2.471 3.755 32.155 3.203 2.873 4.888 36.113 3.494 2.990 3.009 41.04% 38.027 
1.03 0.35 2.595 2.477 3.695 32.306 3.211 2.876 4.838 36.255 3.499 2.991 2.975 40.54% 38.151 
1.035 0.35 2.601 2.482 3.635 32.458 3.219 2.879 4.788 36.397 3.503 2.993 2.941 40.04% 38.275 
1.04 0.35 2.608 2.488 3.575 32.611 3.226 2.883 4.738 36.541 3.508 2.995 2.907 39.55% 38.400 
1.045 0.35 2.615 2.493 3.515 32.764 3.234 2.886 4.688 36.684 3.513 2.997 2.873 39.05% 38.525 
1.05 0.35 2.622 2.499 3.454 32.918 3.242 2.889 4.637 36.828 3.517 2.999 2.838 38.56% 38.650 
1 0.3 2.479 2.369 5.443 30.096 3.142 2.841 6.210 34.629 3.386 2.939 4.683 35.56% 36.213 
1.005 0.3 2.485 2.374 5.387 30.243 3.150 2.845 6.162 34.767 3.391 2.941 4.651 35.06% 36.333 
1.01 0.3 2.492 2.380 5.330 30.390 3.158 2.848 6.114 34.907 3.395 2.943 4.619 34.55% 36.454 
1.015 0.3 2.499 2.385 5.274 30.537 3.166 2.851 6.066 35.046 3.400 2.944 4.587 34.04% 36.575 
1.02 0.3 2.506 2.391 5.216 30.685 3.174 2.854 6.017 35.186 3.405 2.946 4.555 33.54% 36.697 
1.025 0.3 2.513 2.396 5.159 30.834 3.182 2.857 5.968 35.327 3.409 2.948 4.523 33.03% 36.818 
1.03 0.3 2.520 2.402 5.101 30.983 3.189 2.860 5.920 35.468 3.414 2.950 4.490 32.53% 36.941 
1.035 0.3 2.526 2.407 5.043 31.133 3.197 2.863 5.870 35.610 3.419 2.952 4.458 32.03% 37.064 
1.04 0.3 2.533 2.413 4.985 31.283 3.205 2.866 5.821 35.752 3.423 2.954 4.425 31.53% 37.187 
1.045 0.3 2.540 2.418 4.927 31.434 3.213 2.870 5.771 35.895 3.428 2.956 4.392 31.03% 37.310 
1.05 0.3 2.547 2.424 4.868 31.585 3.221 2.873 5.722 36.038 3.433 2.958 4.359 30.53% 37.434 
 
 
 
 
  143 
b) 9.11 =c  
  Multiproduct Monopolist Competition and Pso PSO Fund 
theta x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T k W 
1 0.4 2.464 2.354 5.621 26.862 3.183 2.889 6.271 31.871 3.421 2.984 4.734 33.66% 33.405 
1.005 0.4 2.470 2.359 5.564 27.010 3.191 2.892 6.223 32.011 3.426 2.986 4.702 33.17% 33.528 
1.01 0.4 2.477 2.365 5.506 27.158 3.199 2.895 6.173 32.153 3.430 2.988 4.670 32.68% 33.650 
1.015 0.4 2.484 2.370 5.449 27.306 3.207 2.898 6.124 32.294 3.435 2.990 4.637 32.19% 33.773 
1.02 0.4 2.491 2.376 5.391 27.455 3.215 2.901 6.075 32.436 3.440 2.991 4.605 31.70% 33.897 
1.025 0.4 2.498 2.381 5.332 27.605 3.222 2.904 6.025 32.579 3.444 2.993 4.572 31.22% 34.021 
1.03 0.4 2.505 2.387 5.274 27.755 3.230 2.908 5.975 32.722 3.449 2.995 4.539 30.73% 34.145 
1.035 0.4 2.511 2.392 5.215 27.906 3.238 2.911 5.924 32.866 3.454 2.997 4.506 30.25% 34.270 
1.04 0.4 2.518 2.398 5.156 28.057 3.246 2.914 5.874 33.010 3.458 2.999 4.473 29.76% 34.395 
1.045 0.4 2.525 2.403 5.097 28.209 3.254 2.917 5.823 33.154 3.463 3.001 4.440 29.28% 34.521 
1.05 0.4 2.532 2.409 5.037 28.362 3.262 2.920 5.772 33.299 3.468 3.003 4.407 28.80% 34.647 
1 0.35 2.369 2.259 7.382 25.182 3.156 2.868 7.628 30.853 3.314 2.932 6.631 23.13% 31.865 
1.005 0.35 2.375 2.264 7.327 25.326 3.164 2.872 7.580 30.993 3.318 2.933 6.600 22.63% 31.985 
1.01 0.35 2.382 2.270 7.272 25.471 3.172 2.875 7.532 31.132 3.323 2.935 6.570 22.14% 32.106 
1.015 0.35 2.389 2.275 7.217 25.617 3.180 2.878 7.484 31.273 3.328 2.937 6.539 21.65% 32.227 
1.02 0.35 2.396 2.281 7.162 25.763 3.187 2.881 7.435 31.413 3.332 2.939 6.508 21.16% 32.349 
1.025 0.35 2.403 2.286 7.106 25.910 3.195 2.884 7.386 31.555 3.337 2.941 6.478 20.67% 32.471 
1.03 0.35 2.410 2.292 7.050 26.057 3.203 2.887 7.337 31.697 3.342 2.943 6.447 20.18% 32.593 
1.035 0.35 2.416 2.297 6.993 26.205 3.211 2.890 7.288 31.839 3.346 2.945 6.415 19.69% 32.716 
1.04 0.35 2.423 2.303 6.937 26.354 3.219 2.894 7.238 31.982 3.351 2.946 6.384 19.20% 32.839 
1.045 0.35 2.430 2.308 6.880 26.503 3.227 2.897 7.188 32.125 3.356 2.948 6.353 18.72% 32.963 
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  Multiproduct Monopolist Competition and Pso PSO Fund 
theta x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T k W 
1.05 0.35 2.437 2.314 6.822 26.652 3.234 2.900 7.138 32.268 3.360 2.950 6.321 18.23% 33.087 
1 0.3 2.274 2.164 9.164 23.481 3.129 2.848 9.015 29.813 3.207 2.879 8.535 11.80% 30.307 
1.005 0.3 2.280 2.169 9.112 23.622 3.137 2.851 8.968 29.951 3.211 2.881 8.507 11.30% 30.426 
1.01 0.3 2.287 2.175 9.059 23.764 3.145 2.854 8.921 30.089 3.216 2.883 8.478 10.80% 30.544 
1.015 0.3 2.294 2.180 9.006 23.907 3.153 2.857 8.873 30.228 3.220 2.885 8.449 10.31% 30.664 
1.02 0.3 2.301 2.186 8.953 24.051 3.160 2.861 8.826 30.368 3.225 2.887 8.420 9.81% 30.783 
1.025 0.3 2.308 2.191 8.900 24.194 3.168 2.864 8.778 30.508 3.230 2.888 8.391 9.32% 30.904 
1.03 0.3 2.315 2.197 8.846 24.339 3.176 2.867 8.729 30.648 3.234 2.890 8.362 8.83% 31.024 
1.035 0.3 2.321 2.202 8.792 24.484 3.184 2.870 8.681 30.789 3.239 2.892 8.333 8.33% 31.145 
1.04 0.3 2.328 2.208 8.738 24.630 3.192 2.873 8.632 30.931 3.244 2.894 8.303 7.84% 31.267 
1.045 0.3 2.335 2.213 8.683 24.776 3.200 2.876 8.584 31.073 3.248 2.896 8.274 7.36% 31.388 
1.05 0.3 2.342 2.219 8.628 24.923 3.207 2.879 8.534 31.215 3.253 2.898 8.244 6.87% 31.511 
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Table 2 - Equilibrium outcomes – Asymmetric information  
The tables refer to some computation of the equilibrium outcomes.  
301 =a , 82 =a , 73 =a , 856.1321 === bbb , 1.0=g , 6.1=h , 2.22 =c , 7.13 =c , 3.0=λ  
 
a) 2.21 =c  
  Multiproduct Monopolist Competition and PSO PSO Fund 
theta  x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 k T W 
1 0.3 3.721 3.694 22.413 224.626 5.427 5.093 26.115 247.926 6.315 5.476 44.47% 13.351 259.305 
1.005 0.3 3.752 3.721 22.001 225.365 5.437 5.093 26.115 248.256 6.345 5.488 45.12% 12.989 259.931 
1.01 0.3 3.784 3.748 21.589 226.107 5.448 5.093 26.115 248.587 6.374 5.501 45.77% 12.627 260.558 
1.015 0.3 3.815 3.776 21.174 226.851 5.459 5.093 26.115 248.918 6.403 5.514 46.41% 12.265 261.186 
1.02 0.3 3.847 3.803 20.759 227.597 5.470 5.093 26.115 249.251 6.433 5.526 47.05% 11.903 261.815 
1.025 0.3 3.878 3.830 20.342 228.346 5.480 5.093 26.115 249.584 6.462 5.539 47.69% 11.541 262.445 
1.03 0.3 3.909 3.854 19.924 229.097 5.491 5.093 26.115 249.918 6.491 5.551 48.32% 11.179 263.077 
1.035 0.3 3.941 3.884 19.505 229.850 5.502 5.093 26.115 250.253 6.520 5.564 48.94% 10.817 263.710 
1.04 0.3 3.972 3.911 19.084 230.605 5.513 5.093 26.115 250.588 6.550 5.577 49.57% 10.455 264.344 
1.045 0.3 4.004 3.938 18.663 231.363 5.524 5.093 26.115 250.925 6.579 5.589 50.19% 10.093 264.980 
1.05 0.3 4.035 3.965 18.240 232.123 5.534 5.093 26.115 251.262 6.608 5.602 50.80% 9.731 265.616 
1 0.35 3.764 3.737 18.318 226.848 5.435 5.099 22.472 249.563 6.359 5.497 45.93% 9.170 261.396 
1.005 0.35 3.795 3.764 17.905 227.589 5.446 5.099 22.472 249.893 6.388 5.510 46.58% 8.807 262.022 
1.01 0.35 3.827 3.791 17.490 228.333 5.457 5.099 22.472 250.224 6.417 5.523 47.22% 8.445 262.649 
1.015 0.35 3.858 3.819 17.075 229.078 5.468 5.099 22.472 250.557 6.447 5.535 47.85% 8.083 263.278 
1.02 0.35 3.889 3.846 16.658 229.826 5.478 5.099 22.472 250.889 6.476 5.548 48.48% 7.721 263.908 
1.025 0.35 3.921 3.873 16.239 230.576 5.489 5.099 22.472 251.223 6.505 5.560 49.11% 7.359 264.539 
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  Multiproduct Monopolist Competition and PSO PSO Fund 
theta  x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 k T W 
1.03 0.35 3.952 3.900 15.820 231.328 5.500 5.099 22.472 251.558 6.534 5.573 49.73% 6.996 265.171 
1.035 0.35 3.984 3.927 15.399 232.083 5.511 5.099 22.472 251.893 6.564 5.586 50.35% 6.634 265.805 
1.04 0.35 4.015 3.954 14.977 232.840 5.522 5.099 22.472 252.229 6.593 5.598 50.97% 6.272 266.440 
1.045 0.35 4.047 3.981 14.554 233.600 5.532 5.099 22.472 252.566 6.622 5.611 51.58% 5.910 267.076 
1.05 0.35 4.078 4.008 14.129 234.361 5.543 5.099 22.472 252.904 6.652 5.624 52.18% 5.548 267.714 
1 0.4 3.807 3.780 14.266 229.035 5.444 5.106 18.874 251.164 6.402 5.519 47.38% 5.030 263.451 
1.005 0.4 3.838 3.807 13.851 229.778 5.455 5.106 18.874 251.495 6.431 5.532 48.02% 4.667 264.078 
1.01 0.4 3.870 3.834 13.435 230.523 5.466 5.106 18.874 251.827 6.461 5.544 48.65% 4.305 264.706 
1.015 0.4 3.901 3.862 13.018 231.270 5.477 5.106 18.874 252.159 6.490 5.557 49.27% 3.942 265.336 
1.02 0.4 3.932 3.889 12.600 232.019 5.487 5.106 18.874 252.493 6.519 5.570 49.90% 3.580 265.966 
1.025 0.4 3.964 3.916 12.180 232.771 5.498 5.106 18.874 252.827 6.549 5.582 50.52% 3.218 266.598 
1.03 0.4 3.995 3.943 11.759 233.525 5.509 5.106 18.874 253.162 6.578 5.595 51.13% 2.855 267.231 
1.035 0.4 4.027 3.970 11.337 234.281 5.520 5.106 18.874 253.498 6.607 5.607 51.74% 2.493 267.866 
1.04 0.4 4.058 3.997 10.913 235.040 5.530 5.106 18.874 253.835 6.636 5.620 52.35% 2.130 268.502 
1.045 0.4 4.090 4.024 10.488 235.801 5.541 5.106 18.874 254.172 6.666 5.633 52.95% 1.768 269.139 
1.05 0.4 4.121 4.051 10.062 236.564 5.552 5.106 18.874 254.510 6.695 5.645 53.55% 1.406 269.777 
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b) 3.21 =c  
 
    Multiproduct Monopolist Competition and PSO PSO Fund 
theta  x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 k T W 
1 0.3 3.701 3.674 24.620 220.853 5.426 5.093 28.101 244.475 6.299 5.470 43.78% 15.561 255.653 
1.005 0.3 3.732 3.701 24.209 221.591 5.436 5.093 28.101 244.805 6.329 5.482 44.44% 15.198 256.279 
1.01 0.3 3.764 3.728 23.796 222.332 5.447 5.093 28.101 245.135 6.358 5.495 45.09% 14.836 256.905 
1.015 0.3 3.795 3.756 23.382 223.076 5.458 5.093 28.101 245.467 6.387 5.507 45.74% 14.474 257.533 
1.02 0.3 3.827 3.783 22.967 223.822 5.469 5.093 28.101 245.799 6.417 5.520 46.38% 14.111 258.162 
1.025 0.3 3.858 3.810 22.551 224.569 5.480 5.093 28.101 246.132 6.446 5.533 47.02% 13.749 258.793 
1.03 0.3 3.889 3.837 22.133 225.320 5.490 5.093 28.101 246.466 6.475 5.545 47.65% 13.387 259.424 
1.035 0.3 3.921 3.864 21.714 226.072 5.501 5.093 28.101 246.801 6.504 5.558 48.28% 13.024 260.057 
1.04 0.3 3.952 3.891 21.294 226.827 5.512 5.093 28.101 247.137 6.534 5.571 48.91% 12.662 260.691 
1.045 0.3 3.984 3.918 20.872 227.584 5.523 5.093 28.101 247.473 6.563 5.583 49.53% 12.300 261.327 
1.05 0.3 4.015 3.945 20.450 228.344 5.533 5.093 28.101 247.811 6.592 5.596 50.15% 11.937 261.963 
1 0.35 3.746 3.719 20.332 223.192 5.435 5.100 24.285 246.202 6.345 5.492 45.32% 11.183 257.855 
1.005 0.35 3.777 3.746 19.919 223.933 5.446 5.100 24.285 246.533 6.374 5.505 45.97% 10.820 258.481 
1.01 0.35 3.808 3.773 19.504 224.675 5.456 5.100 24.285 246.864 6.403 5.518 46.61% 10.458 259.108 
1.015 0.35 3.840 3.800 19.089 225.420 5.467 5.100 24.285 247.196 6.433 5.530 47.25% 10.095 259.737 
1.02 0.35 3.871 3.828 18.672 226.168 5.478 5.100 24.285 247.529 6.462 5.543 47.88% 9.733 260.367 
1.025 0.35 3.903 3.855 18.254 226.917 5.489 5.100 24.285 247.863 6.491 5.555 48.51% 9.370 260.998 
1.03 0.35 3.934 3.882 17.835 227.669 5.500 5.100 24.285 248.197 6.520 5.568 49.14% 9.008 261.630 
1.035 0.35 3.966 3.909 17.415 228.423 5.510 5.100 24.285 248.533 6.550 5.581 49.76% 8.645 262.264 
1.04 0.35 3.997 3.936 16.993 229.180 5.521 5.100 24.285 248.869 6.579 5.593 50.38% 8.282 262.899 
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theta  x p2 p3 T W p2 p3 T W p2 p3 k T W 
1.045 0.35 4.029 3.963 16.570 229.939 5.532 5.100 24.285 249.206 6.608 5.606 50.99% 7.920 263.535 
1.05 0.35 4.060 3.990 16.146 230.700 5.543 5.100 24.285 249.544 6.638 5.619 51.60% 7.557 264.172 
1 0.4 3.790 3.764 16.090 225.493 5.444 5.107 20.519 247.891 6.390 5.515 46.84% 6.850 -8.437 
1.005 0.4 3.822 3.791 15.676 226.235 5.455 5.107 20.519 248.222 6.419 5.528 47.48% 6.487 260.645 
1.01 0.4 3.853 3.818 15.260 226.980 5.466 5.107 20.519 248.554 6.449 5.540 48.11% 6.125 261.273 
1.015 0.4 3.885 3.845 14.843 227.726 5.476 5.107 20.519 248.887 6.478 5.553 48.74% 5.762 261.903 
1.02 0.4 3.916 3.873 14.425 228.475 5.487 5.107 20.519 249.220 6.507 5.565 49.37% 5.399 262.533 
1.025 0.4 3.948 3.900 14.005 229.227 5.498 5.107 20.519 249.554 6.537 5.578 49.99% 5.036 263.165 
1.03 0.4 3.979 3.927 13.584 229.980 5.509 5.107 20.519 249.890 6.566 5.591 50.60% 4.674 263.798 
1.035 0.4 4.011 3.954 13.162 230.736 5.520 5.107 20.519 250.225 6.595 5.603 51.22% 4.311 264.433 
1.04 0.4 4.042 3.981 12.739 231.494 5.530 5.107 20.519 250.562 6.624 5.616 51.83% 3.948 265.068 
1.045 0.4 4.074 4.008 12.314 232.254 5.541 5.107 20.519 250.900 6.654 5.629 52.43% 3.585 265.705 
1.05 0.4 4.105 4.035 11.888 233.017 5.552 5.107 20.519 251.238 6.683 5.641 53.03% 3.222 266.343 
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A.2.3. The share of participation to PSO fund 
We consider only competitive segments 2 and 3. 
The utility functions of the incumbent and of the entrant are: 
TqcpkqcpU I +−+−= 3333222 )()(     (38.) 
3333 ))(1( qcpkU E −−=       (39.) 
 
3.1. k defined ex ante 
Solving backward 
In the second stage firms compete in prices: 
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The equilibrium prices when k is decided ex ante are given by the 
solution of the system of the above conditions (42) and (43): 
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In the first stage, the regulator sets k on the basis of the announced rule. 
 
3.2. k defined ex post 
In the second stage, the regulator observes the equilibrium outcome 
and determines k according to the rule defined in the first stage. 
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In stage 1, firms compete in prices, given the rule defined for k and the 
transfers T. 
Firm I  maximizes (40.): 
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Firm E maximizes (41.) 
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The equilibrium prices are: 
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a)  k as the ratio of quantities: 
32 qq
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In this case: 
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b) k as the ratio of revenues: 
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But we cannot determine the sign of the derivative with respect to 3p : 
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